STATE OF MISSOURI v. CHRISTOPHER MARSHALL (2026)

Mr. Christopher Marshall (“Marshall”) appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cass County, Missouri (“trial court”), following a jury trial, that convicted him of one count of second-degree murder, one count of armed criminal action, one count of stealing a firearm, and four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm. On appeal, Marshall asserts evidentiary error. But, because Marshall himself offered into admission the very evidence he now complains of, he has neither preserved any evidentiary objection nor does his claim on appeal warrant plain error review. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

Prior to her death, Victim,² Marshall's girlfriend, lived with Marshall at their home. On Saturday, April 15, 2023, they hosted five guests: Marshall's long-time friend, Friend;³ Friend's Wife; Friend's Daughter; Friend's Brother; and Friend's Niece.

Friend's family observed Marshall arguing with Victim all day, drinking excessively, and exclaiming that he was “fed up” with “that bitch” in a reference to Victim. In the evening, Marshall showed Brother one of his handguns and told Brother, “I'm going to kill that fucking bitch. I'm done with her.” Again, this was a reference to Victim. Brother tried to de-escalate Marshall's vengeful attitude, but Marshall instead asked Brother, “Do you know how to get rid of a body?”

Brother and Niece left Marshall's home at approximately midnight and, after almost everyone had gone to sleep, Daughter (who was a teenager) found Marshall sitting alone in the dark in the kitchen, and Marshall asked Daughter to hug him. Victim then came out of the main bedroom and told Marshall to “stop being weird” and come to bed. Daughter excused herself to go back downstairs when, less than a minute later, she heard a gunshot and saw a bright flash of light. She ran to Friend and Wife, who were asleep in the basement, to wake them and tell them what she had seen and heard.

Subsequently, Marshall came downstairs and told everyone to stay in the basement. Instead, Friend followed Marshall upstairs and observed blood everywhere and Victim lying dead. Friend told Marshall to call 9-1-1. Marshall did and told numerous conflicting stories. He first told the 9-1-1 operator that Victim had shot herself in the head, walked to a nearby pond to throw the gun away, then came back to the kitchen and collapsed dead, after which Marshall waited forty-five minutes to call 9-1-1. Marshall next told the operator that he had waited forty-five minutes to call because the gunshot had simply roused him from a deep sleep.

Law enforcement quickly arrived on the scene. After securing the house, the deputies performed a search pursuant to a warrant.⁴ They first noted several signs that someone had unsuccessfully attempted to clean up the large amount of blood pooled around Victim's body. Then, the deputies found bloody tracks leading from the kitchen into the main bedroom. The tracks came to the side of the bed and then left the bedroom. When police looked on top of the bed, they found nothing. So, they lifted the mattress and found three ⁵ handguns—two securely in their holsters and one that appeared to be improperly and hastily shoved into its holster. The improperly holstered gun had eight bullets in its ten-round magazine; deputies found two spent bullet casings, one in the kitchen and one outside the house, which matched the remaining bullets in the magazine. From these circumstances, the deputies determined that Victim had been shot with this gun.⁶ A forensic analyst later confirmed that the bullet casing in the kitchen had come from a bullet fired by the improperly holstered gun.

In addition to searching the house, the deputies searched the area around the pond referenced in Marshall's 9-1-1 call. First, they came to the door leading from the house to the area with the pond and noted that the cobwebs around the door suggested it had not been opened that night. Next, the deputies walked approximately 200 feet through the unlit backyard towards the pond, which was on a neighboring property. At the property line, the police encountered a fence, which they scaled over to reach the pond. Throughout the search, they found no evidence corroborating Marshall's claim that Victim had walked to the pond after shooting herself in the head.

The deputies arrested Marshall and took him to the jailhouse, where one of the deputies swabbed Marshall's hands for gunshot residue, and a later lab test confirmed its presence.

Marshall filed a pretrial motion to suppress the results of the gunshot residue analysis, arguing that the swab constituted an unreasonable and unconstitutional warrantless search of his person. At a pretrial hearing on the motion, an expert witness testified that gunshot residue is similar to dust and that, like dust, a person could easily destroy gunshot residue by rubbing their fingers on an object or by washing their hands. The expert further noted that most analysts expect that gunshot residue dissipates entirely within eight hours of the initial gunshot. The trial court overruled the pretrial motion to suppress.⁷

At trial, Marshall, not the State, injected the results of the gunshot residue analysis during opening statements:

[COUNSEL]: ․ GSA—gunshot residue was taken from Mr. Marshall, and it was consistent with having fired a firearm․

․

The evidence will be that Mr. Marshall did have gunshot residue on his hands. Gunshot residue kit labeled [Victim] will be Defendant's Exhibit 55. The Item 21—2.1 kit was reportedly collected from an individual who sustained a gunshot wound. Individuals with gunshot wounds can have gunshot residue deposited on their hands even if the individual did not discharge the weapon. This gunshot residue is not Mr. Marshall's. This is [Victim]’s gunshot residue test. The results were never tested. There was never a report generated. There was never a finding made whether she fired a weapon. We don't know why. But remember, this will be offered, Defendant's Exhibit 55, showing that a gunshot residue kit, a method of collecting it, was collected and may have been sent off for testing but has never been tested to the best of our knowledge.

