MATTHEW RYAN ROUNER v. STATE OF MISSOURI (2026)

Mr. Matthew Rouner (“Rouner”) appeals from the judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Livingston County, Missouri (“motion court”), which denied his Rule 29.15 ¹ motion for post-conviction relief (“PCR”), following a hearing. Rouner argues the motion court erred in rejecting his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to his statements to law enforcement from a recorded interview after his arrest, which he claims were involuntary due to sleep deprivation. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 2

On May 31, 2020, Rouner's adoptive parents, Mother and Father, left their home to attend a Sunday church service.³ When they returned two hours later, their home was engulfed in flames and ultimately burned to the ground. While the house burned, Father noticed his maroon truck was missing from the driveway and immediately suspected that Rouner had stolen it. While digging through the rubble of the house, Mother and Father noticed that several pieces of jewelry were missing, which they believed to be stolen along with the truck.

On June 8, law enforcement received a tip from an informant that Rouner was at a car wash. Around 8:00 p.m., law enforcement came to the car wash in multiple marked police cars and two unmarked vehicles and located Rouner standing next to a black pickup truck. As Rouner entered the truck, officers in the marked police cars activated their lights and sirens. In response, Rouner attempted to flee by driving over the parking lot curb towards a wooded area. As he fled, Rouner hit one of the unmarked vehicles, disabling the truck and revealing its original maroon paint. Rouner then got out of the truck and fled on foot. Law enforcement arrested Rouner and impounded the truck, which was later confirmed to be Father's stolen truck.

At around 1:30 a.m. on the night of Rouner's arrest, law enforcement began a recorded interview with Rouner, which lasted for approximately one hour. At the beginning of the interview, Interviewing Officer read Rouner his Miranda ⁴ rights, spending several minutes emphasizing that Rouner was not required to talk with them and that he could end the interview at any time or choose to answer only certain questions. Rouner agreed to answer their questions without an attorney present and signed a Miranda waiver form. During the interview, Rouner claimed that the truck had been stolen by members of the Sinaloa Cartel and that he received a picture of the stolen truck with an offer to buy it for $1,000. When law enforcement pressed Rouner on how he was able to pay the purported $1,000 purchase price while he was admittedly homeless and unemployed, Rouner refused to answer, and Interviewing Officer responded, “That's okay. No, that's fine. Like I said before, if you don't want to answer certain questions ․”

Later in the interview, Rouner asserted that he had spent hours cleaning the interior of the truck in preparation to return it to Father and that he was nearly ready to return the truck when law enforcement arrested him. Eventually, Interviewing Officer asked Rouner why the people who stole the truck would have started the house fire; Rouner became agitated and indignant at what he perceived to be an allegation that he started the fire and threatened to end the interview, stating “I think I'm about done talking to you.” Interviewing Officer replied, “Okay, Bud you don't have to answer anything.” But, Rouner voluntarily continued the interview, offering to help recover the stolen property and providing information on its possible whereabouts. The interview questions ended promptly when Rouner said, “I need to sleep.”

After the interview, law enforcement searched the impounded truck pursuant to a warrant. Despite Rouner's claims that he spent hours cleaning the truck and that he planned to return it to Father immediately, the inside of the truck was very dirty and strewn with clothing, food waste, and garbage—as if someone had been living out of it for several days. Law enforcement also found some, but not all, of Mother's missing jewelry in the truck.

At trial, the State presented the testimony of the following witnesses: the neighbor who reported the fire, Father, the officer who responded to the car wash, and Interviewing Officer.⁵ During Interviewing Officer's direct examination, the State moved to admit Rouner's taped interview into evidence, subject to the pretrial stipulation that all references to Rouner's other criminal activity be removed, including his suspected involvement in the house fire. Rouner's counsel never objected that Rouner's statements were involuntary; however, his counsel did object to a portion of the interview tape that inadvertently included a reference to the house fire.

The jury convicted Rouner on two counts: stealing a motor vehicle and stealing jewelry. In his direct appeal, Rouner did not challenge the admissibility of any of the State's evidence and instead only challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of stealing jewelry. This Court affirmed Rouner's convictions.

