STATE OF MISSOURI v. RODNEY COLLINS (2026)

Introduction

Rodney Collins appeals the circuit court's judgment convicting him of first-degree murder and armed criminal action, following a three-day jury trial, and sentencing him to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the first-degree murder conviction and three years for the armed criminal action conviction.¹ Collins appeals claiming the circuit court plainly erred in admitting into evidence a written statement and video recording of Collins’ “formal” interview with police, because these statements were derived from an impermissible two-step interrogation technique.

Collins fails to establish facially substantial grounds that the alleged error was evident, obvious, and clear and that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted. Accordingly, this Court declines Collins’ request for plain error review and affirms the judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

On August 11, 2023, surveillance video recorded Collins and Victim working together. After Victim failed to meet with his family later that day, Victim's mother tried repeatedly and unsuccessfully to call him.

On August 13, Victim's mother went to Victim's home and discovered his body on the floor in his bedroom. She also observed that the doors of his home were unlocked and that the interior of his home was in general disarray. Shortly thereafter, Victim's brother arrived to Victim's home and observed that several items of tangible personal property were missing from the home like a television, tablet computers, and clothing. That same day, a detective with the St. Louis County Police Department arrived to commence his investigation. Victim had blood all around him and a towel over his face covering a gunshot wound to his head. There were various indications that Victim did not shoot himself, including the lack of a firearm and shell casings at the scene and the appearance that someone had tried to clean up the crime scene using cleaning supplies and a towel that were left in Victim's bathroom.

On August 14, Collins contacted Victim's sister to ask if she knew where Victim was because they were supposed to work together that day. Victim's sister informed Collins that Victim had died. Collins then went to Victim's sister's home to console her. During that conversation with Victim's sister, Collins said he had possession of Victim's vehicle and keys thereto because Victim had asked him to “go do something” with the vehicle. Collins also had Victim's house keys, separated from Victim's usual key chain. Victim's sister found Collins possessing Victim's vehicle and keys to be strange because Victim did not like anyone else driving his vehicle and Victim always kept all of his keys together on one key chain. After this conversation, Victim's sister called the police and informed them of the vehicle's location.

Collins’ Statements on August 14, 2023

Shortly after speaking with Victim's sister on August 14, police arrived at Collins’ residence to seize Victim's vehicle. While seizing Victim's vehicle, a police lieutenant interviewed Collins after informing Collins of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Collins voluntarily spoke with the lieutenant. Collins was not under arrest or detained, and he was free to leave. During this first interview, Collins “was all over the place,” inconsistently addressing why Collins had possession of Victim's vehicle, where Collins was planning to take Victim's vehicle, and what work needed to be done on Victim's vehicle. At this time, the lieutenant did not single out Collins specifically as a suspect but “regarded everyone as a suspect.”

After searching Victim's vehicle, the police found a receipt for a purchase at a Family Dollar store. The police then obtained surveillance camera footage from the Family Dollar store and noted an individual who matched Collins’ description purchasing what appeared to be cleaning supplies. The circuit court issued a valid search warrant for Collins’ residence.

Collins’ Statements on August 29, 2023

Late in the evening on August 29, 2023, the St. Louis County Police Department's Special Response Unit (“SRU”) executed the search warrant on Collins’ residence. Following standard procedure, the SRU placed Collins in handcuffs and removed him from his residence. The SRU escorted Collins to a nearby location in front of several patrol cars, where the SRU detained Collins for the duration of this search. In addition to the SRU officers conducting the search in Collins’ residence, three other police officers were present around Collins, including the same police lieutenant who conducted the first interview with Collins on August 14.

While detained outside, the lieutenant asked for Collins’ handcuffs to be removed and questioned Collins a second time for approximately twenty to thirty minutes. Collins was not under arrest, and neither the lieutenant nor any other officer gave Collins a Miranda warning.

During this second interview, the lieutenant asked Collins questions about the active murder investigation, items that were missing from Victim's home, and topics addressed during the first interview on August 14. The lieutenant testified that he was trying to clarify certain details and “was just trying to figure out which story ․ [Collins was] going to actually have” by the time the lieutenant got “ready to put all this together.”

