ADAMS v. HOSKINS (2026)

The Missouri Secretary of State (“Secretary”) appeals from the trial court's determination that the Secretary's certified summary statement for an initiative petition was insufficient and unfair; from the trial court's refusal to certify as sufficient and fair a revised summary statement prepared by the Secretary; and from the trial court's certification of its own summary statement as sufficient and fair. Finding no error, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Secretary received an initiative petition that proposed to amend article III, section 49 of the Missouri Constitution, addressing the people's reserved power to propose and enact or reject laws and amendments to the constitution by initiative, and to approve or reject any act of the general assembly by referendum. The Secretary designated the initiative petition as Initiative Petition 2026-134 (“Initiative Petition”).

The Initiative Petition proposes renumbering article III, section 49 as section 49.1, and adds language to that section characterizing the people's initiative and referendum powers as “fundamental rights.” The Initiative Petition adds new sections 49.2, 49.3, 49.4, 49.5, 49.6, and 49.7. Section 49.2 requires any initiative or referendum to take effect thirty calendar days after an election if approved by a simple majority of the votes cast. Section 49.3 restricts the general assembly from amending or repealing a law passed by initiative within the first five years of the effective date of the law unless at least three-fourths of the members of each house of the general assembly vote to do so. Section 49.4 requires ballot summary statements to be in the form of a question using no more than 100 words, and to “be true, accurate, unbiased, and ․ clearly written using words that have a common everyday meaning to the general public,” and to “be neither intentionally argumentative nor likely to create prejudice either for or against the proposed constitutional amendment, statutory initiative, or referendum measure.” Section 49.5 requires citizen challenges to summary statements or fiscal notes to be filed within ten calendar days of certification, requires any challenge to be determined by the trial court within ten calendar days after the action is filed, and authorizes the trial court to adopt an order with a ballot title or fiscal note that meets the requirements of the law should the challenge be sustained. Section 49.6 describes the time within which a challenge under Section 49.5 must be fully resolved, including all appeals. Section 49.7 requires all other challenges to the sufficiency of a petition to be brought within ten days after the Secretary has certified the petition.

The Secretary prepared a proposed summary statement for the Initiative Petition as follows:

Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to make initiative and referendum a fundamental right, have approved measures take effect in 30 days, restrict legislative changes for five years unless three-fourths of both chambers approve, and thereby increase the influence over state law by persons not required to be Missouri citizens or elected officials?

The Secretary certified the official ballot title ¹ for the Initiative Petition on October 15, 2025.

On October 24, 2005, Caitlyn Adams (“Adams”), a Missouri citizen, filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cole County (“trial court”) challenging the official ballot title pursuant to section 116.190.² Specifically, Adams challenged the phrase in the summary statement that reads “and thereby increase the influence over state law by persons not required to be Missouri citizens or elected officials.” Adams contended that this nineteen-word phrase is insufficient and unfair because the quoted words are not a central purpose of the Initiative Petition; do not describe a probable or potential effect of the measure; and are misleading and prejudicial, as the Initiative Petition would actually increase the power of Missouri citizens over state law. The Secretary filed an answer in response to Adams's petition denying any deficiencies in the summary statement, and asserting an affirmative defense that the certified summary statement is fair and sufficient.

On January 9, 2026, the trial court entered an order finding the certified summary statement to be insufficient and unfair because the nineteen-word phrase challenged by Adams is “argumentative and likely to create prejudice.” The trial court directed the Secretary to revise the summary statement pursuant to section 116.190.4(2)(a)³ within seven days.

On January 16, 2026, the Secretary submitted a first revised summary statement for the Initiative Petition as follows:

Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to restrict the General Assembly from legislating in response to recently enacted initiative petitions approved under Article III, Section 49 unless three-fourths of each chamber approve, have approved initiative measures take effect in 30 days, and limit the ability of trial courts to review challenges to the language of any ballot title certified by the Secretary of State?

