RONNIE INGLIS v. BNSF RAILWAY CO (2026)

Ronnie Inglis appeals the judgment, after jury trial, of the Platte County Circuit Court. In his sole point on appeal, he claims the trial court erred in submitting BNSF Railway Company's contributory negligence defense to the jury. Inglis argues that the defense was an impermissible assumption of risk defense. The judgment is affirmed.

Facts

In March 2021, Ronnie Inglis filed a petition for damages against BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”) under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, et sequitur. The petition alleged the following: In April 2018, Inglis was employed by BNSF as a truck driver in the maintenance department. Inglis was tasked with repairing a broken rail near Parkville, Missouri on an urgent basis. Inglis worked with a crew he was not familiar with which included himself as a section truck driver, a welder, a grinder, and a laborer.

Inglis drove the BNSF section truck to the Center Leavenworth Yard (“Rail Yard”), located near Platte City, to pick up a section of rail the crew anticipated needing for the urgent repair. The Rail Yard is located on 45 Highway in Platte County. Highway 45 runs north/south, and the Rail Yard is on the west side of the highway. The section of rail was stored to the west of a set of siding tracks and two sets of main line tracks. The siding track and two sets of main line tracks were in between Highway 45 and the needed section of rail.

Inglis and the crew collected the section of rail. To exit the Rail Yard and drive onto Highway 45, the crew had to drive north, stop at a stop sign, and then drive farther north to a road that ran east. After turning right onto this road, the road would run east across the siding tracks and across both sets of main line tracks to an apron that connected to Highway 45.

Inglis alleged that there were a number of problems with the Rail Yard that made it unnecessarily and unreasonably unsafe for an employee driving a section truck to navigate everything he had to navigate to safely enter the stream of traffic on Highway 45. These problems were:

(1) The stop sign faced south and was placed a significant distance from the road that ran east across the various railroad tracks. A driver stopping at the stop sign in a section truck could only see as much of the three sets of tracks extending to the south behind him as his passenger side mirror could reflect;

(2) The area between the railroad tracks was broken down and not maintained so that a person driving a section truck had to focus his attention to maneuver over, around, and through depressions and raised areas at the same time that he was maneuvering over the railroad tracks and ties of the three sets of tracks;

(3) There was insufficient distance between the siding track and the west main line track for a section truck driver to stop before the west main line track without fouling the siding track. This denied the driver a place to stop to study the view from the north and the south for trains along the main lines. This was a problem with respect to train traffic from the south because a passenger, the passenger side pillar, and the passenger door mirror all made it difficult to see to the south along the main line;

(4) Once a section truck driver made it over the siding track and over the terrain between the siding track and the west main line track, the area between the west main line track and the east main line track was also broken down and not maintained. A person driving a section truck had to focus his attention to maneuver over, around, and through depressions and raised areas at the same time that he was maneuvering over the railroad tracks and ties of the main line tracks; and

(5) Once a section truck driver made it to the apron that connected to Highway 45, the apron was too short to allow him to stop there and study the flow of traffic on the highway without fouling the main line track.

Inglis claimed that all of these difficulties demanded the attention of a section truck driver and diverted his attention from train and vehicle traffic, and this attention was already divided among the three sets of tracks in both the north and south direction and Highway 45 in both the north and south direction.

In April 2018, as Inglis was navigating over the east set of main line tracks and onto the apron, the section truck was struck by a northbound train on the east set of main line tracks. The train struck the section truck on the rear passenger side behind the rear axles. The collision spun the truck and knocked it eastward.

Inglis alleged in his petition that the collision with the train cause him severe, permanent, and disabling injuries. He claimed that these injuries were caused by BNSF's violation of the Federal Employer's Liability Act because BNSF failed to provide a reasonably safe place to work, reasonably safe conditions for work, and reasonably safe help and assistance in his work.

In its answer, BNSF asserted as an affirmative defense that Inglis's contributory negligence caused or contributed to cause Inglis's injuries. BNSF claimed that Inglis: (1) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of alertness and situational awareness in the performance of his work activities; and/or (2) failed to exercise reasonable care for his own safety; and/or (3) failed to follow standard safety procedures; and/or (4) violated BNSF's safety and operating rules.

The matter proceeded to jury trial in October 2024. The jury was given Instruction Number 8:

In your verdict, you must assess a percentage of fault to defendant, if you believe:

First, conditions for work were not reasonably safe and defendant knew or by using ordinary care could have known of such conditions and that they were not reasonably safe, and

Second, with respect to such conditions for work, defendant either failed to provide:

reasonably safe conditions for work, or

reasonably safe methods of work, or

reasonably adequate help, and

Third, defendant in any one or more of the respects submitted in Paragraph Second was negligent, and

Fourth, such negligence resulted in whole or in part in injury to plaintiff.

