BRANDON WARD v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE STATE OF MISSOURI (2026)

Brandon Ward appeals the judgment from the Circuit Court of Johnson County, Missouri (“trial court”), upholding the Director of Revenue's (“Director”) suspension of his driving privileges. On appeal, Ward alleges the trial court erred in: 1) allowing the Director to shift the burdens of proof and persuasion to Ward to prove that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that he was intoxicated rather than requiring Director to prove that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Ward was intoxicated; and 2) entering a judgment that was against the weight of the evidence in that the trial court relied on Ward's refusal to submit to voluntary field sobriety testing while there is no statutory sanction for refusing such testing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Factual and Procedural Background

The facts, in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment,¹ are as follows. At approximately 3:30 a.m. on March 4, 2023, a police officer (“Officer”)² approached a vehicle in the parking lot of a closed Arby's restaurant. The vehicle was sideways across multiple parking spaces and not in a parking space. Officer observed Ward in the driver's seat, and he appeared to be asleep. The engine of the vehicle was running, the transmission was in the drive position, and its brake lights were on. Ward did not awaken when Officer shone his flashlight into the vehicle, but he did awaken when Officer knocked on the window. When Ward rolled down his window, Officer noticed an odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle; Ward appeared surprised. Officer asked Ward how drunk he was, and Ward responded that he was “fine.” Officer observed that Ward's eyes were bloodshot and watery. Officer asked Ward to step out of his vehicle, and Ward complied, but Ward informed Officer that he would not submit to a preliminary breath test or to any field sobriety testing. Ward's speech was slurred.

Another officer arrived at the scene; Officer directed Ward to put his “butt up against ․ the car,” and Officer spoke with the second officer, informing the other officer that Ward was “Passed out. In drive. Slurrin[g] his words. [Reeks] of alcohol. Eyes are glassy and bloodshot.” Ward again stated that he did “not submit to anything,” and the officer placed him under arrest for driving while intoxicated. At the police station, Ward was read the implied consent notice, and he was asked to take a breath test. Ward responded, “Negative.”

The Director revoked Ward's license pursuant to Missouri's implied consent statute, and Ward filed a Petition for Review in the trial court. At the bench trial Officer and Ward both testified, and the bodycam video of the interaction between Officer and Ward was received into evidence. The trial court issued its judgment finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ward was arrested, that Officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Ward was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged condition, and that Ward refused to submit a breath test; the trial court sustained the revocation of Ward's driving privileges. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

When reviewing the trial court's decision sustaining the revocation of a driver's license, we will affirm the judgment “unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.” Phillips v. Dir. of Revenue, 403 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Mo. App. S.D. 2012).

Analysis

Burden shifting

Ward's first point on appeal is that the trial court misapplied the law in allowing the Director to shift the burdens of proof and persuasion to Ward because Officer required Ward to prove there were not reasonable grounds to believe Ward was intoxicated rather than requiring the Director prove that Officer had reasonable grounds to believe Ward was intoxicated. We disagree.

Section 302.574 ³ authorizes the Director to suspend a person's driver's license for the refusal to submit to a chemical test under its implied consent provisions. Urbaniak v. Dir. of Revenue, 651 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022).

[W]hen drivers contest the revocation or suspension of their driver's licenses, we review the trial court's decision to confirm it considered the requisite elements of Missouri's refusal statute. In proceedings under section 302.574.4, the trial court is only to determine whether: (1) the person was arrested or stopped; (2) the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged condition; and (3) the person refused to submit to the test. “Reasonable grounds” are virtually the same as “probable cause.”

Wood v. Dir. of Revenue, 668 S.W.3d 292, 296 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (citation modified). “The Director has the burden of establishing each element by a preponderance of the evidence.” Gamblin v. Dir. of Revenue, 674 S.W.3d 184, 187 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (citation modified).