The Secretary noted that the first revised summary statement removed the offending nineteen-word phrase. The Secretary explained that the first revised summary statement also removed reference to characterizing the power of initiative and referendum as a fundamental right because that was not necessary. Finally, the Secretary explained that the first revised summary statement added reference to limiting trial court review of challenges because even though much of the Initiative Petition's language constitutionalized existing statutory processes, the Initiative Petition required summary statement and fiscal note challenges to be determined by the trial court within ten days.

Adams objected to the first revised summary statement because section 116.190 does not authorize the Secretary to make “wholesale revisions” to a summary statement when only a part of the originally certified summary statement is found to be insufficient and unfair. Adams also objected to removal of the language that makes the power of initiative and referendum a fundamental right because this is a central purpose of the Initiative Petition and is language that was certified as sufficient and fair in the Secretary's original summary statement. Finally, Adams objected to the new language suggesting the Initiative Petition would “limit the ability of trial courts to review challenges to the language of any ballot title certified by the Secretary of State” because the Initiative Petition guarantees that trial courts will be able to determine challenges to the sufficiency and fairness of a ballot title, and will have the power to certify modified language should a challenge be sustained.

The parties argued their respective positions on the Secretary's first revised summary statement during a January 30, 2026 hearing. In addition to the arguments raised in her written opposition, Adams argued that the Secretary's first revised summary statement should be disregarded altogether because it had been prepared and submitted pursuant to section 116.190.4(2), which was rendered void ab initio when Senate Bill 22 was declared unconstitutional by the Missouri Supreme Court on January 23, 2026.⁴ The Secretary argued that the intervening unconstitutionality of section 116.190.4(2) does not apply retroactively to the first revised summary statement, or alternatively that the first revised summary statement could be nonetheless considered as a suggested revision submitted in response to rejection of the original summary statement as insufficient and unfair.

On April 2, 2026, the trial court entered its judgment (“Judgment”). The trial court found that prior to the voided revisions to section 116.190, settled law in Missouri cautioned restraint in modifying summary statements so that modifications were no broader than necessary to address specific identified deficiencies. The trial court then rejected the Secretary's first revised summary statement “for having suggested revisions that are too broad and for introducing new problematic language.” The trial court exercised its authority pursuant to section 116.190 as it existed prior to Senate Bill 22, and certified the following summary statement portion of the official ballot title for the Initiative Petition:

Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to make initiative and referendum a fundamental right, have approved measures take effect in 30 days, and restrict legislative changes for five years unless three-fourths of both chambers approve[?]

With the exception of adding the word “and” before the phrase “restrict legislative changes,” the trial court thus certified verbatim the Secretary's original summary statement, omitting only the nineteen-word phrase challenged by Adams and determined to be insufficient and unfair in the trial court's January 9, 2026 order.

On April 6, 2026, the Secretary filed this appeal from the trial court's January 9, 2026 order and from the Judgment.⁵ This appeal has been expedited as Adams's challenge to the Secretary's summary statement must be fully and finally resolved, including all appeals, by April 22, 2026, pursuant to section 116.190.5.

Standard of Review

“De novo review of the trial court's legal conclusions about the propriety of the [Secretary's] summary statement ․ is the appropriate standard of review when there is no underlying factual dispute that would require deference to the trial court's factual findings.” Brown v. Carnahan, 370 S.W.3d 637, 653 (Mo. banc 2012).

Analysis

The Secretary raises three points on appeal respectively challenging the trial court's January 9, 2026 order determining the certified summary statement to be insufficient and unfair; challenging the Judgment's conclusion that the first revised summary statement was insufficient and unfair; and challenging whether the summary statement certified by the trial court in the Judgment is sufficient and fair.

The Secretary's first point challenges the determination in the trial court's January 9, 2026 order that the Secretary's certified summary statement is insufficient and unfair because the nineteen-word phrase “and thereby increase the influence over state law by persons not required to be Missouri citizens or elected officials” is argumentative and likely to create prejudice. The Secretary argues that the nineteen-word phrase described a probable consequence of the Initiative Petition without bias, prejudice, deception, or favoritism because no provision of Missouri law “prohibits out-of-state-entities from spending to influence initiative petitions.”