The jury was given Instruction Number 10, which was submitted by BNSF over Inglis's objection:

In your verdict, you must assess a percentage of fault to plaintiff if you believe:

First, plaintiff failed to keep a lookout for and yield to the oncoming trains, and

Second, plaintiff was thereby negligent, and

Third, such negligence of plaintiff resulted in whole or in part in injury to plaintiff.

At the request of Inglis, the jury was also given Instruction Number 11:

Plaintiff does not assume any of the risks of plaintiff's employment. This matter is withdrawn from the case and you are not to consider such evidence in arriving at your verdict.

The jury found that Inglis suffered $3,000,000 in damages. The jury further found that Inglis was 70% contributorily negligent. The trial court accordingly reduced Inglis's damages by the 70% contributory negligence. Inglis was awarded $900,000 in damages. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

“Whether the jury was properly instructed regarding the plaintiff's contributory negligence is a question of law this Court reviews de novo.” Miller v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 591 S.W.3d 29, 44 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to submission of the instruction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Any issue submitted to the jury in an instruction must be supported by substantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably find such issue.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Substantial evidence is evidence which, if true, is probative of the issues and from which the jury can decide the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Analysis

In his sole point on appeal, Inglis claims the trial court erred in submitting BNSF's contributory negligence defense to the jury. He states that the defense was an impermissible assumption of risk defense in violation of 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 54, and 55. Inglis argues that the defense made him liable for the danger BNSF put in Inglis's workplace. He further argues that there was no substantial evidence that he created a danger that was new or additional to the danger BNSF created.

The Federal Employer's Liability Act (“FELA”) is found at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, et sequitur. 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 states:

Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories, or between any of the States and Territories, or between the District of Columbia and any of the States or Territories, or between the District of Columbia or any of the States or Territories and any foreign nation or nations, shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.

Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be considered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this chapter.

(Emphasis added). 45 U.S.C.A. § 54 states:

In any action brought against any common carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter to recover damages for injuries to, or the death of, any of its employees, such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment in any case where such injury or death resulted in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier; and no employee shall be held to have assumed the risks of his employment in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.

(Emphasis added). 45 U.S.C.A. § 53, part of the original 1908 enactment, states:

In all actions on and after April 22, 1908 brought against any such common carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee: Provided, That no such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.

45 U.S.C.A. § 55 states:

Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void: Provided, That in any action brought against any such common carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter, such common carrier may set off therein any sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to the injured employee or the person entitled thereto on account of the injury or death for which said action was brought.

(Emphasis in original).

“Under FELA railroads have a duty to provide [their] employees with a reasonably safe place to work.” Cole v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 713 S.W.3d 180, 190 (Mo. banc 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). “FELA provides that a railroad is liable for damages when its employee is injured due in whole or in part to the railroad's negligence.” Id. (citing 45 U.S.C. sec. 51). “[U]nder section 53, if a jury finds a railroad employee contributorily negligent, it must diminish damages in proportion to the employee's negligence.” Id.

“Congress amended the FELA in 1939 to eliminate the defense of assumption of risk.” Miller, 591 S.W.3d at 37 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 54). “Thus, case[s] tried under the [FELA] [are] to be handled as though no doctrine of assumption of risk had ever existed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Although Congress amended the FELA to eliminate the defense of assumption of risk, contributory negligence remains a viable defense to an FELA general negligence claim.” Id. at 42. “Thus, because contributory negligence on the plaintiff's part reduces his or her damages, while assumption of risk does not, courts have the delicate job of separating out evidence on one theory from evidence on the other.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

In the current case, the jury was given Instruction Number 10, which was submitted by BNSF:

In your verdict, you must assess a percentage of fault to plaintiff if you believe:

First, plaintiff failed to keep a lookout for and yield to the oncoming trains, and

Second, plaintiff was thereby negligent, and

Third, such negligence of plaintiff resulted in whole or in part in injury to plaintiff.

On appeal, Inglis argues that Instruction Number 10 required Inglis to assume the risk of the dangers BNSF negligently placed in Inglis's workplace.

“In determining whether the issue of assumption of risk has been injected into the case, we are guided by the principle that an employee's voluntary, knowledgeable acceptance of a dangerous condition that is necessary for him to perform his duties constitutes an assumption of risk.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]ssumption of risk in the employment context describe[s] the notion of implied consent—when an employee takes a job, he or she consents to assume the risk of any danger he or she knows or should know necessarily is entailed in the job.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Contributory negligence, in contrast, is a careless act or omission on the plaintiff's part tending to add new dangers to conditions that the employer negligently created or permitted to exist.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Contributory negligence involves the notion of some fault or breach of duty on the part of the employee.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Assimilating the above, [a] plaintiff's recovery under the FELA never can be reduced on the basis that he or she implicitly consented to the risk by accepting employment with the railroad or by performing a task in a manner which the employer directed.” Id. at 42-43 (internal quotation marks omitted). “But all other actions of plaintiff are to be handled as though no doctrine of assumption of risk ever existed, and if they are evidence of negligence they should be admitted to show contributory negligence.” Id. at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus, when reasonable alternatives besides quitting or refusing to perform the task in an unsafe way are available, a plaintiff is charged with acting with due care and will be held responsible for acting unreasonably.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Examples of evidence of contributory negligence include failing to follow specific safety instructions reasonably calculated to protect the employee from the injury that occurred; failing to report a defect when the evidence establishes that such reporting would be productive; and failing to act prudently in performing the task.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

