JOSHUA WILLIAMS v. STATE OF MISSOURI (2026)

Introduction

Joshua Williams appeals the St. Charles County circuit court judgment denying his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief after he pleaded guilty to felony offenses in three separate cases on July 18, 2023.¹ In his only point on appeal, Williams claims the motion court erred in denying his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing because his punishment exceeds the lawful amount, violating his due process rights. Williams asserts the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDC) unlawfully required that he serve 80 percent of his seven-year sentence before becoming eligible for parole for the class D felony of driving while intoxicated as an aggravated offender. Williams requests this court order MDC to rescind the imposed minimum prison term ² pursuant to section 558.019.2(3) RSMo or, in the alternative, remand for an evidentiary hearing.

Williams’ claim is not cognizable under Rule 24.035 because his motion challenges the determination of his parole eligibility rather than his original sentence or conviction. The motion court's judgment is affirmed.

Background

On October 25, 2021, law enforcement observed Williams driving suspiciously in the 1600 block of Beale Street in St. Charles County. After law enforcement curbed his vehicle, Williams exhibited “clues of intoxication including slurred speech and droopy eyelids” and performed poorly in a field sobriety test. Williams was arrested and tested positive for several controlled substances, including 4-ANPP, Fentanyl, Norfentanyl, Diphenhydramine, EDDP, Methadone, Methamphetamine and Pseudoephedrine. Following a record check, the Officer determined that Williams previously pleaded guilty to several driving while intoxicated offenses.³ Consequently, the State charged Williams with the class D felony of driving while intoxicated as an “aggravated offender” (Count I) pursuant to section 557.010 RSMo. “Aggravated Offender” is defined as a person previously found guilty of “[t]hree or more intoxication-related traffic offenses committed on separate occasions.” Section 577.001(1)(a) RSMo.

Later, Williams agreed to plead guilty to the collective charges in three different felony cases in exchange for the State dismissing all misdemeanor violations and recommending seven years under section 217.362 RSMo. Pursuant to the agreement, Williams pleaded guilty to one count of delivery of a controlled substance and two counts of possession of a controlled substance in cause 2211-CR02443-01, one count of possession of a controlled substance in cause 211-CR03076-01 and the one count of driving while intoxicated, as an aggravated offender, in cause 2311-CR00036-01. The State dismissed three collective misdemeanor charges. Following the State's recommendation, the circuit court sentenced Williams to seven years, concurrent, pursuant to section 217.362 RSMo, the long-term drug treatment program. After the sentencing, the court advised Williams of his post-conviction rights, including the opportunity to petition the court about his conviction and sentence within 180 days.

Williams filed a timely, amended motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 24.035 asking the court to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment. The circuit court denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing and he now appeals.

Point 1 – Rule 24.035 is the Incorrect Procedural Vehicle for Williams’ Claim

Williams argues the motion court erroneously denied his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing because his punishment exceeded the lawful amount and thus violated his right to due process of law. Williams alleges MDC is misapplying section 558.019.2(3) RSMo when requiring him to serve 80 percent of the driving while intoxicated seven-year sentence. Specifically, he claims his sentence is precluded from the rule because his offense qualifies as a class D felony, not an A or B felony. Section 558.019.2(3) RSMo. (“[T]his section shall only be applicable to the offenses contained in [section 577.010] ․ when punished as a class A or B felony.”). In other words, the 80 percent minimum prison term requirement is inapplicable and MDC should recalculate his parole eligibility to a more prompt date. Section 558.019.2 RSMo.

We conclude the circuit court properly denied Williams’ motion for post-conviction relief because he does not challenge his original sentence or conviction and his claim is not cognizable. Ordering MDC to recalculate his parole eligibility is an inappropriate remedy in post-conviction relief.

Standard of Review

After a circuit court denies a Rule 24.035 post-conviction motion, this court limits its appellate review to determining “whether the findings and conclusions of the trial court are clearly erroneous.” Rule 24.035(k). Findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous if a review of the entire record leaves this court with a “definite and firm impression a mistake has been made.” Welch v. State, 551 S.W.3d 86, 91 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018). The motion court's findings are presumed correct. Id.

“To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a movant must: (1) allege facts, not conclusions, that, if true, would warrant relief; (2) these facts must raise matters not refuted by the record and files in the case; and (3) the matters complained of must have resulted in prejudice to the movant.” Barnett v. State, 103 S.W.3d 765, 769 (Mo. banc 2003). If the court determines the motion, files and record “conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, a hearing shall not be held.” Rule 24.035(h).

Analysis

After pleading guilty to a felony, a person may challenge the imposed conviction or sentence under Rule 24.035, claiming it is unconstitutional, it exceeds the maximum lawful punishment or the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction. See Rule 24.035(a). “Rule 24.035 allows only challenges to the validity of judgments of convictions or sentences, and then only on specified grounds.” Teter v. State, 893 S.W.2d 405, 405 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995) (quoting Wood v. State, 853 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993).

A criminal sentence is a court-imposed penalty consisting of a punishment based on the application of the designated statute's permissible penalty for the offense. Johnson v. Missouri Department of Corrections, 639 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021). Parole eligibility is generally not part of the original judgment or sentence. Id. at 7-8. Thus, challenging a parole determination is not a cognizable claim under Rule 24.035. Trams v. State, 555 S.W.3d 480, 483 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018).

Rule 24.035 is an inappropriate remedy when all of movant's claims relate to the executive branch's administrative rules and regulations. See Durham v. State, 751 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988) (concluding movant's challenge to administrative parole program improper for post-conviction relief). Post-conviction relief is an improper vehicle for ordering MDC to rescind an allegedly unlawful parole determination. See Stout v. State, 745 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Mo. App. E.D. 1987) (finding post-conviction relief an improper remedy to force MDC to implement court's properly imposed sentence as a matter of law).

We hold that the circuit court did not err in denying his Rule 24.035 motion without an evidentiary hearing because his claim is not cognizable. Williams does not challenge his imposed conviction or sentence as unconstitutional; he does not claim it exceeds the maximum authorized by law and he does not assert that the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence. Rather, Williams claims that MDC incorrectly applied the 80 percent minimum prison term requirement to his class D felony driving while intoxicated offense. However, Rule 24.035 is an inappropriate remedy to challenge his parole eligibility. See Trams, 555 S.W.3d at 483. His claim is not cognizable and we cannot grant him relief. Point denied.

Conclusion

For these reasons, we affirm the motion court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2025).

2.   “Minimum prison term” is defined as the “time required to be served by the offender before he or she is eligible for parole, conditional release, or other early release by the department of corrections.” Section 558.019.5.

3.   Williams pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated in St. Charles County on April 18, 2010 and May 20, 2003. He also pleaded guilty to the same charge in Miller County on May 28, 2001.

Thomas C. Clark II, Judge

Renee D. Hardin-Tammons, Presiding Judge, and Angela T. Quigless, Judge, concur.