“The Secretary of State is responsible for drafting the official summary statements for constitutional amendments proposed by initiative petitions.” Hill v. Ashcroft, 526 S.W.3d 299, 307-08 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017) (citing section 116.190.1). A summary statement must “accurately reflect the legal and probable effects of the proposed initiative” and “inform voters of the central feature[s] of the initiative.” Brown, 370 S.W.3d at 654; McCarty v. Mo. Sec'y of State, 710 S.W.3d 507, 515 (Mo. banc 2025). The summary statement is “intended to provide voters with enough information that they are made aware of the subject and purpose of the initiative and allow the voter to make an informed decision as to whether to investigate the initiative further.” Hill, 526 S.W.3d at 308. “It is incumbent upon the Secretary in the initiative process to promote an informed decision of the probable effect of the proposed amendment.” Id. (quoting Cures Without Cloning v. Pund, 259 S.W.3d 76, 82 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008)). But, language addressing the probable effect of an initiative petition must not be deceptive, misleading, or argumentative. Id. (holding that a summary statement “may be broad so as to encompass matters not included in the measure so long as it is not deceptive, misleading, or argumentative”).

Here, the nineteen-word phrase found by the trial court to be insufficient and unfair addressed a matter not expressly encompassed in the Initiative Petition, and was instead intended by the Secretary to inform voters of the “probable effect” of the Initiative Petition. As the party challenging the Secretary's certified summary statement, Adams bore the burden to show that the challenged nineteen-word phrase was insufficient or unfair. Id. “Insufficient means ‘inadequate; especially lacking adequate power, capacity, or competence.’ The word ‘unfair’ means to be ‘marked by injustice, partiality, or deception.’ Thus, the words insufficient and unfair ․ mean to inadequately and with bias, prejudice, deception and/or favoritism state the [consequence of the initiative].” Id. (quoting State ex rel. Humane Soc'y v. Beetem, 317 S.W.3d 669, 673 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010)).

In Adams's petition, and in the trial brief she submitted before the trial court entered its January 9, 2026 order, Adams argued that the nineteen-word phrase she was challenging was insufficient and unfair, as no provision in the Initiative Petition gives a role to persons who are not Missouri citizens or Missouri officials. Adams argued that instead, the Initiative Petition strengthens the people's power of initiative by restricting the general assembly's ability to immediately repeal initiatives passed by a popular vote of the people. Adams explained that the initiative and referendum process require signatures of a specified number of registered Missouri voters before a matter can be placed on the ballot. Mo. Const. article III, sections 51 and 52(a). Adams explained that initiatives and referendums must receive a certain percentage of the votes cast to pass, and that to qualify as a voter, one must be a Missouri citizen. Mo. Const. article VIII, section 2. Finally, Adams noted that the Initiative Petition constitutionalizes a method for Missouri citizens to challenge the components of an official ballot title.

The Secretary argued in its trial brief that the nineteen-word phrase describing the “probable effect” of the Initiative Petition was not insufficient and unfair because “money pours into Missouri in support of candidates and causes,” and that “[t]his money influences elections.” The Secretary argued that the influence of foreign-sourced money on local elections prompted the general assembly to pass a law prohibiting ballot measure committees from accepting funds from foreign nationals, but that no Missouri law prohibits “domestic, out-of-state money from pouring in to create and support various initiatives and referenda.” The Secretary argued that “wealthy financiers around the United States have jumped at the opportunity to take advantage of this lack of regulation.” The Secretary urged that the influence of out-of-state money would increase by virtue of the Initiative Petition because of the restrictions imposed on the general assembly to override an approved initiative.

The trial court rejected the Secretary's arguments and found the nineteen-word phrase in the certified summary statement describing the “probable effect” of the Initiative Petition to be argumentative and prejudicial. The trial court did not commit legal error in doing so.