Furthermore, Marshall, not the State, entered the gunshot residue report as an exhibit during trial on the cross-examination of the deputy who swabbed Marshall's hands:

[COUNSEL]: Do you know whether or not gunshot residue collection efforts were made on [Victim]?

[DEPUTY]: I do not.

․

[COUNSEL]: I'll show you what's been marked Exhibit 55, ask you to take a look at that.

Did you have a chance to look at it?

[DEPUTY]: I did.

․

[COUNSEL]: All right. And can we agree, now that you've had a chance to look at Exhibit 55, that a gunshot residue analysis was requested on the following item: Item 2.1, gunshot residue kit labeled [Victim]?

[DEPUTY]: Correct.

[COUNSEL]: Does that mean that ․ the information that would be necessary to do a gunshot residue analysis was taken from [Victim]?

[DEPUTY]: Yes.

[COUNSEL]: But it's fair to say ․ that, based on your familiarity with this investigation, no actual testing was done on [Victim]; is that correct?

[DEPUTY]: According to the lab sheet, yes.

[COUNSEL]: I'd offer Exhibit 55.

[STATE]: No objection, Your Honor

[COURT]: Defendant's Exhibit 55 is admitted.

After Marshall admitted the gunshot residue report as an exhibit—without any limitation or redaction—the State later used the same report while questioning its expert witness on gunshot residue, to which Marshall objected:

[STATE]: I'm showing you what's been previously admitted, Exhibit 55. Do you recognize that?

[ANALYST]: Yes.

[STATE]: What is it?

[ANALYST]: This is a copy of a lab report that I produced summarizing the results of the testing that I performed on the gunshot residue kits that were ․ submitted to the laboratory.

[STATE]: And what were the gunshot residue kits submitted to the laboratory in this case?

[ANALYST]: There's one that we discussed that had the label—the name on it, “Christopher M. Marshall,” and there was a second kit that was labeled “[Victim].”

․

[COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I am going to object to the results because the results were obtained from a gunshot residue kit that was obtained from an illegal search ․

[COURT]: I understand your objection. But the now-admission of Defendant's Exhibit 55, which is the kit itself, your own exhibit, does that now relieve any objections you have thereafter? Because you've actually admitted that kit insomuch the document indicating that the gunshot residue was taken.

[COUNSEL]: Well, Your Honor, I think we have to understand we have to proceed with the understanding of the previous court rulings that the gunshot residue kit was going to come in anyway. So we had to, basically, be preemptive and make sure we have the right trial strategy knowing it was coming in because we've been overruled on this [pretrial] motion.

The trial court overruled Marshall's objection and permitted the State's questioning to continue; Analyst further testified that Marshall's swabs tested positive for gunshot residue.

After the jury's verdict, Marshall was sentenced to life in prison for second-degree murder and to thirty years’ imprisonment for armed criminal action, ten years’ imprisonment for stealing a firearm, and ten years’ imprisonment for each of the four unlawful possession convictions—with all terms to run consecutively. Marshall timely appealed, raising a single point asserting evidentiary error as to the admission of the gun residue evidence.⁸

Point on Appeal

In his sole point on appeal, Marshall contends the trial court erred in overruling his pretrial motion to suppress the gunshot residue report because it was created from an unreasonable and unconstitutional search (warrantless gunshot residue swab of his hand) in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

As an initial matter, Marshall's pretrial motion to suppress did not preserve any objection to the admissibility of the gunshot residue report:

It long has been the law in Missouri that filing a pretrial motion objecting to the admission of evidence is not sufficient to preserve for appeal any error in failing to exclude it. When a motion to suppress evidence is denied, and the evidence is offered, the defendant must object at the trial to preserve his contentions for appellate review. This is because the trial judge should be given an opportunity to reconsider his prior ruling against the backdrop of the evidence actually adduced at trial. This also allows the defendant to control whether the objection is maintained or withdrawn. It is entirely possible that after hearing the evidence on motion to suppress the defendant's attorney may become convinced that his motion was without merit.

State v. Hughes, 563 S.W.3d 119, 124-25 (Mo. banc 2018) (citation modified) (emphasis added); see also State v. Vinzant, 716 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Mo. App. W.D. 1986). Instead of re-raising his objection at trial, as required to preserve it for appellate review, Marshall offered the gunshot residue report into evidence.