Rouner then filed a pro se PCR motion pursuant to Rule 29.15, and his appointed counsel subsequently filed an amended motion. In the amended motion, Rouner argued, in relevant part to this appeal, that his statements to law enforcement during the audiotaped interview were involuntary and that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the admission of those statements. Rouner specifically asserted that his interview statements were involuntary because of sleep deprivation resulting from law enforcement starting the one-hour interview at 1:30 a.m. and allegedly refusing Rouner's request to sleep before the interview.

To support his claim at the PCR hearing, Rouner presented the testimony of three witnesses: Second Chair counsel, First Chair counsel, and himself.

Second Chair counsel testified that she had no direct conversation with Rouner on any matter, that she could not recall specifically speaking with First Chair counsel about the taped interview, and that she did not review the taped interview before trial.

First Chair counsel testified during her direct examination that she had adequate time to prepare Rouner's defense, that she could not recall a strategic reason for not objecting to the interview tape, and that she could not recall having a conversation with Rouner about the circumstances of the interview or about the possibility of attempting to suppress the interview in its entirety. During her cross-examination, First Chair counsel stated that she spent several hours working with the State to remove any mention of the allegation that Rouner burned down the house from the interview tape and to avoid the appearance that the tape had been edited.

During his direct examination at the PCR hearing, Rouner testified that, before his arrest, he had not slept for four or five days; that his pre-interview request to sleep, which was not on the interview tape, was refused; and that he believed his lack of sleep prevented him from answering the interview questions effectively. During his cross-examination, Rouner recalled that he had spoken with First Chair counsel about the audiotaped interview and that “I told [First Chair counsel] I wanted everything pertaining to the fire to not be in [the tape].” When asked whether he ever mentioned his lack of sleep to his counsel, Rouner replied, “We were so rushed, I'm not really sure.” Despite his recollection of instructing First Chair counsel to edit the interview tape and his failure to recall whether he informed First Chair counsel of his alleged sleep deprivation, Rouner also asserted that he told First Chair counsel he did not want any portion of the interview tape played at trial.

After the hearing, the motion court concluded that Rouner could not satisfy either the Strickland ⁶ performance prong nor the Strickland prejudice prong and denied Rouner's PCR motion accordingly. Rouner timely appealed the motion court's judgment.

Standard of Review

“Appellate review of the [motion] court's action on the motion filed under this Rule 29.15 shall be limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the [motion] court are clearly erroneous.” Scott v. State, 719 S.W.3d 723, 725 (Mo. banc 2025) (quoting Rule 29.15(k)). “In applying this standard, appellate courts should defer to the motion court's superior opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses and recognize the ‘circuit court is entitled to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing.’ ” Flaherty v. State, 694 S.W.3d 413, 419 (Mo. banc 2024) (quoting Driskill v. State, 626 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Mo. banc 2021)). To find that a decision was clearly erroneous, this Court must form a “definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made” after a review of the entire record. Id. at 416 (quoting Davis v. State, 486 S.W.3d 898, 905 (Mo. banc 2016)). “The motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are presumed to be correct.” Beck v. State, 637 S.W.3d 545, 551 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting Hays v. State, 360 S.W.3d 304, 309 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012)). “[W]e ‘may affirm the [judgment] on any legal ground supported by the record if the motion court arrived at the correct result.” Kelley v. State, 618 S.W.3d 722, 735 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (quoting Greene v. State, 332 S.W.3d 239, 246 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010)).

Analysis

“To be entitled to post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her trial counsel failed to meet the Strickland test.” Watson v. State, 520 S.W.3d 423, 435 (Mo. banc 2017) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)); accord Flaherty, 694 S.W.3d at 420. Under Strickland, the movant must demonstrate: “(1) his trial counsel failed to exercise the level of skill and diligence that a reasonably competent trial counsel would in a similar situation, and (2) he was prejudiced by that failure.” Watson, 520 S.W.3d at 435.

To establish the performance prong, “a movant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonable and effective and identify specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in light of all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of professional competent assistance.” McKee v. State, 540 S.W.3d 451, 456 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (citation modified) (quoting Hoeber v. State, 488 S.W.3d 648, 655 (Mo. banc 2016)). “Reasonable choices of trial strategy, no matter how ill-fated they appear in hindsight, cannot serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance.” Shockley v. State, 579 S.W.3d 881, 898 (Mo. banc 2019) (quoting Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Mo. banc 2006)); accord Goodwater v. State, 560 S.W.3d 44, 56 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (“If trial counsel's failure to object is based on reasonable trial strategy, the movant cannot demonstrate counsel was ineffective.” (quoting Bradley v. State, 292 S.W.3d 561, 564 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009))).

