CHELSEA ELDER v. THE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY ST LOUIS (2026)

Introduction

Plaintiff, Chelsea Elder, appeals the judgment entered by the Circuit Court of St. Louis County dismissing her claims for disability discrimination, gender discrimination due to pregnancy, hostile work environment based on disability, hostile work environment based on gender-pregnancy, and retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act against the defendant, The Washington University - St. Louis (“University”). We affirm in part and vacate in part.

Because Plaintiff failed to plead facts demonstrating she is legally disabled under the Missouri Human Rights Act, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of her claim of disability discrimination. Because Plaintiff failed to plead facts demonstrating a hostile work environment based either on disability or gender-pregnancy, we also affirm the trial court's dismissal of those claims. However, the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's claim of gender discrimination due to pregnancy. The sole ground for dismissal asserted by the University in its motion to dismiss for this claim was that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. We find Plaintiff exhausted her remedies as to her claim of gender discrimination due to pregnancy. Thus, there is no ground set forth in the University's motion to support a dismissal. Consequently, the trial court's judgment is vacated as to Plaintiff's claim of gender discrimination due to pregnancy, and the case is remanded.

Factual and Procedural Background

We relate the following facts, as set out in Plaintiff's petition.¹

Plaintiff began working for the University as a Patient Billing Services Representative in June of 2022. In late December 2022 or early January 2023, Plaintiff found out she was pregnant with twin girls. Plaintiff informed her supervisors of her pregnancy on January 6, 2023. Around the same time, because Plaintiff was pregnant with twins, her OB/GYN designated the pregnancy as “high risk.” Nonetheless, at that time, there was no expectation that Plaintiff would experience any actual medical complications during the pregnancy.

Unexpectedly, on March 24, 2023, due to concerns about both the Plaintiff's and the babies’ health, Plaintiff's OB/GYN ordered Plaintiff be admitted to the hospital. On that same day, Plaintiff texted one of her supervisors (“Supervisor H”) that Plaintiff's OB/GYN had admitted her to the hospital due to complications with the pregnancy.

The following Monday, March 27, 2023, Plaintiff texted Supervisor H to update her on Plaintiff's still unfolding medical situation. Specifically, Plaintiff informed Supervisor H that: 1) she was ordered to follow up with her fetal medicine provider or OB/GYN later that week; 2) her OB/GYN would not authorize her return to work until she was seen by either the fetal medicine provider or her OB/GYN; 3) she had a prescheduled doctor's appointment for that upcoming Thursday; and 4) she planned to reach out to the University's short-term disability provider, to proactively inquire as to the process for seeking short-term disability benefits under the University's employer-sponsored plan. Plaintiff's OB/GYN's concerns about Plaintiff returning to work related to Plaintiff being on her feet throughout the workday.

In response, Supervisor H claimed that, since she had not heard from Plaintiff, she assumed that Plaintiff would be at work on March 24, 2023 (i.e., the same day Plaintiff informed Supervisor H that her OB/GYN had admitted her to the hospital). Supervisor H further advised Plaintiff that, since she was not at work, Plaintiff needed to contact the University's short-term disability provider. As a result, Plaintiff forwarded Supervisor H a letter from Plaintiff's primary healthcare provider stating that Plaintiff would be absent from work until Plaintiff had a medical consultation with either Plaintiff's fetal medicine provider or OB/GYN – a doctor's appointment Plaintiff has previously informed Supervisor H was already scheduled to take place on March 30, 2023.

On March 29, 2023, Plaintiff again texted Supervisor H to let her know that she had been re-admitted to the hospital due to complications related to her pregnancy, and that she would let Supervisor H know when she was informed by her OB/GYN that she could safely return to work. On March 31, 2023, Plaintiff notified Supervisor H that she had been in contact with one of the University's Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) representatives. Because Plaintiff had not yet been employed by the University for a full twelve months, Plaintiff was not eligible for FMLA leave. However, in accordance with the University's policies, Plaintiff was eligible for an unpaid non-FMLA medical leave of absence of up to fourteen weeks.

On the same day, while Plaintiff was still in the hospital, she spoke with Supervisor H about the possibility of working remotely as opposed to taking an unpaid non-FMLA medical leave of absence. However, Supervisor H advised Plaintiff that the University did not have a work-from-home policy for Patient Billing Services Representatives. Plaintiff then asked about what other options would be available to her moving forward. Plaintiff further informed Supervisor H that she would move forward with completing the University's required non-FMLA medical leave paperwork.

Plaintiff further advised Supervisor H that Plaintiff's fetal medicine specialist wanted Plaintiff to consult with her OB/GYN about a prognosis for her return to work and that she should know something more concrete soon. Later that afternoon, the afternoon of March 31, 2023, Plaintiff forwarded Supervisor H a letter Plaintiff received from the University's short-term disability provider stating that Plaintiff's short-term disability had been approved, but Plaintiff would need to be re-evaluated closer to April 27, 2023.