Although Marshall failed to preserve his point on appeal, we nonetheless have the authority to review it for plain error: “Even when the defendant fails to object to the admission of evidence at trial, erroneous admission of evidence is normally reviewable for plain error under Rule 30.20 ․” Hughes, 563 S.W.3d at 125. However, “plain error review is discretionary.” State v. Jones, 725 S.W.3d 577, 584 (Mo. banc 2025). “[W]hen a defendant affirmatively causes or contributes to an ․ error [during trial],” we are well within our discretion to decline plain error review. See State v. Burkett, 725 S.W.3d 565, 573 (Mo. banc 2025). Historically, when a defendant has responded to the denial of pretrial motion to suppress by choosing to admit that very evidence at trial instead of re-raising the objection from the motion to suppress, we have considered any alleged error in admitting the evidence to be invited and have declined to grant plain error review:

[Defendant]’s contention on this point does not require reversal. First, it was [Defendant] himself who introduced the portion of his confession in which he stated that he believed he should pay for his crime in the same manner as did [Victim], with his life “nothing less.” Defendant suggests on appeal that he nonetheless should be able to appeal admission of this statement. In support, he points out that he had previously filed a motion in limine to exclude the statement, which had been denied, and that he had again moved to exclude the statement at trial, and his motion again had been denied. He suggests that in this type of situation, he was entitled to admit the statement himself and then raise the denial of his motion to exclude the statement as error on appeal.

While we appreciate the difficult position in which counsel was placed by the trial court's denial of his motions to exclude this evidence, Missouri law is settled that a party may not complain about evidence introduced into the case through his attorney's questions or conduct. It was reasonable trial strategy for defense counsel to attempt to take the sting out of his client's confession by admitting it in evidence himself, and by showing his contrition for his act․ [Defendant] may not now complain that it was error to admit the very evidence he chose to introduce.

State v. Eighinger, 931 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In accordance with this precedent, we decline to grant plain error review of Marshall's point on appeal.

Point denied.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Pursuant to the directive of section 509.520.1(4) (Supp. IV 2025), we do not use any victim names in this opinion, other than parties to the underlying litigation. All other statutory references are to The Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016), as supplemented through April 15, 2023, unless otherwise indicated.

3.   Pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Operating Rule 2.02(c)(3), we do not identify the names of non-party witnesses in our ruling today.

4.   On this appeal, Marshall does not challenge the validity of this warrant or any aspect of the search of the house.

5.   Deputies found a fourth handgun in the main bedroom's closet.

6.   Further investigation revealed that Marshall stole this gun from one of his friends on April 6, 2023—less than two weeks before the shooting.

7.   Though we do not reach Marshall's unpreserved claim of evidentiary error relating to this gun residue test, we note that our Missouri Supreme Court has concluded that where the arrest is valid—and here, there is no challenge to Marshall's arrest—a gun residue swab collection falls within the exception to search warrant requirements relating to destructible evidence. State v. Howell, 524 S.W.2d 11, 20 (Mo. banc 1975); see also State v. Morris, 662 S.W.2d 884, 892-93 (Mo. App. S.D. 1983) (upon a lawful arrest, collection of gunshot residue from arrestee was a lawful warrantless search incident to arrest); State v. Parsons, 513 S.W.2d 430, 441 (Mo. banc 1974) (lawful hand swab search incident to arrest by arresting officer where incriminating microscopic particles on arrestee's hands could have been destroyed by handwashing); State v. Salcedo, 695 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (upon a lawful arrest, warrantless search incident to arrest is permissive to seize evidence from arrestee's person in order to prevent its destruction).

8.   In his brief, Marshall asserts that the gunshot residue evidence harmed his defense because it was the critical evidence that placed him in the kitchen with Victim when she was shot. However, Daughter's uncontroverted testimony also placed Marshall and Victim together in the kitchen within a very short time before the shooting and placed every other person then in the house in the basement at the time of the shooting. Further, the forensic medical examiner who performed Victim's autopsy testified at trial that her report, which did not consider the gunshot residue taken from Marshall, concluded Victim's manner of death was homicide because her wounds were consistent with a gunshot from a distance of more than thirty inches away and, thus, inconsistent with a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Combined with Marshall's statements on the date of the incident that, “I'm going to kill that fucking bitch,” his inquiry to Brother about whether he knew “how to get rid of a body,” his fabricated story to the 9-1-1 operator about Victim shooting herself in the head, walking back and forth from a nearby pond that would have required her to scale the fence going and coming, and then only to return and lie down and die in a puddle of her blood, constituted overwhelming evidence of Marshall's guilt. “[I]n view of the abundant independent evidence [of defendant's guilt] ․ any evidence admitted, if erroneous, was so ‘unimportant and insignificant’ that it may be deemed harmless.” U.S. v. Leon, 441 F.2d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1971) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967)); see also State v. Rice, 573 S.W.3d 53, 71-72 (Mo. banc 2019) (same); State v. Pace, 551 S.W.3d 646, 651 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (“It is unnecessary for this Court to determine whether [Officer's] seizure of the car keys from [the defendant], or the police's subsequent search of the car, were unlawful, or whether evidence derived from that search and seizure should have been suppressed. Even if the circuit court erroneously admitted evidence from the search and seizure, the admission of that evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and does not justify a new trial, in light of the overwhelming other evidence establishing [defendant]’s guilt.”); State v. Johnston, 957 S.W.2d 734, 745 (Mo. banc 1997) (refusing to reverse a defendant's guilty verdict despite the admission at trial of evidence seized in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment because the evidence “was cumulative and its presence added very little to the state's case when one considers the overwhelming, independent evidence of defendant's guilt”).

Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge

Gary D. Witt, Presiding Judge, and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge, concur.