BENJAMIN CURTIS RAMIREZ INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED ET AL v. MISSOURI PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS AND CIRCUIT ATTORNEYS RETIREMENT SYSTEM ET AL (2026)

Benjamin Ramirez, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, appeals the judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Missouri Prosecuting Attorneys and Circuit Attorneys’ Retirement System Fund (“PACARS”) on his unjust enrichment claim. He contends the circuit court erred in finding a motion to retax costs is the proper mechanism to recover statutory costs the court ruled unconstitutional in a prior partial summary judgment. PACARS filed a cross-appeal that is contingent on our reversal of the judgment on the pleadings. In the cross-appeal, PACARS argues the circuit court erred in finding the costs unconstitutional and requests we transfer the case to the Missouri Supreme Court to review that decision. For reasons explained herein, we affirm the judgment on the pleadings, vacate the prior partial summary judgment, and find PACARS's cross-appeal moot. We deny the motion to transfer the case to the Supreme Court.

Factual and Procedural History

In 1989, the legislature created the “Prosecuting Attorneys and Circuit Attorneys’ Retirement Fund.” § 56.800.¹ PACARS's board of trustees manages the fund. § 56.809. Beginning in 2003, the legislature required court clerks to collect a $4 surcharge in all criminal cases from any person who pleads guilty to a criminal or traffic offense, and the clerks are to disburse the funds to PACARS. § 56.807.7. No PACARS surcharge is collected when the costs are waived or the defendant is dismissed. § 56.807.7(1).

In 2018 and 2019, Ramirez pled guilty to criminal charges filed against him in Jackson County. He was assessed and paid mandatory court surcharges, including Section 56.807.7's PACARS surcharge. In June 2021, Ramirez filed a putative class action petition in the Jackson County Circuit Court against PACARS, the Director of Revenue (“Director”), and the Treasurer, arguing the PACARS surcharge and seven other statutory surcharges (“Seven State Funds surcharges”) he was assessed violate the Missouri Constitution. Ramirez's petition asserted unjust enrichment and conversion claims, seeking reimbursement of the surcharges Ramirez and other similarly-situated individuals had paid. He later voluntarily dismissed the conversion claim. In February 2023, the court certified two classes, one comprised of Missouri citizens who were assessed and paid the PACARS surcharge, and another comprised of Missouri citizens who were assessed and paid the Seven State Funds surcharges.

Ramirez filed a motion for partial summary judgment against PACARS on the constitutionality of Section 56.807. On August 4, 2023, the court granted Ramirez's motion. The court found the PACARS surcharge was not reasonably related to the expense of the administration of justice and, therefore, Section 56.807 violated Article I, Section 14 of the Missouri Constitution.²

The Director and Treasurer moved for summary judgment on Ramirez's unjust enrichment claim. They asserted the claim against them was barred by sovereign immunity and the statutes authorizing the Seven State Funds surcharges did not violate the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court granted the Director and Treasurer's motion after finding the statutes authorizing the Seven State Funds surcharges were constitutional. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the Director and Treasurer, finding Ramirez's claims against them were barred by sovereign immunity. Ramirez v. Mo. Prosecuting Att'ys’ & Cir. Att'ys’ Ret. Sys., 694 S.W.3d 432 (Mo. banc 2024) (“Ramirez I”).

Meanwhile, PACARS, the only remaining defendant in the lawsuit, moved for judgment on the pleadings on the only remaining claim of unjust enrichment. PACARS argued Ramirez could not assert a claim for the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment to recover the PACARS surcharge because a statutory remedy, specifically, a motion to retax costs under Section 514.270, exists. The circuit court agreed and entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of PACARS. Ramirez appeals.

PACARS cross-appeals, challenging the circuit court's determination that Section 56.807 is unconstitutional. After PACARS filed its notice of appeal, Ramirez filed a motion to transfer the case to the Supreme Court on the basis the Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the issues raised in PACARS's cross-appeal under Article V, Section 3 of the Missouri Constitution. In the jurisdictional statement of its brief, PACARS asserts we need not reach its cross-appeal if we affirm the judgment on the pleadings. If we reverse the judgment on the pleadings and reach the cross-appeal, however, PACARS requests we transfer the case to the Supreme Court.

Standard of Review

We review the circuit court's grant of judgment on the pleadings de novo. Woods v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 595 S.W.3d 504, 505 (Mo. banc 2020). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings should be sustained if, from the face of the pleadings, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citation omitted).

Analysis

In his sole point on appeal, Ramirez argues the circuit court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings on the basis that his remedy is a motion to retax costs. He argues the court performs a ministerial function when ruling on a motion to retax costs under Section 514.270; therefore, a motion to retax costs under Section 514.270 is not the proper vehicle for performance of a judicial function such as determining the constitutional validity of Section 56.807, the statute authorizing the PACARS surcharge.