During this time, the lieutenant also referenced Collins’ smaller stature and size in relation to Victim's size and told Collins that “if it was self-defense or something ․ you need to let us know.” The lieutenant testified that in response to his question, “why don't you tell me what really happened,” Collins’ eyes began to water and that he mumbled something to the effect of, “if I tell the truth, I'll be in jail for a long time.” After hearing this statement from Collins, the lieutenant suggested that Collins come in to the police department and “get this off [his] chest.”

Collins then asked to go up into his residence and tell his girlfriend that he would be voluntarily going to the police station to give a formal interview. The lieutenant permitted Collins to do so, then another officer placed Collins in handcuffs and drove Collins to the police station where he was escorted into an interview room.

Collins’ Statements on August 30, 2023

About thirty minutes later, the lieutenant who questioned Collins while the SRU executed the search warrant joined Collins and a detective corporal in the interview room. The lieutenant then told Collins something to the effect of “we're going to do this formally now” and gave the verbal Miranda warning to Collins along with a Miranda rights waiver form. Collins acknowledged his rights and signed the Miranda waiver form.

The lieutenant and detective interviewed Collins in the early morning hours of August 30 during which time Collins made verbal statements that were video recorded and provided a written statement wherein he described facts and details leading up to the shooting of Victim. Collins told police that Victim was the aggressor, that Collins was afraid, and that there was a struggle for the gun.

Pretrial Suppression Hearing

Collins filed a motion to suppress and exclude from evidence at trial “any and all statements obtained by law enforcement” from Collins regarding his “alleged knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the death” of Victim. In his motion, Collins sought exclusion of the statements he made during the course of his discussions with law enforcement on August 14, August 29 and August 30, 2023. Collins argued that statements made during the interview with the police lieutenant on August 29, while he was detained during execution of the search warrant, were in response to custodial interrogation based on the totality of the circumstances, and, because he had not been read his Miranda rights, any and all statements must be suppressed. The State conceded this point during the pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress and advised it did not intend to present the August 29 statements at trial.

Collins further argued that the statements he made during the subsequent “formal” interview at the police department on August 30 should also be suppressed on the basis that the police engaged in a “two-step” interrogation process in a deliberate attempt to circumvent Miranda requirements and elicit incriminating statements from Collins. Collins argued that by intentionally asking Collins questions while he was detained but not Mirandized outside of his residence on August 29, the police sought to elicit incriminating statements in contravention of Missouri v. Siebert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), and in violation of Collins’ rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections Ten and Nineteen of the Missouri Constitution.

During the pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress, the circuit court heard testimony from the officers about their interactions and discussions with Collins on August 14, August 29, and August 30.

The lieutenant testified that on August 14, he gave the Miranda warning to Collins because this first interrogation was part of his general investigation into the circumstances of Victim's death and because he had suspicions about Collins’ involvement given Collins’ possession of Victim's keys and vehicle. The lieutenant further testified that he gave this Miranda warning because the circumstances indicated to him that Collins might have been the last person to see Victim alive. However, on August 14, the lieutenant “regarded everyone as a suspect,” not solely Collins.

The lieutenant testified that during the execution of the August 29 search warrant, Collins was detained but not under arrest. Another officer present during this second interview of Collins by the lieutenant testified that Collins was “not free to leave” the area.

The lieutenant testified that on August 29 he “was trying to put two and two together” and “trying to clear up a couple things” from the August 14 interview now that “more evidence had come up” during the course of the lieutenant's investigation. The lieutenant testified that he told Collins to think about what really happened overnight and then come in to talk to the lieutenant. Additionally, the lieutenant testified that he, “never did ask [Collins] anything to incriminate him,” but rather was merely following up on incriminating statements that Collins had already given during the August 14 interview. However, once Collins said, “if I tell you everything, I'll be in jail for a long time,” the lieutenant cut off the conversation and suggested that Collins come in to the police department and “get this off [his] chest.”

Collins argued that there was very little time between the statements he made on the night of August 29 when he was outside of his residence during the execution of the search warrant and the verbal and written statements he made on the early morning of August 30 when he was at the police department. Collins had been Mirandized before the formal interview on August 30, but he argued that he would not have made any statements had he been properly Mirandized before any statements were made on August 29. As a result, Collins sought suppression of all statements made on August 29 and August 30.

The circuit court granted in part and denied in part Collins’ motion to suppress. The circuit court ordered that statements made by Collins to law enforcement on August 29 while Collins was detained outside of his residence during the execution of the search warrant on his residence were suppressed. The circuit court ordered further that statements made by Collins to law enforcement on August 14 and August 30, 2023, were not suppressed.