To establish the prejudice prong, the movant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. When the motion court judge and the trial court judge are the same, as is the case here, the motion court's findings on the issue of prejudice are entitled to heightened deference. See Flaherty, 694 S.W.3d at 423 (“The additional deference due a judge who also presided over the criminal trial weighs strongly in favor of affirming the motion court's finding that [movant] was not prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance.”).

If the movant fails to prove either prong, relief cannot be granted. Hecker v. State, 677 S.W.3d 507, 512 (Mo. banc 2023). And if the movant fails to satisfy one prong, we need not address the other. Staten v. State, 624 S.W.3d 748, 750 (Mo. banc 2021); Shores v. State, 674 S.W.3d 127, 133 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023).

Performance Prong

Here, the motion court did not clearly err in concluding Rouner failed to establish the Strickland performance prong for two reasons.

First, Rouner failed to demonstrate that his counsel knew or should have known of the facts supporting his claim that the statements in his taped interview were involuntary. “In determining whether ․ counsel's performance was deficient, we view the reasonableness of counsel's actions from counsel's perspective at the time and not with the benefit of hindsight. What defenses or claims counsel raises at trial necessarily depends on what information the defendant has supplied his or her lawyer.” Sokolic v. State, 710 S.W.3d 630, 634 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (citation omitted). “The reasonableness of investigation depends significantly on the information provided by the defendant, and trial counsel can reasonably rely on a defendant's statements (or lack thereof in a situation where he would be expected to speak) in determining what investigation to conduct and what defenses to pursue.” Gleason v. State, 329 S.W.3d 714, 717-18 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010) (emphasis added); see also Verge v. State, 695 S.W.3d 290, 295 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (“It is not unreasonable for trial counsel to rely on statements of the defendant in determining what defenses to pursue at trial such that his or her failure to investigate the truthfulness of the statements will not give rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate.” (citation modified) (quoting Johnson v. State, 674 S.W.3d 22, 32 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023))). When a defendant fails to inform counsel of the facts necessary to support a defense, counsel does not render constitutionally deficient performance in failing to raise that defense:

Movant did not inform counsel before trial of the facts he now asserts support a claim of imperfect self-defense: namely, that, due to a methamphetamine-induced hallucination, he thought he saw Victim holding a knife, and he genuinely feared for his life, causing him to defend himself with deadly force. Other than Movant's assertions, nothing in the record independently suggests self-defense, such that trial counsel should have known to raise this defense․

Under these circumstances, trial counsel's decision not to pursue a defense of imperfect self-defense was reasonable.

Sokolic, 710 S.W.3d at 634-35. Here, prior to trial, First Chair counsel and Rouner discussed strategy surrounding the taped interview. Despite this discussion, neither Rouner nor First Chair counsel recalled any mention of Rouner's claims that he had not slept for several days prior to the interview or that Rouner requested an opportunity to sleep before the interview. Rouner's assertion that his interview statement was involuntary relies entirely on these allegations of sleep deprivation, and no evidence in the record suggests he ever informed his counsel of these facts. Furthermore, no evidence in the record suggests that Rouner's counsel could have reasonably uncovered these facts aside from Rouner supplying them.⁷ Rouner was aware of these facts supporting his sleep deprivation claim before trial, so he would have been expected to disclose them to his counsel during their discussion surrounding the interview tape. Rouner's silence on these facts during the pretrial discussion surrounding the taped interview allowed Rouner's counsel to reasonably believe that no facts supported a claim that the interview statements were involuntary. In light of what counsel knew—or rather did not know—at the time of trial, counsel's failure to raise an objection reasonably perceived to be without a factual basis could not amount to constitutionally deficient performance. See Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 581 (Mo. banc 2005) (“[C]ounsel is not ineffective for failing to make nonmeritorious objections.” (quoting State v. Holloway, 877 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994))).

Second, the PCR court did not clearly err in concluding that Rouner's involuntariness objection was, itself, meritless.

The test for whether a statement is voluntary is whether the totality of circumstances created a physical or psychological coercion sufficient to deprive the defendant of a free choice to admit, deny or refuse to answer the examiner's questions and whether the physical and psychological coercion was of such a degree that the defendant's will was overborne at the time he made the statement.