The Secretary's concerns about the influence of out-of-state money on Missouri elections, even assuming they are grounded in fact, describe the status quo, and thus a state of affairs that exists independent of, and not as a result of, the Initiative Petition. So long as the general assembly elects not to pass legislation restricting or limiting domestic, out-of-state money from influencing elections (as the Secretary states has been done for foreign sourced money), out-of-state proponents and opponents of election matters will continue to have the ability to “influence” initiative elections.

The Secretary's certified summary statement opined that the Initiative Petition would “thereby increase the influence over state law by persons not required to be Missouri citizens or elected officials.” There is no reasoned basis to argue that this would be the probable legal effect of the Initiative Petition, as the Initiative Petition proposes no change to any law that addresses out-of-state participation in the initiative process. Nor is there a reasoned basis to argue that this would be the probable practical effect of the Initiative Petition. The Secretary does not argue that the Initiative Petition will “increase the influence” that domestic, out-of-state money already allegedly has on whether Missouri citizens vote to approve an initiative. Nor does the Secretary claim that the Initiative Petition will “increase influence” because it will yield the probable outcome of more out-of-state money pouring into Missouri to influence elections. Instead, the status quo about which the Secretary expresses grave concern will remain unchanged by the Initiative Petition, as according to the Secretary, the initiative process will remain “uniquely susceptible to out-of-state influence” because Missouri law “does not prohibit domestic, out-of-state money from pouring in to the State to create and support various initiatives.”

It is therefore deceptive, misleading, and argumentative to state that the probable effect of the Initiative Petition will be to “increase the influence” of persons not required to be Missouri citizens or elected officials over state law, when the argued source of that influence--domestic, out-of-state money--will not be altered by the Initiative Petition, and when the alleged effect of domestic, out-of-state money--inundating voters with information in order to encourage support for an initiative--will not be altered by the Initiative Petition.

The Secretary nonetheless argues that the Initiative Petition will “increase influence over state law by persons not required to be Missouri citizens or elected officials” because restrictions on the general assembly's ability to override a successful initiative will “insulat[e] initiatives from review” by “enshrin[ing] policies in Missouri law unchecked by the legislature.” This explanation for the challenged nineteen-word phrase in the Initiative Petition does not logically align with a probable effect of “increas[ing] influence over state law” by non-Missouri citizens or elected officials. Instead, the Secretary's explanation for the nineteen-word phrase in the Initiative Petition aligns with a concern that the Initiative Petition will have the probable effect of decreasing the influence of the general assembly over initiatives that have already been approved by Missouri voters. This is, indeed, a probable effect of the Initiative Petition as it is a central feature of the Initiative Petition. But, the nineteen-word phrase in the Secretary's certified summary statement does not express the “probable effect” of the Initiative Petition in these terms. Instead, the nineteen-word phrase cloaks the probable effect of the Initiative Petition behind inflammatory language that diverts attention to the alleged influx of domestic, out-of-state money, and thus to a state of affairs that preexists, and will not be changed by, the Initiative Petition. As such, the nineteen-word phrase in the certified summary statement “ ‘inadequately and with bias, prejudice, deception and/or favoritism state[s] the [consequence of the initiative],’ ” as it appears calculated to enhance the likelihood that the Initiative Petition will fail, and not to inform voters “to make an informed decision as to whether to investigate the [Initiative Petition] further.” Hill, 526 S.W.3d at 308 (quoting State ex rel. Humane Soc'y, 317 S.W.3d at 673).

The trial court did not commit legal error when it concluded that the nineteen-word phrase in the Secretary's certified summary statement challenged by Adams is insufficient and unfair because it does not “accurately reflect the legal and probable effects” of the Initiative Petition. Brown, 370 S.W.3d at 654 (quoting Mo. Mun. League v. Carnahan, 303 S.W.3d 573, 584 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010)).

Point One is denied.