Evidence of Statements at Trial

At trial, the State introduced into evidence Exhibit 10: the video recording of Collins’ formal interview with law enforcement on August 30. Collins did not object to the admission of Exhibit 10. Additionally, the State introduced into evidence Exhibit 11: Collin's written statement given to law enforcement on August 30. Collins did not object to the admission of Exhibit 11.

Collins did not testify at trial, but his counsel referenced statements made by Collins contained in Exhibits 10 and 11 during opening statement and closing argument. Collins relied on the statements that Victim was the aggressor, that Collins was afraid, and that there was a struggle for the gun to affirmatively raise the issue of whether the use of physical force by Collins against Victim was lawful. Collins tendered a jury instruction on the issue of self-defense, which the circuit court submitted to the jury.

Collins admits he did not object to the admission of Exhibits 10 and 11 at trial. As such, Collins concedes that his claim that the circuit court erred in admitting into evidence the verbal and written statements Collins made on August 30 as part of his “formal” interview with police is not preserved for appellate review. Therefore, Collins requests this Court review his claim for plain error under Rule 30.20. For the reasons set forth below, this Court declines to engage in plain error review.

Standard of Review: Plain Error Review

“Because a circuit court cannot be faulted for acting in a manner consistent with the behest of a party claiming error, appellate courts generally do not review unpreserved claims of error.” State v. Jones, 725 S.W.3d 577, 582 (Mo. banc 2025). An appellate court may review unpreserved claims of error regarding “the sufficiency of the information or indictment, verdict, judgment, or sentence.” Rule 30.20. Additionally, an appellate court has discretion to review “plain errors affecting substantial rights.” Id. Collins does not allege the information, the verdict, the judgment, or the sentence was insufficient. Instead, Collins argues that errors in admitting his verbal and written statements are “plain errors affecting substantial rights.”

In reviewing these claims of plain error, this Court must determine: “(1) whether the circuit court committed ‘plain error affecting substantial rights’; (2) whether ‘manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice’ resulted; and (3) whether the Court in its ‘discretion’ should review” these claims. Jones, 725 S.W.3d at 582-83. This Court will conduct plain error review under Rule 30.20 only when the appellant's request meets this burden. Jones, 725 S.W.3d at 583 (citation omitted). This Court will decline to review for plain error under Rule 30.20 unless the appellant makes this initial showing. Id.

Plain Error Affecting Substantial Rights

“Plain errors” are errors that are “facially evident, obvious, and clear,” meaning that the circuit court definitively should have recognized the error. Jones, 725 S.W.3d at 583 (citation omitted). “Substantial rights” are involved if there are facially “significant grounds for believing that the error is of the type from which manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice could result if left uncorrected.” Id. “Plain errors affecting substantial rights” thus involve important and essential legal rights fundamental to our system of justice; they are plainly erroneous, inherently self-evident, discernible, and undeniable – the type of errors on which the circuit court should have taken corrective action because, left uncorrected, a manifest injustice may result. Id.

Manifest Injustice or Miscarriage of Justice

Still, “Even if an appellant can establish the alleged error constitutes plain error affecting substantial rights, ․ Rule 30.20 specifically provides plain error review is available only when appellate courts find manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice resulted.” Jones, 725 S.W.3d at 583 (citation omitted). The existence of “manifest injustice” or “miscarriage of justice” varies widely depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. Id. Generally, the existence of manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice depends on the strength of the evidence leading to conviction and whether the error was outcome determinative. Id. Manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice may result even where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. Id. Yet, mere prejudice alone fails to demonstrate manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice; the appellant's substantive rights must suffer so substantially from the error that a miscarriage of justice or manifest injustice will occur if left uncorrected. Id.

It is the defendant's burden to demonstrate that both a plain error affecting substantial rights occurred as well as manifest injustice. Id. “Unless the appellant makes [a] facial showing” “establish[ing] facially substantial grounds for believing that the trial court's error was evident, obvious, and clear and that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted,” “this Court will decline to review for plain error under Rule 30.20.” Id.