Section 514.260 directs the circuit clerk to tax statutory court costs. Solberg v. Graven, 174 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Mo. App. 2005). Unlike discretionary court costs imposed by the circuit court “upon judicial investigation,” statutory court costs are definite and fixed by statute. Id. at 701 n.5. Because the circuit court “has no role to play in the initial taxation of statutory court costs that are definite in amount,” the circuit clerk's taxing of such costs is a ministerial duty. Id. at 701. The circuit clerk exercised its ministerial duty when it taxed Ramirez $4 for the PACARS surcharge pursuant to Section 56.807.

Section 514.270 provides a remedy for those wishing to challenge the taxation of statutory court costs:

Any person aggrieved by the taxation of a bill of costs may, upon application, have the same retaxed by the court in which the action or proceeding was had, and in such retaxation all errors shall be corrected by the court; and if the party aggrieved shall have paid any unlawful charge, by reason of the first taxation, the clerk shall pay the costs of retaxation, and also to the party aggrieved the amount which he may have paid by reason of the allowing of such unlawful charge.

(Emphasis added.) The plain language of Section 514.270 does not limit the type of alleged errors the court can review in a motion to retax costs. Instead, it provides for the court to review and correct “all errors” in the taxation of costs, and it expressly allows the court to determine whether the cost is “unlawful.” No language in Section 514.270 restricts the court to reviewing only mathematical errors or errors that do not require the performance of a judicial function to resolve. Indeed, as the Eastern District of this court stated, “In applying § 514.270, Missouri courts have long recognized that, ‘where a party complains that the judgment taxing the costs is wrong, for any reason, he must, to obtain relief, lodge his complaint with the court rendering such judgment.’ ” Wiley v. Davy, 472 S.W.3d 257, 265 (Mo. App. 2015) (quoting Turner v. Butler, 66 Mo. App. 380, 386 (Mo. App. K.C. 1896) (emphasis added)). “If a party contests a category or specific item of costs, the remedy is by motion to retax in the court of the alleged error.” Id. (citation omitted). Because Section 514.270 “creates a right or liability that did not exist at common law or under prior statutes, and also provides a specific remedy for the enforcement thereof, as a general rule such statutory remedy is exclusive.” Id. (citation omitted).

In a footnote in Ramirez I, the Supreme Court indicated Section 514.270 is the proper vehicle to assert statutory costs are unlawful. Specifically, the Court stated:

Ramirez acknowledges he did not object to paying the surcharges at the time, and he did not file a motion to retax costs under section 514.270. This Court has held a motion to retax costs is the proper mechanism for challenging the legality of court costs assessed in criminal cases. State v. Richey, 569 S.W.3d 420, 423 n.2 (Mo. banc 2019).

Ramirez I, 694 S.W.3d at 435 n.2. Although the Court affirmed Ramirez I on the basis that sovereign immunity barred Ramirez's suit, the Court's footnote is significant to this appeal. Ramirez's challenge to the Seven State Funds statutes in Ramirez I was the same challenge he is making to the PACARS statute, which is that the surcharge statutes violate Article I, Section 14 of the Missouri Constitution. Id. at 435. Moreover, the case the Court cited in the footnote, Richey, involved the interpretation of several statutes. See Richey, 569 S.W.3d at 423-26. Interpreting statutes is clearly a judicial function, and the Court in Richey held the defendants properly filed a motion to retax costs under Section 514.270 to assert this challenge. Id. at 423 n.2.

We recognize the footnote in Ramirez I is dicta, and “we are not required to follow Supreme Court dicta.” State v. Ison, 270 S.W.3d 444, 446 (Mo. App. 2008). However, “dicta can be persuasive when supported by logic.” Id. The implication of the Supreme Court's dicta in Ramirez I – that a motion to retax costs is the appropriate mechanism for challenging the constitutionality of a statute authorizing surcharges – is supported by logic, precedent, and the plain language of Section 514.270. Hence, to challenge the constitutionality of Section 56.807, Ramirez must file a motion to retax costs under Section 514.270.

The circuit court's judgment on the pleadings in favor of PACARS must be affirmed, as the unjust enrichment claim of Ramirez and the class members is precluded by virtue of an exclusive statutory remedy. See Wiley, 472 S.W.3d at 266. Ramirez and the class members must contest the PACARS surcharge by way of a Section 514.270 motion to retax costs proceeding. In any such proceeding, the court will not be bound by the circuit court's substantive legal conclusion in this case that Section 56.807 is unconstitutional. See id. Therefore, we vacate the partial summary judgment in favor of Ramirez finding that Section 56.807 is unconstitutional because the circuit court erred in reaching the merits, “which must be examined in accordance with Section 514.270.” See id. Ramirez's point is denied.

Conclusion

The judgment dismissing Ramirez's unjust enrichment claim on the pleadings is affirmed. The summary judgment finding Section 56.807 unconstitutional is vacated. Our holding in Ramirez's appeal renders PACARS's cross-appeal moot. The motion to transfer the case to the Supreme Court is denied.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2016, as updated by the 2025 Cumulative Supplement.

2.   Article I, Section 14 provides “[t]hat the courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character, and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.”

Lisa White Hardwick, Judge

All Concur.