The Secretary's second point on appeal complains that the Judgment erroneously concluded that the Secretary's first revised summary statement was insufficient and unfair because the first revised summary statement accurately summarized the central features of the Initiative Petition without bias, prejudice, deception, or favoritism.

The first revised summary statement was submitted by the Secretary on January 16, 2026, pursuant to the multi-step revision process described in section 116.190.4(2) as amended in 2025. The 2025 amendment to section 116.190.4 was included in Senate Bill 22. Senate Bill 22 was declared unconstitutional in its entirety by the Missouri Supreme Court on procedural grounds ⁶ on January 23, 2026, in Nicholson v. State, No. SC101308, ––– S.W.3d ––––, 2026 WL 202013 (Mo. banc Jan. 23, 2026). “As a general rule, legislation that is unconstitutional is void ab initio.” Mo. Bankers Ass'n v. St. Louis Cnty., 448 S.W.3d 267, 274 (Mo. banc 2014). As a result, the summary statement revision process described in section 116.190.4(2) and relied on by the Secretary to submit a first revised summary statement was void ab initio, that is, from its enactment. See City of Normandy v. Kehoe, 709 S.W.3d 327, 334 (Mo. banc 2025) (holding that “[w]hen a statute is declared unconstitutional, that declaration has a definite and certain effect. ‘An unconstitutional statute is no law and confers no rights. This is true from its enactment, and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it.’ ”) (quoting State ex rel. Miller v. O'Malley, 342 Mo. 641, 117 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Mo. banc 1938)). Where legislation is declared unconstitutional on procedural grounds, section 3.066 requires the version of the statute as existed immediately prior to enactment of the unconstitutional legislation to be reprinted as the controlling law.

Because Senate Bill 22 was declared unconstitutional on procedural grounds before the Judgment was entered, section 3.066 thus required the trial court to consider the Secretary's first revised summary statement pursuant to the version of section 116.190 in effect prior to enactment of Senate Bill 22. Read together, sections 116.190.3 and .4 authorize a citizen to challenge a summary statement as insufficient or unfair, and authorize a trial court to determine whether the challenge should be sustained. Notably, these sections make no provision for remand of a summary statement to the Secretary for revision if it is determined to be insufficient or unfair.⁷ Cures Without Cloning, 259 S.W.3d at 83 (holding that section 116.190 makes “no provision for ․ remand of [a] summary statement” that is determined by a trial court to be insufficient or unfair). As a result, the trial court was not legally authorized to treat the Secretary's first revised summary statement as an official substitute for the Secretary's original certified summary statement. And, the trial court was not legally authorized to afford the first revised summary statement the same process for review of its sufficiency and fairness as was applicable to the original certified summary statement.

The Secretary disagrees with this conclusion. The Secretary argues that the declared procedural unconstitutionality of Senate Bill 22 does not apply retroactively, and that the first revised summary statement must be viewed as having been properly submitted pursuant to the multi-step revision process described in section 116.190.4(2). The Secretary's contention is without merit.

In Toder v. Hoskins, 730 S.W.3d 129, 135 n.3 (Mo. App. W.D. Jan. 29, 2026), and in Omohundro v. Hoskins, 729 S.W.3d 772, 777 n.3 (Mo. App. W.D. Jan. 29, 2026), this court held that the declaration of Senate Bill 22's unconstitutionality should not be “retroactively” applied because the effect would be to defeat the legislative purpose of allowing citizens to challenge the sufficiency and fairness of an official ballot title. In both Toder and Omohundro, final judgments had already been entered when Senate Bill 22 was declared unconstitutional, and those final judgments certified as sufficient and fair revised summary statements submitted by the Secretary pursuant to the multi-step revision process contemplated by section 116.190.4(2). The summary statements certified by the final judgments in both cases were thus irreversible byproducts of the unconstitutional process described in section 116.190.4(2). Our willingness notwithstanding to review the sufficiency and fairness of the unconstitutionally prepared summary statements was consistent with, and readily explained by, the “good faith compliance” exception to the general rule that unconstitutional legislation is void ab initio, except where injustice would arise from applying the general rule. State ex rel. Pub. Def. Comm'n v. Cnty. Ct. of Greene Cnty., 667 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Mo. banc 1984). The good faith compliance exception had obvious application in Toder and Omohundro. In both cases, but for application of the exception, the Secretary's revised summary statement certified as sufficient and fair by a final judgment would have been invalid because it was prepared in reliance on a statutory process that had since been declared void ab intio, leaving no certified summary statement to review on appeal. And, but for application of the exception, the legislative purpose of allowing citizens to challenge the sufficiency and fairness of an official ballot title would have been defeated.