On appeal, Inglis argues that his theories of liability were that the conditions at the crossing at the Rail Yard were not reasonably safe, the work methods BNSF employed at the crossing were not reasonably safe, and that the co-workers BNSF provided to Inglis to assist in his work at the crossing failed to provide him reasonably adequate help. Inglis argued that these dangers, put in place by BNSF, required him to give attention to more dangers than he reasonably could give adequate attention. One of the dangers he could not pay attention to was the possibility of train traffic coming from the south. Inglis states that the contributory negligence argument, that he did not look for and yield to train traffic coming from the south, is not a new or additional danger.

“An employee is contributorily negligent when he fails to use those precautions for his own safety, which ordinary prudence requires.” White v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 539 S.W.2d 565, 570 (Mo. App. 1976). “[I]f the employer provides safety precautions of which the employee has failed to take advantage, then that employee is contributorily negligent as a matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In Miller, 591 S.W.3d at 44, this court found that the employer did not inject assumption of risk into the trial where evidence was introduced that the employee (1) violated the employer's safety rules by failing to report defective equipment and (2) that safety was a two-way street and the employee had a duty to act with due care, because this was evidence relevant to contributory negligence. Accordingly, there was also no error in submitting a contributory negligence instruction stating that the jury must assess a percentage of fault to the employee if the jury found the employee “failed to report defective seats including but not limited to loose and wobbly seats, failed to follow railroad safety rules, or failed to operate the locomotive in a safe manner.” Id. at 44.

The evidence at trial, in the light most favorable to the submission of Instruction Number 10 consistent with our standard of review, was: Inglis held a commercial driver's license which imposed on him to obligation to operate the truck and look for trains. BNSF had multiple operating rules. These included: in case of doubt or uncertainty, employees should take the safe course; employees must be alert and attentive to avoid injury; employees must not be careless of their safety; employees must expect the movement of trains at any time, on any track, in any direction; vehicle drivers must operate the vehicle in a careful and safe manner; and employees must look for and yield to trains when crossing tracks. Instruction Number 10, stating that Inglis was contributorily negligent if he “failed to keep a lookout for and yield to the oncoming trains” was not an impermissible assumption of the risk defense. See also Drury v. Missouri P. R. Co., 905 S.W.2d 138, 149 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995) (no error in a contributory negligence instruction stating the employee was contributorily negligent “if he failed to request the assistance of a co-worker to move the drawbar, if he failed to use a pry bar, strap or cable to assist in moving the drawbar, or if he failed to assure that he had sound footing prior to attempting to move the drawbar”); Turner v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 785 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Mo. App. W.D. 1990) (no error in refusing to give an instruction that the plaintiff did not assume any of the risks of his employment where there was evidence that the plaintiff chose not to use hearing protection made available by the employer because an employee is contributorily negligent when he fails to use those precautions for his own safety which ordinary prudence requires and thus the evidence went to contributory negligence and not assumption of the risk); Conley v. Burlington N. R. Co., 765 S.W.2d 272, 276 (Mo. App. W.D. 1988) (an employee's failure to report pain in his ankle is not an assumption of the risk argument because contributory negligence tends to add new dangers to conditions the employer negligently created, and the employee's negligent failure to report his ankle pain tended to add new dangers to the conditions of his employment); Wilmoth v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 486 S.W.2d 631, 637 (Mo. 1972) (trial judge properly submitted the issue of contributory negligence to the jury by an instruction which required a finding that decedent was contributorily negligent if the jury believed that decedent had help available to him and failed to provide himself with sufficient help); contrast Robertson v. Burlington N. R. Co., 785 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990) (trial court did not err in failing to give instructions which “hypothesized plaintiff's contributory negligence for riding on the car in an unsafe area and riding the car in an area that had no flangeway space” because the instructions are assumption of the risk instructions).²

The point is denied.

Conclusion

The judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Although Inglis contends that the jury may have impermissibly reduced his recovery based on a finding that he had assumed the risks inherent in his employment, the jury was specifically instructed - at Inglis’ request - that he had not assumed the risk of his employment, and that assumption of risk could not influence the jury's verdict. “This Court presumes that the jury follows the instructions given by the trial court.” Dieser v. St. Anthony's Med. Ctr., 498 S.W.3d 419, 435 (Mo. banc 2016).

Anthony Rex Gabbert, Chief Judge

All concur.