Plaintiff did not immediately receive a response from Supervisor H. However, several days later, on April 4, 2023, Supervisor H asked Plaintiff if she had completed her non-FMLA medical leave paperwork. Plaintiff informed Supervisor H that she had both completed it and emailed it to the University's FMLA representative. Plaintiff also asked Supervisor H if she needed to personally follow-up with the representative to provide or receive any additional information. In response, Supervisor H advised Plaintiff that she did not need to follow-up with the representative, but instead Supervisor H would do so on Plaintiff's behalf.

The next day, April 5, 2023, Plaintiff received a telephone call from Supervisor H, who asked Plaintiff if she had received an email regarding the status of her non-FMLA medical leave. Plaintiff informed Supervisor H that she would check her email and let her know. Supervisor H then proceeded to explain to Plaintiff that Plaintiff's non-FMLA medical leave had only been approved for a total of two weeks and that, as a result, Plaintiff's last day of employment with the University would be the next day, April 6, 2023.

Plaintiff was shocked, as prior to this conversation, there was never any mention about the possibility that Plaintiff's employment may be terminated due to her pregnancy complications. In response, Plaintiff informed Supervisor H that, pursuant to the University's policies, it was her understanding that she was eligible for up to fourteen weeks of non-FMLA medical leave. However, Supervisor H informed Plaintiff that, while that was true, because Supervisor H was down to three Patient Billing Services Representatives, she could not hold Plaintiff's job any longer. Supervisor H further advised Plaintiff that she could re-apply for her Patient Billing Services Representative position once she was no longer experiencing pregnancy complications.

On April 7, 2023, Plaintiff reached out to Supervisor H to further inquire as to Plaintiff's available options, short of losing her job. Specifically, Plaintiff texted the following to Supervisor H:

I received your letter, and I was just hoping for some clarity. Am I being formally terminated from my employment at Washington University as of today due to my leave expiring or for some other reason? In other words, if I were able to return to work on Monday, would I still have a job??

Plaintiff also advised Supervisor H that:

As I previously informed you, my OB/GYN has approved me to work remotely. I know that you said I would not be permitted to work remotely in my current position, but are there any other positions at Washington University that I may qualify for that do permit remote working? Other than my approved two-week medical leave and informing you that my doctor's orders permitted me to work from home, there hasn't been any other conversation about potential reasonable accommodations that would allow me to remain employed at the university during the remainder of my high-risk pregnancy? Would it be possible for me to meet with you and/or a Washington University HR representative to engage in an interactive process to discuss potential reasonable accommodations that would work for both Washington University and my high-risk pregnancy?

Supervisor H responded: “Sorry for the late response. I am out of the office today. Can we discuss Monday?

On Monday, April 10, 2023, Supervisor H sent Plaintiff a follow-up text message stating that she had “․ shared [Plaintiff's] concern with [the University's] HR. [Plaintiff] is eligible for rehire and [she is] able to apply for any open positions that fit [Plaintiff's] needs.” As a result, Plaintiff applied for a number of exclusively remote-work positions with the University for which, Plaintiff pleaded, she was imminently qualified, including positions which fit directly within Plaintiff's previous job title as a Patient Billing Services Representative. However, Plaintiff never received any response to any of her applications.

Sometime after April 10, Plaintiff spoke with one of the University's short-term disability representatives regarding her short-term disability application. The representative informed Plaintiff that the University's HR system showed Plaintiff as an active employee. When Plaintiff further inquired about still being listed as an active employee, the representative advised Plaintiff that the University was required to maintain Plaintiff in the system as an “active” employee in order for Plaintiff to continue qualifying for her short-term disability benefits. In response, Plaintiff explained to the representative that the University's continuing to list her as an “active” employee caused her serious concerns in applying for unemployment benefits or positions at other companies, as they may unjustifiably view her applications as dishonest. Thereafter, Plaintiff remained on short-term disability and received her benefits.

Four to five months later, the University's Assistant Vice Chancellor and Associate General County, after receiving a service letter request from Plaintiff, sent a letter to Plaintiff's counsel, dated September 5, 2023, stating in part that “․ [Plaintiff] remains employed on leave while receiving short-term medical disability benefits and has not been ‘discharged or voluntarily quit.’ ” Plaintiff pleaded that it appears to her that the University maintained her as an “employee’ in its HR system for the sole purpose of claiming that Plaintiff has not been subjected to any form of adverse employment action.

Plaintiff believed at the time she was placed on short-term disability by the University that she could perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodations. Moreover, when she began applying for other internal positions at the University (as it had suggested), she was treated as a “new hire,” rather than a current University employee.

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against the University with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on July 13, 2023. Plaintiff alleged discrimination based on disability, sex, and retaliation, and that the discrimination was a continuing action. Plaintiff in her charge included most of the same factual allegations set out above, including the allegation that she was informed April 6, 2023 would be her last day of employment. She concluded her charge by stating that she believed the University had “discriminated against, retaliated against, and ultimately terminated my employment due to my gender (female-pregnancy) and disability (pregnancy complications)․.”