The loose references in Toder and Omohundro to the declared unconstitutionality of Senate Bill 22 not being applied retroactively were not, however, broad holdings of general application to all cases involving challenges to summary statements. They were instead case specific holdings driven by what would otherwise be an injustice in light of good faith reliance by the Secretary, a citizen challenger, and the trial court on an unconstitutional law under circumstances that could no longer be remediated, in sharp contrast with the circumstances in this case. Toder and Omohundro did not, nor could they have, abrogated our Supreme Court's binding determination that as a general rule, legislation that is unconstitutional is void ab initio, that is, from its enactment. Mo. Bankers Ass'n, 448 S.W.3d at 274. Nor did Toder or Omohundro abrogate the statutory requirement that a law declared unconstitutional on procedural grounds immediately resorts to the version of the law in existence prior to enactment of the unconstitutional law. Section 3.066.

The inescapable effect is that when the Missouri Supreme Court declared Senate Bill 22 to be unconstitutional on procedural grounds, section 116.190 as amended in 2025 was rendered void ab initio, requiring immediate resort to the version of section 116.190 in existence prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 22.⁸ As explained, this general rule applies “unless injustice occurs as a result of good faith compliance” with section 116.190 as amended in 2025. See State ex rel. Pub. Def. Comm'n, 667 S.W.2d at 413. No such injustice is alleged to have occurred here, nor would we find there to be one. The Secretary had both the legal obligation and the opportunity to prepare a certified summary statement for the Initiative Petition that complies with the law. The Secretary claims that he did just that, and argues even now that the original certified summary statement was sufficient and fair. No injustice or hardship befalls the Secretary, Adams, or the trial court merely because the timing of the declared unconstitutionality of Senate Bill 22 deprived the Secretary of multiple chances to write a legally compliant summary statement. Instead, because the trial court had not yet rendered a final judgment when Senate Bill 22 was declared unconstitutional, it was bound to view the Secretary's first revised summary statement pursuant to the version of section 116.190 that was in existence prior to Senate Bill 22. It follows that the first revised summary statement was not entitled to review for its sufficiency and fairness pursuant to section 116.190.4(2) as amended in 2025.

Cognizant of this possibility, the Secretary argued during the January 30, 2026 hearing before the trial court that the first revised summary statement should be considered as a suggestion offered in response to the trial court's determination that the Secretary's original certified summary statement was insufficient and unfair. The Secretary makes the same argument on appeal. The Secretary is correct that despite the declared unconstitutionality of section 116.190.4(2), nothing prevented the trial court from considering suggestions from the parties about how the insufficient and unfair original certified summary statement could be revised. See Omohundro v. Hoskins, 729 S.W.3d 772, 777 n.3 (Mo. App. W.D. Jan. 29, 2026). Even viewed in this light, however, the trial court did not commit legal error in refusing to certify a summary statement in the Judgment that mirrored the Secretary's first revised summary statement. In fact, the trial court would have committed legal error had it done so.

