GREGORY THORNTON v. STATE OF MISSOURI (2026)

Introduction

Gregory V. Thornton (Movant) appeals from the motion court's judgment denying his Rule 24.035 ¹ motion for post-conviction relief after he pled guilty to one count of first-degree robbery, one count of armed criminal action, and one count of resisting arrest. He was sentenced to twenty, ten, and four years, respectively, which were ordered to run consecutively for a total of thirty-four years in the Missouri Department of Corrections. We affirm.

Background

During a plea hearing on February 10, 2023, Movant informed the plea court he understood he was giving up his right to plead not guilty and be tried by a jury. The prosecutor stated on March 5, 2021, Movant committed the charged offenses when he and his accomplice, J.O. (co-defendant), arrived at 12 Hawks Nest Plaza in St. Charles County, in a black 2012 Chevy Cruze. They pointed pistols at J.H. (victim), who was walking to his 2008 Cadillac STS in the parking lot. Movant took victim's car while co-defendant left in the Chevy Cruze. Minutes later, officers observed the stolen Cadillac traveling east on Interstate 70 without lights. When they attempted to stop the car, it fled at a high speed. Movant wrecked the stolen Cadillac and absconded on foot, leaving a Taurus G2C nine-millimeter pistol in the driver's seat, which was found loaded with ammunition and an extended magazine. He was arrested a short time later.

The prosecutor said Movant made admissions to the police he committed the armed robbery with a borrowed gun and vehicle, he and his accomplice waited for someone who seemed like an easy target, and he did not intend to stop for the police. The prosecutor further stated the punishment for the class A felony of robbery in the first degree ranged from not less than ten years to no more than thirty years or life and the unclassified felony of armed criminal action was no less than three to no more than fifteen years which must run consecutively. Finally, he stated the class E felony of resisting arrest had a punishment of a county jail term of up to one year or imprisonment for a term of no more than four years and a fine of up to $10,000.

Upon questioning by the court, Movant claimed he understood the nature and elements of each of the three charged offenses and the range of punishment for each. He denied he was threatened or coerced, nor was he promised anything to plead guilty. Movant understood there was no plea agreement between his attorney and the prosecutor and the court would determine his sentence from the options within the range of punishment. The court asked again, “In other words, do you understand that the decision with regard to sentencing, if I accept your plea, will be the Court's decision alone?” Movant answered, “Yes, sir.” He also understood he would not be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea if the court accepted it and he was pleading guilty to these offenses voluntarily.

Movant then told his account of the incident and agreed the prosecutor's statements were substantially true except he claimed he did not tell the police anything. The court found Movant's plea was “made voluntarily and intelligently, with a full understanding of the charges, the consequences of his plea and with an understanding of his rights attending a jury trial as well as the effect of a plea of guilty on those rights” and there was a factual basis for his plea. The court accepted Movant's plea and found him guilty of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

At the sentencing hearing the court received a sentencing assessment report (SAR), heard testimony from Movant's mother asking for leniency, and Movant apologize for his crime. Movant's counsel (Plea Counsel) argued he had no prior criminal history at age twenty-five, had attended community college and was employed with two young children, but acted out of character and was “not in his own mind” from “smoking weed” on the day of the crime. Although Plea Counsel acknowledged it was extremely unusual, he asked the court to give Movant probation. The prosecutor argued the crimes were serious and Movant should be sentenced to twenty years. The court announced the sentence of twenty years on first-degree robbery, ten years on armed criminal action, and four years on resisting arrest, to run consecutively.

The court next explained Movant's Rule 24.035 rights to post-conviction relief. When the court questioned Movant regarding assistance from his attorney, he responded, “The best.” Movant acknowledged he had enough time to discuss the consequences of his guilty plea with his attorney, who did everything asked of him. Plea Counsel further explained to him the minimum and maximum punishment for each charge and discussed his options of going to trial versus pleading guilty. Movant agreed Plea Counsel discussed prior offers made by the State, which he rejected for an open plea. The court found Movant was advised of his rights pursuant to Rule 24.035, was represented by counsel at all critical stages of this proceeding, and there was no probable cause to believe Movant had received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Movant filed his pro se motion for post-conviction relief on September 29, 2023, and, with appointed counsel (PCR Counsel), a timely amended motion on September 3, 2024, claiming Plea Counsel was ineffective for advising him to enter into an open plea. On February 24, 2025, the motion court made findings and denied Movant's amended motion without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal follows.

Discussion

In his sole point on appeal, Movant alleges the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 24.035 amended motion claim without an evidentiary hearing because Plea Counsel was ineffective for advising Movant to enter into an open plea because the amended motion alleged facts, not conclusions, entitling him to relief, which were not refuted by the record and file. Movant claims prejudice because if Plea Counsel had not advised him to enter into an open plea, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have chosen to go to trial, or accepted a prior offer from the state. Movant argues Plea Counsel's failure violated his rights to effective assistance of counsel and due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution.