State v. Hicks, 408 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Mo. banc 2013) (citation modified). “Factors to be considered in reviewing the totality of the circumstances include: whether the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and understood them; the defendant's physical and mental state; the length of questioning; the presence of police coercion or intimidation; and the withholding of food, water, or other physical needs.” State v. Perdomo-Paz, 471 S.W.3d 749, 758 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015). “No single factor is dispositive when the totality of the circumstances is considered, but the fact that the defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights is an important consideration.” Id.

After listening to the entirety of the unedited interview that Rouner presented to the motion court, we agree with the motion court's conclusion that Rouner's will was not overborne during the interview. At the outset, many of the factors favor a finding that the circumstances of Rouner's interview were not coercive. Interviewing Officer did not just read Rouner his Miranda rights and secure a signed waiver, he spent several minutes emphasizing that Rouner could end the interview at any time and that he could refuse to answer any questions. Interviewing Officer then reiterated these rights at several moments throughout the interview when Rouner refused to answer some questions and when he threatened to end the interview. Furthermore, nothing in the taped interview suggests law enforcement intimidated or coerced Rouner or withheld food, water, or other physical needs against Rouner's demands. To the contrary, Interviewing Officer approached Rouner with a friendly tone, allowed Rouner a wide degree of latitude to speak freely on his version of events, and promptly ended the interview when Rouner stated that he needed to sleep.

Regarding Rouner's alleged sleep deprivation, we find the facts here similar to State v. Lawson, 693 S.W.3d 82 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). In Lawson, the defendant Lawson argued that the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements from his police interview, arguing that the interview was coercive, in part, because he “was questioned between approximately 2:30 A.M. and 5:00 A.M. and had not slept since the late morning of the previous day.” Id. at 103. The Lawson court rejected Lawson's argument that his sleep deprivation deprived him of his free choice to answer the questions because he “responded coherently to questions and there [was] no indication that this affected his behavior or that he requested to sleep.” Id. Furthermore, the Lawson court also found the timing and length of Lawson's interview were not coercive, citing several cases where longer interview times were not considered coercive. See id. at 104 (collecting cases). After examining all the factors raised, the Lawson Court ultimately concluded Lawson's statements were voluntary, id. at 104-05, and affirmed the trial court's judgment, id. at 114.

Compared to the facts of Lawson, Rouner was questioned earlier in the night, and his interview was less than half the length. Like Lawson, Rouner's answers throughout the interview were coherent and responsive to the questions presented. In these answers, Rouner plainly exercised his free choice: he refused to answer some questions that he believed would incriminate him; he never admitted to anything incriminating; and he threatened to exercise his right to end the interview.

Rouner has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the motion court clearly erred in its conclusions that his interview statements were voluntary and, thus, any objection to the interview tape would have been meritless. Because counsel cannot render deficient performance by failing to raise a meritless objection, Rouner has failed to satisfy the Strickland performance prong. See Worthington, 166 S.W.3d at 581.

Prejudice Prong

Additionally, because any objection to the voluntariness of the interview statements would have been meritless, Rouner has also failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland:

In order to be successful on this claim, the appellant was required to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test by showing that the outcome of his case would have been different had his motion been brought to the attention of the trial court by his trial counsel. Necessarily, whether or not appellant's trial counsel brought the appellant's motion to dismiss counsel to the attention of the trial court would not have had any effect on the outcome of his trial, unless the motion had been found to be meritorious and sustained by the trial court.

Vogel v. State, 31 S.W.3d 130, 146 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000) (citation omitted). Because Rouner has not satisfied either Strickland prong of his ineffective assistance claim, the motion court did not clearly err in denying Rouner's PCR motion.

Point denied.

Conclusion

The judgment of the motion court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All rule references are to I Missouri Court Rules – State 2025.

3.   Many of the underlying facts are taken directly from the opinion of this Court denying Rouner's direct appeal, State v. Rouner, 679 S.W.3d 141 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023), without further attribution.

4.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

5.   Rouner presented a single alibi witness during his case in chief, and the State presented a rebuttal witness in response. Neither is relevant to this appeal.

6.   Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

7.   For instance, the recording does not include any mention of Rouner's several days without sleeping or any pre-interview request by Rouner to sleep.

Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge

W. Douglas Thomson, Presiding Judge, and Lisa White Hardwick, Judge, concur.