The trial court's Judgment correctly observed that “Missouri courts have regularly cautioned restraint in the modification of summary statements and have indicated that modifications should be made in the most limited fashion possible.” Copenhaver v. Ashcroft, 697 S.W.3d 601, 603 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (quoting Fitz-James v. Ashcroft, 678 S.W.3d 194, 214 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023)). “Missouri courts have recognized that ‘[s]ection 116.190 allows the trial court to correct any insufficient or unfair language of the ballot title and to certify the corrected official ballot title to the secretary of state.’ ”⁹ Cures Without Cloning, 259 S.W.3d at 83 (quoting Overfelt v. McCaskill, 81 S.W.3d 732, 736 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002)). Although section 116.190 plainly empowers a trial court to correct a summary statement that it determines is insufficient or unfair, a trial court “has no authority to rewrite the summary statement but only to correct the aspect of the language that rendered it unfair or insufficient.” Fitz-James, 678 S.W.3d at 214 (citing Cures Without Cloning, 259 S.W.3d at 83).

Here, the only language in the Secretary's certified summary statement that was found to be insufficient and unfair was the nineteen-word phrase “and thereby increase the influence over state law by persons not required to be Missouri citizens or elected officials.” To correct this aspect of the language deemed insufficient and unfair, the first revised summary statement abandoned the offending phrase, and offered no language as an alternative.

But, the first revised summary statement went beyond correcting language deemed insufficient and unfair. It deleted reference to the people's power of the initiative and referendum as a “fundamental right,” even though that language was certified by the Secretary in the original summary statement, and was neither challenged by Adams nor found by the trial court to be insufficient and unfair in the January 9, 2026 order. The first revised summary statement also added new language stating that the Initiative Petition would “limit the ability of trial courts to review challenges to the language of any ballot title certified by the Secretary of State.” These modifications did not address the only language in the Secretary's certified summary statement that was found by the trial court to be insufficient and unfair. The trial court did not commit legal error by refusing to certify as sufficient and fair the Secretary's first revised summary statement.

Point Two is denied.

The Secretary's third point on appeal argues that the summary statement certified by the trial court was erroneous because it “differed substantially from the revised language properly presented to the [trial] court by the Secretary,” and erroneously omitted reference to the limitations on trial courts to review ballot title challenges.

The Secretary's third point on appeal depends for its success on our acceptance of the Secretary's contention in the second point on appeal that the trial court remained bound to view the first revised summary statement as a statutorily authorized revision to the original summary statement despite the intervening declaration of Senate Bill 22 as unconstitutional. We have already explained that this contention is without merit. It follows that the Secretary's third point on appeal, which presupposes that in certifying a summary statement, the trial court had to begin with and work from the first revised summary statement, is without merit.

Ironically, the Secretary acknowledges that settled law prohibits a trial court from wholesale rewriting a summary statement that has been determined to be insufficient and unfair. However, as we have explained, these conceded legal limitations apply to the trial court's authority to rewrite the Secretary's original certified summary statement, and not the first revised summary statement. As the Secretary concedes, these legal authorities thus afforded the trial court no authority to wholesale rewrite the Secretary's original certified summary statement after concluding that the nineteen-word phrase challenged by Adams was insufficient and unfair. Rather, the trial court's authority was limited to correcting “the aspect of the language that rendered [the original certified summary statement] unfair or insufficient.” Fitz-James, 678 S.W.3d at 214 (citing Cures Without Cloning, 259 S.W.3d at 83). The Initiative Petition features addressing trial court review of ballot title challenges were not addressed in the Secretary's original certified summary statement. Adding reference to those features in the trial court's certified summary statement merely because those features were referenced for the first time in the Secretary's first revised summary statement ¹⁰ would have been legally erroneous as the reference would have gone beyond correcting the aspect of the language in the Secretary's original certified summary statement that was determined to be insufficient and unfair. See Pippens v. Ashcroft, 606 S.W.3d 689, 713 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (noting that after identifying deficiencies in a summary statement, the court should work from the existing summary and modify that language in the most limited fashion possible).

Point Three is denied.

Conclusion

The trial court's January 9, 2026 order, and the trial court's April 2, 2026 Judgment are affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “An official ballot title consists of a summary statement prepared by the Secretary of State and a fiscal note summary prepared by the State Auditor.” Fitz-James v. Ashcroft, 678 S.W.3d 194, 199 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023).