The Discretion of the Court

Plain error review is discretionary, and, “This Court has a long history of refusing to exercise its discretion to review claims for plain error when the facts and circumstances so warrant.” Jones, 725 S.W.3d at 584. “The plain language of Rule 30.20 demonstrates not every allegation of error is entitled to appellate review.” Id. at 582. “The plain error rule is to be used sparingly and may not be used to justify review of every point that has not been otherwise preserved for appellate review.” Id. at 584. “Certain types of claims are particularly ill-suited for plain error review and justify declining to review for plain error,” and this is “especially true when the appellant's actions or inactions caused or contributed to the error alleged,” including cases where appellants do not raise objections as part of their trial strategy. Id.

There are no special categories of plain error review, and the plain error framework in Rule 30.20 applies to all claims of error, including serious constitutional violations. Id. at 585. Thus, an appellate court confronted with a request to grant relief applying plain error review may resolve the claim in one of five ways under the Rule 30.20 framework: (1) declining plain error review when an appellant fails to facially establish substantial grounds that the circuit court committed plain error; (2) declining plain error review when an appellant fails to facially establish substantial grounds that the circuit court committed an error affecting substantial rights; (3) declining plain error review when an appellant fails to facially establish substantial grounds that any alleged error the circuit court committed resulted in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice; (4) declining to exercise its discretionary authority to review for plain error; or (5) determining an appellant facially established substantial grounds that the circuit court committed plain error affecting substantial rights resulting in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice, warranting exercise of the appellate court's discretion to review and grant relief. Id.

Analysis

Collins’ asserted “plain error” is the circuit court's admission into evidence of the verbal and written statements Collins made to law enforcement on August 30, after he was Mirandized, but following a prior interview with law enforcement when he was not Mirandized. Collins argues the admission of Exhibits 10 and 11 resulted in manifest injustice, but manifest injustice is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Jones, 725 S.W.3d at 583 (citation omitted). Here, several factors justify declining to review Collins’ claim for plain error.

First, the record does not reflect that law enforcement set up the August 29 interview of Collins to violate Miranda or elicit a confession from Collins. During the pretrial hearing on Collins’ motion to suppress, the police lieutenant testified that it was not his intent to skirt the protections of Miranda by conducting a prohibited two-step interrogation. See State v. Gaw, 285 S.W.3d 318, 322-23 (Mo. banc 2009) (adopting the “subjective test” requiring a finding of fact by the circuit court that an arresting officer was deliberately trying to skirt the protections of Miranda when conducting a two-part custodial interrogation). The circuit court made no factual finding that the lieutenant's questioning prior to the advisement of Miranda rights was “intended to acquire an advantage in the interrogation process.” See id. at 324.

Second, Collins had the opportunity to object to the admission at trial of both Exhibit 10 – his verbal statements contained in the video recorded interview with law enforcement – and Exhibit 11 – his written statement. Collins did not seize that opportunity and instead affirmatively stated to the circuit court that he had “no objection” to the introduction of these exhibits.

Third, the record indicates that Collins’ lack of objections to Exhibits 10 and 11 was part of a broader trial strategy to introduce into evidence his version of events as relayed in his statements without having to testify at trial. Collins used his statements from August 30 to raise the issue of self-defense arguing that Victim was the aggressor, Collins was afraid, and there was a struggle for the gun. Collins tendered a jury instruction on self-defense, which the circuit court submitted to the jury.

Given the factual circumstances of Collins’ trial strategy and prevailing Missouri law governing police procedure during custodial interrogations, Collins’ claim of plain error is particularly ill-suited for plain error review. See Gaw, 285 S.W.3d at 323-24. The circuit court's admission into evidence of Collins’ statements in Exhibits 10 and 11 is not an error that is “facially evident, obvious, and clear.” Jones, 725 S.W.3d at 583 (internal quotation omitted). Further, a circuit court “cannot be faulted for acting in a manner consistent with the behest of a party claiming error.” Id. at 582.

Collins fails to establish facially substantial grounds that the admission of his statements made on August 30, 2023, was an evident, obvious, and clear error and that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice resulted. Accordingly, this Court declines Collins’ request for plain error review and affirms the judgment.

Conclusion

Collins’ sole point on appeal is denied. Having exercised the Court's discretion to decline plain error review, this Court affirms the circuit court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Collins was also charged with tampering with physical evidence for destroying evidence by cleaning blood; felony stealing for appropriating Victim's vehicle; and felony stealing for appropriating various items of Victim's property. The jury found Collins not guilty of these three counts.

Kathleen S. Hamilton, Judge

Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge and Virginia W. Lay, Judge concur.