Standard of Review

Our review of a Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief denial is limited to determining whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. State v. Evans, 524 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (citing Rule 24.035(k) and Roberts v. State, 276 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Mo. banc 2009)). The motion court's findings are presumptively correct and will be deemed clearly erroneous only if a review of the entire record leaves this court with a “definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.” Id. (citing Soto v. State, 226 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Mo. banc 2007)). Furthermore, “[a]n evidentiary hearing is not required on a post-conviction relief motion if the motion court determines that the motion and the files and records conclusively show the movant is not entitled to relief.” Evans, 524 S.W.3d at 533 (citing Rule 24.035(h) and Brown v. State, 67 S.W.3d 708, 709 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002)).

Analysis

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant in a criminal case must show (1) that trial counsel failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney, and (2) that he was prejudiced in that a different outcome would have resulted but for trial counsel's failure. Sanders v. State, 738 S.W.2d 856, 857 (Mo. banc 1987) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish trial counsel's performance did not meet the standard of a reasonably competent attorney, a movant must overcome the presumption “any challenged action was sound trial strategy[,] ․ that counsel rendered adequate assistance,” and counsel “made all significant decisions in the exercise of professional judgment.” Aaron v. State, 81 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). “Reasonable choices of trial strategy, no matter how ill-fated they appear in hindsight, cannot serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance.” Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Mo. banc 2006) (citing Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Mo. banc 2005)).

For post-conviction relief motions, we distinguish the separate inquiries pursuant to Rule 29.15 and Rule 24.035. In the context of a Rule 29.15 motion for ineffective assistance after a trial, the inquiry is simply whether, but for counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, the movant received a fair trial. Beach v. State, 220 S.W.3d 360, 365 n.4 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007). However, under a Rule 24.035 post-conviction motion after pleading guilty, the inquiry is whether, but for plea counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, the movant would have insisted on receiving a fair trial. Id. After entering a plea of guilty, ineffective assistance of counsel is relevant only to the voluntariness of the plea, to the extent Movant would have insisted on going to trial. Whaley v. State, 833 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992). Thus, a movant does not allege prejudice in his post-conviction relief motion pursuant to Rule 24.035 where he merely claims he would have accepted a more favorable prior plea. Beach, 220 S.W.3d at 365.

In Beach, the movant's only allegation of prejudice in his post-conviction relief motion after a guilty plea was that he would not have rejected the plea offer previously extended by the state, but for plea counsel's advice regarding probation. Id. at 364. The court analyzed his allegation of prejudice under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985), which found prejudice only arises when, “but for plea counsel's alleged error, the movant would have pleaded not guilty and insisted upon a trial.” Beach, 220 S.W.3d at 364 (emphasis added) (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59). The Beach court likewise found insufficient prejudice and held the movant's conviction by pleading guilty was not the result of a violation of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, and not cognizable under Rule 24.035. Beach, 220 S.W.3d at 365.

Movant argues it was “objectively unreasonable” for Plea Counsel to advise him to enter an open plea based on what he led Movant to believe about the potential outcome. However, “[m]istaken beliefs about sentencing affect a defendant's ability to knowingly enter a guilty plea if the mistake is reasonable and the mistake is based upon a positive representation upon which the movant is entitled to rely.” Dobbins v. State, 187 S.W.3d 865, 866-67 (Mo. banc 2006) (citing Dorsey v. State, 115 S.W.3d 842, 845 (Mo. banc 2003)). “[W[here there is no reasonable basis for the movant's belief in light of the guilty plea record, the movant is not entitled to relief.” Rivers v. State, 498 S.W.3d 534, 537 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, the record refutes Movant's claim of prejudice absent Plea Counsel's ineffectiveness he would not have entered an open plea of guilty but rather insisted on going to trial. Movant understood the judge alone was going to impose his sentence and the state opposed his request for probation, instead recommending twenty years given the seriousness of Movant's crimes. Movant admitted to the crimes and agreed with the statements made by the prosecution about them. After he was sentenced, Movant claimed his attorney was “the best,” agreed he did everything he asked and discussed all the state's plea offers with him.

Indeed, Plea Counsel acknowledged it would be “extremely unusual” and “completely rare” for the court to sentence Movant to probation, but they were asking the court to do so. Both Movant and his Plea Counsel understood their request was a risk, not a promise, but they were hopeful given the mitigating factors favoring Movant. However, the plea court disagreed. “Neither a disappointed expectation of a lesser sentence, nor a mere prediction as to sentencing by counsel that proves incorrect, is sufficient to render a guilty plea involuntary.” Gold v. State, 341 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Mo. App. S.D. 2011) (internal citations omitted).

We find the record clearly supports Movant's guilty plea was voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and with sufficient awareness of the facts and consequences of the act. See State v. Hunter, 840 S.W.2d 850, 861 (Mo. banc 1992). Movant has not demonstrated Plea Counsel was ineffective such that his claim warranted an evidentiary hearing. As a result, the motion court did not err in denying Movant's motion for post-conviction relief. Movant's point is denied.

Conclusion

The motion court's judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All rule citations are to Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2023).

Lisa P. Page, Judge

Robert M. Clayton III, Presiding Judge and Michael E. Gardner, Judge concur.