2.   Adams's petition was filed pursuant to section 116.190 as revised in 2025 as a part of Senate Bill 22 (2025). However, Senate Bill 22 (2025) was declared unconstitutional in its entirety on procedural grounds in Nicholson v. State, No. SC101308, ––– S.W.3d ––––, 2026 WL 202013 (Mo. banc Jan. 23, 2026), with the effect being immediate resort to section 116.190 as it existed prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 22 (2025). See section 3.066. As a result, except as otherwise noted, all references to section 116.190 are to the version in effect prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 22 (2025).All further references in this opinion to Senate Bill 22 are to Senate Bill 22 (2025).

3.   Section 116.190.4(2) was a part of the 2025 amendment to section 116.190 included in Senate Bill 22, which was declared unconstitutional in Nicholson v. State, No. SC 101308, ––– S.W.3d ––––, 2026 WL 202013 (Mo. banc January 23, 2026). Section 116.190.4(2) described a multi-step revision process wherein the Secretary could make several attempts to submit a summary statement to the trial court for review to determine whether it was sufficient and fair, after which the trial court would be authorized to revise the summary statement to be sufficient and fair.

4.   Nicholson v. State, No. SC101308, ––– S.W.3d ––––, 2026 WL 202013 (Mo. banc Jan. 23, 2026).

5.   Pursuant to Rule 81.045, on April 6, 2026, the Secretary filed in the trial court an unopposed motion to shorten the time the trial court retains Rule 75.01 control over its Judgment to permit the immediate filing of this appeal.

6.   Senate Bill 22 was declared unconstitutional because it “violated the original purpose requirement of article III, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution.” Nicholson v. State, No. SC101308, ––– S.W.3d ––––, 2026 WL 202013, *7 (Mo. banc Jan. 23, 2026). The original purpose requirement is a procedural requirement of the Missouri Constitution. Id. at *4.

7.   “Section 116.190.3 uses the words, ‘insufficient or unfair (emphasis added), while Cures Without Cloning and other cases have used the word ‘and’ in place of the word ‘or, when analyzing this provision. We note that the proper consideration is whether the ballot title is ‘insufficient or unfair.” Mo. Mun. League, 303 S.W.3d at 552 n.6.

8.   The Secretary argues in his Brief that it is a settled principle that procedural changes in the law are given prospective effect only and cites several cases in support of this proposition. Johnson v. St. John's Mercy Med. Ctr., 812 S.W.2d 845, 851 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991); State v. Shafer, 609 S.W.2d 153, 157 (Mo. banc 1980); Koebel v. Tieman Coal & Material Co., 337 Mo. 561, 85 S.W.2d 519, 525 (1935). The cases relied on by the Secretary are of no application here, as they address the adoption of new statutes or amendments to existing rules or statutes, and not a scenario where an exiting statute is declared to be unconstitutional, and thus void from the date of its enactment.

9.   “These decisions are consistent with [s]ection 116.190.3, which allows a petitioner in circuit court to request a ‘different summary statement’ if the Secretary's ballot title is determined insufficient or unfair.” Cures Without Cloning, 259 S.W.3d at 83.

10.   We need not address the sufficiency or fairness of the language in the Secretary's first revised summary statement claiming that a central feature of the Initiative Petition will be to “limit the ability of trial courts to review challenges to the language of any ballot title certified by the Secretary of State.” However, we observe that the Secretary conceded in the trial court, and concedes again on appeal, that the Initiative Petition largely constitutionalizes ballot title challenge procedures that are already authorized by Missouri statutes, and thus does not change existing law. The only exception highlighted by the Secretary is the Initiative Petition's requirement that ballot title challenges must be determined by a trial court within ten days of their filing. This narrow new “limit” on the ability of trial courts to review challenges to the language of a certified ballot title is not, however, what is described in the Secretary's first revised summary statement.

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

All concur