ARMSTRONG v. STATE (2026)

Rafael M. Armstrong appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri (“motion court”), denying, after an evidentiary hearing, his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 24.035. In his single point on appeal, Armstrong claims that the motion court clearly erred in denying his motion because his guilty plea was not voluntary in that it was entered under the mistaken belief that he would be able to challenge, after his guilty plea, the trial court's pre-trial denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm the judgment of the motion court.

Factual and Procedural Background

On August 15, 2018, Armstrong was charged with seven felonies for events that occurred on June 9, 2018, and with three felonies for events that occurred on August 10, 2018. On February 28, 2019, Armstrong was charged as a prior and persistent offender with three felonies, including first degree murder, for events that occurred on August 5, 2018, and which were unrelated to the prior charges. Armstrong filed a motion to suppress in the case arising from the events on August 5, 2018, regarding evidence seized “during a protective sweep” of a hotel room. The trial court initially granted Armstrong's motion to suppress, including a firearm that was later connected to the murder, found in his hotel room. However, after additional briefing and a second evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the State's motion to reconsider, which would have allowed the evidence to be admitted in Armstrong's criminal trial(s).

On August 5, 2022, pursuant to a plea agreement, Armstrong changed his plea to guilty to an amended charge of Murder in the Second Degree, section 565.021.¹ As part of a plea agreement, the State recommended that Armstrong receive a sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment on the charge of murder. The State further agreed to dismiss the remaining twelve counts in both cases which were pending against Armstrong. The court followed the plea agreement and sentenced Armstrong to a term of twenty years in the Department of Corrections.

At the plea hearing, Armstrong affirmed that he understood that if he went to trial and was found guilty, he would have the right to appeal.

At the sentencing hearing, the plea court questioned Armstrong:

Court: Mr. Armstrong, I am going to ask you as I did before, have you had enough time to talk to your attorney?

Armstrong: Yes.

Court: Has she done everything you wanted her to do?

Armstrong: Yes.

Court: And you are satisfied with her services?

Armstrong: Yes.

Court: And once again, no one has forced or coerced you to plead guilty?

Armstrong: No.

Court: And no [one] has made a promise to you that we haven't talked about in our previous hearing when I accepted your plea of guilty and I found you were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of this charge? No one has made an effort to make a promise to you in any way?

Armstrong: No.

Armstrong filed a timely motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 24.035.² An amended motion was timely filed by appointed counsel, alleging that Armstrong's plea was involuntary because his plea counsel advised him that he could challenge the ruling on his suppression motion even though he had entered a guilty plea; he also alleged that his plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective. An evidentiary hearing was held on the amended motion and Armstrong testified, as did his plea counsel (“Counsel”). Counsel was questioned about the suppression issue. Plea Counsel testified that she specifically advised Armstrong that, by pleading guilty, he would be waiving his right to appellate review of the suppression ruling.

Counsel then explained that she was able to negotiate a recommended sentence of twenty years on the murder charge, and the other case, which involved multiple felony charges arising from a shooting at a gas station, would be dismissed entirely. Counsel stated she “was very much concerned that even if we went to trial on the murder charge and were able to win that case, he would still end up in prison for a fairly lengthy period on the gas station case.” Counsel testified that she talked with Armstrong about the effect the plea would have on their legal arguments regarding the motion to suppress and that “if he entered the plea, we could not directly appeal anything.” Counsel informed Armstrong that if he wanted to try to challenge that the “statutory rule scheme” was unconstitutional, she would help him try to do that in a motion for post-conviction, but it would be a “very long route” and she was not sure it would be successful. She also informed him that if he were successful in his post-conviction challenge that the first-degree murder charge and other charges that were dismissed as part of the plea agreement could be reinstated and he would again face the possibility of a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole as well as other lengthy sentences.

The motion court found that Counsel was not constitutionally ineffective and that Armstrong's testimony regarding his pre-trial conversations with Counsel were “not credible.” The judgment noted that Armstrong acknowledged that prior to his plea he was facing thirteen felony charges in two criminal cases. The judgment noted that “evidence was adduced that [Armstrong] was facing the potential of life without parole plus about fifteen years in the homicide case and approximately eighty-two years in the dismissed gas station shooting case.” The motion court's judgment found Armstrong's assertion that he relied on Counsel's promise of an appeal of the suppression issue was not credible and therefore denied the claim. Armstrong only appeals the motion court's judgment on the issue of the voluntariness of his guilty plea due to the alleged advice of counsel that he could raise a challenge to the ruling on the suppression issue on appeal following his guilty plea.

Standard of Review

We review the denial of a motion for post-conviction relief for clear error. Staten v. State, 624 S.W.3d 748, 750 (Mo. banc 2021); Rule 24.035(k). A judgment is clearly erroneous only “when, in light of the entire record, the court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.” Flaherty v. State, 694 S.W.3d 413, 416 (Mo. banc 2024) (citation modified). “We review the record in the light most favorable to the motion court's judgment, accepting as true all evidence and inferences that support the judgment and disregarding evidence and inferences that are contrary to the judgment.” Shores v. State, 674 S.W.3d 127, 129 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (citation modified). “Determinations concerning credibility are exclusively for the motion court[,] and it is free to believe or disbelieve any evidence, whether contradicted or undisputed.” Rainey v. State, 696 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024). The movant bears the burden of proof as the motion court's judgment is presumed correct. Forrest v. State, 290 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Mo. banc 2009).

Analysis

A guilty plea “must be a voluntary expression of the defendant's choice and a knowing and intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences of the act.” Wills v. State, 321 S.W.3d 375, 379 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010). Armstrong's sole point on appeal ³ is that the motion court clearly erred in finding that Armstrong's guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily because Counsel misrepresented to him that he could challenge the ruling on the motion to suppress after his guilty plea and sentencing. We disagree.

The motion court found it “[f]atal” to Armstrong's motion that Counsel credibly testified that she specifically informed Armstrong he could not challenge the denial of his motion to suppress by either a direct appeal or through Rule 24.035, and that the motion court, at his plea hearing, “specifically advised [Armstrong] during the plea colloquy that he was waiving his right to an appeal in the case.” The motion court concluded that Armstrong's “assertion that he relied on Counsel[‘s] promise of an appeal [was] not credible.” (LF 6, p.14). Because we defer to the motion court's assessment of credibility, Armstrong's appeal fails.

Conclusion

For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the judgment of the motion court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to the Missouri Revised Statutes (2016) as updated by supplement as of 2018, the year of Armstrong's offenses.

2.   All Rule References are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2025) unless otherwise noted.

3.   Armstrong's point on appeal alleges that his rights to “due process and effective assistance of counsel” were violated, but supports this assertion only with “because his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently” due to his mistaken beliefs caused by counsel's “misrepresentation.” To the extent that Armstrong is attempting to make both arguments in his single point on appeal it is multifarious and thus leaves nothing for review and subjects his appeal to dismissal. Kirk v. State, 520 S.W.3d 443, 450 n.3 (Mo. banc 2017). We will assume his point is only challenging the judgment's ruling as to its finding that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.

Gary D. Witt, Presiding Judge

All concur