There is no evidence in this case that the trial court was confused about the Director's burden or that the trial court required Ward to prove or persuade the court that Officer lacked reasonable grounds to believe that Ward was intoxicated. Instead, Ward's argument is essentially that the trial court erred because Ward was falsely led to believe by Officer at the time of his arrest that he had the burden to prove to the Officer that he was not intoxicated. Neither Ward's belief as to the Director's burden nor even the Officer's apparent mistaken belief that Ward had to prove to him that Ward was not intoxicated is dispositive. In this case, Ward does not show that he suffered a detriment from the Officer's misunderstanding or misstatement, in other words, he suffered no prejudice. Ward did not submit to any field sobriety tests or breath tests, even though Officer told Ward he had to convince the Officer that he was not intoxicated; Ward was not, therefore, coerced into doing anything by Officer's statements. Rather, review of the bodycam footage indicates that, because of Ward's military service, Officer was inclined to show Ward leniency despite the fact that, as Ward acknowledged, things didn't “look good,” if it turned out that Ward was not intoxicated as he appeared to be in officer's opinion. The Officer specifically informed Ward that if he passed the PBT, even though Officer believed him to be intoxicated, Officer would not arrest him.

Because there is no indication that the trial court placed the burdens of production or persuasion on Ward or otherwise misapplied the law, Ward's first point on appeal is denied.

Against the weight of the evidence

Ward's second point on appeal is that the trial court erred in sustaining Director's revocation of Ward's driver's license because the trial court's finding that Officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Ward was intoxicated was against the weight of the evidence. We disagree.

Just last year, our Supreme Court expressly adopted the elements of an against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge as previously articulated in Houston v. Crider, 317 S.W.3d 178 (Mo. App. 2010). Weeks v. City of St. Louis, 721 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Mo. banc 2025). The Houston framework requires the appellant to:

(1) identify a challenged factual proposition necessary to sustain the judgment; (2) identify all favorable evidence in the record supporting the challenged factual proposition; (3) identify the evidence in the record contrary to that proposition, resolving all evidentiary conflicts in accordance with the circuit court's implicit and explicit credibility determinations; and (4) demonstrate the favorable evidence, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, is so lacking in probative value it fails to induce belief in that proposition when considered in the context of the entire record.

Id. “This analytical framework provides the necessary framework to demonstrate the circuit court's factual findings are against the weight of the evidence.” Id.

Ward acknowledges some of the evidence favorable to the judgment, including that Ward had bloodshot and watery eyes, that he slurred a word, and that he refused to participate in voluntary sobriety testing. Ward fails to acknowledge in his analysis that he was found “sleeping” in his running car, which was in gear, sideways across multiple parking spaces, in the parking lot of a closed restaurant at 3:30 in the morning; he fails to acknowledge that he appeared somewhat disoriented, he does not acknowledge that Officer detected an odor of alcohol that was characterized by Officer as “[reeking] of alcohol.”

Moreover, Ward's brief fails to complete the third and fourth steps of the required analysis. Instead of identifying evidence in the record that would be contrary to a finding that Officer had reasonable grounds to believe Ward was intoxicated, Ward simply attacks the credibility of the very evidence he just cited that supports the trial court's finding, despite the third step's requirement that “all conflicts” in the evidence be resolved “in accordance with the court's credibility determinations, whether explicit or implicit.”

For example, although Ward acknowledges that his speech was slurred, he argues that he only slurred a single word. This ignores the fact that Ward appeared to say as little to Officer as possible during the stop and refused to participate in field sobriety tests. He also argues that his eyes were not, in fact, bloodshot or watery, and he points to an enlarged still photo taken from the video. However, the trial court saw this photo and the video, heard Officer's testimony, and apparently resolved this discrepancy in favor of the Director.

Finally, Ward argues that there is no statutory penalty for refusing to submit to field sobriety tests. While this is an accurate statement, refusal to submit to field sobriety tests can be considered as evidence of intoxication for purposes of a probable cause determination. Turner v. Dir. of Revenue, 609 S.W.3d 492, 497-98 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). Accordingly, Officer based his assessment of Ward's state of intoxication on his observations, which the trial court found sufficient to constitute reasonable grounds to believe that Ward was intoxicated. We do not find the trial court's judgment to be against the weight of the evidence.

Ward's second point on appeal is denied.

Conclusion

For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   When considering a motorist's appeal from a trial court's judgment affirming the Director of Revenue's decision to suspend his driving privileges, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment. Kinkead v. Dir. of Revenue, 673 S.W.3d 157, 160 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023).

2.   Pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Operating Rule 2.02(c)(3), we do not include the names of individuals other than parties.

3.   All statutory references are to Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016), as currently updated by supplement, unless otherwise indicated.

Gary D. Witt, Judge

All concur