Plaintiff delivered her twin children in August 2023. Plaintiff pleaded in her petition that at no time following the birth of her children did the University ever reach out to Appellant with respect to her returning to work. Plaintiff further pleaded she was advised in September 2023 that all benefits of her employment with the University would terminate effective September 30, 2023. Plaintiff pleaded that she was under information and belief that the University continued to advertise her previous job position and that the University could have rehired her into her previous job position after the birth of her twins.

Plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter from the Missouri Commission on Human Rights on February 9, 2024, authorizing her to file a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction within 90 days of issuance of the right-to-sue letter. Plaintiff then filed her petition against the University in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County. Plaintiff's petition asserted five claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) related to her employment and termination. Count One alleged disability discrimination. Count Two alleged a hostile work environment due to Plaintiff's disability. Count Three alleged gender discrimination due to pregnancy. Count Four alleged a hostile work environment due to Plaintiff's gender-pregnancy. Count Five alleged retaliation.

The University filed its motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims with prejudice on the grounds that they failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Specifically, the University argued Plaintiff's disability claim (Count One) and her claim for hostile work environment based on disability (Count Two) must be dismissed because pregnancy is not a disability under the MHRA. Next, the University argued Plaintiff's claims for hostile work environment based on disability (Count Two) and hostile work environment based on gender-pregnancy (Count Four) must be dismissed because Plaintiff had not alleged harassment that was severe or pervasive as a matter of law. Lastly, the University argued that any alleged discriminatory or retaliatory acts that occurred after Plaintiff filed her July 13, 2023, charge of discrimination, including the termination of her employment, are not actionable because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.

Plaintiff opposed the University's motion to dismiss. She included in her opposition an alternative request for leave to amend her petition although she did not recite any new or additional facts that she wished to plead in an amended petition. Neither did Plaintiff attach a proposed amended petition to her suggestions in opposition to the motion to dismiss, nor did she file a separate motion for leave to amend. After full briefing and argument, the trial court granted the University's motion to dismiss all counts of the petition, and entered judgment in favor of the University.² The trial court did not state its reasons for dismissing the counts. The trial court also did not expressly rule on Plaintiff's alternative request to amend her petition.

In ten points on appeal, Plaintiff challenges the trial court's dismissal of her two discrimination counts (Counts One and Three) and her two hostile work environment counts (Counts Two and Four). Plaintiff also challenges the trial court's implicit denial of her request to amend her petition. Plaintiff does not appeal the dismissal of her retaliation count (Count Five).

Standard of Review

Plaintiff challenges the trial court's dismissal of her claims under the MHRA. We review de novo the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss. Matthews v. Harley-Davidson, 685 S.W.3d 360, 365 (Mo. banc 2024). We will affirm the dismissal if it can be sustained on any grounds raised in the motion. Sullivan v. City of University City, 677 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is solely a test of the adequacy of the plaintiff's petition.” Id. We assume the plaintiff's averments are true, and we liberally grant the plaintiff all reasonable inferences. Id.

“A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim assesses whether the petition alleged facts giving rise ‘to a cognizable cause of action or of a cause that might be adopted.’ ” Id. (quoting Graves v. Mo. Dep't of Corrections, 630 S.W.3d 769, 772 (Mo. banc 2021)) (emphasis in original). However, threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, will not pass muster. Wilkinson v. Farmers Holding Companies, 2023 WL 2536374, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 16, 2023). To sufficiently state a claim, the plaintiff must plead ultimate facts demonstrating entitlement to relief, and may not rely on mere conclusions. Gross v. A New Missouri, Inc., 591 S.W.3d 489, 493 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019). “Ultimate facts are those the jury must find to return a verdict for the plaintiff.” Matthews, 685 S.W.3d at 366. We do not weigh the factual allegations to determine whether they are credible or persuasive. Id.

Plaintiff also challenges the trial court's implicit denial of her request to amend her petition. Denial of leave to amend is within the discretion of the trial court, and we presume the trial court's ruling is correct. Gross, 591 S.W.3d at 493. The plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate that the trial court clearly and palpably abused its discretion. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion when its “ruling is so clearly against the logic of the circumstances and so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates lack of careful consideration.” Horton v. St. Louis Public Schools, 700 S.W.3d 311, 316 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024).

Points on Appeal

Plaintiff sets forth ten points of alleged trial court error. Her first and second points on appeal challenge the trial court's dismissal of her disability discrimination claim (Count One). Her third point on appeal challenges the trial court's dismissal of her hostile work environment claim based on disability (Count Two). Her fourth and fifth points challenge the trial court's dismissal of her claim of gender discrimination due to pregnancy (Count Three). Her sixth point challenges the trial court's dismissal of her hostile work environment claim base on gender-pregnancy (Count Four). In her seventh point on appeal, Plaintiff alleges the trial court erred in denying her request to file an amended petition. Finally, in her eighth, ninth, and tenth points on appeal, Plaintiff alleges the trial court erred in granting the University's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

We address Plaintiff's points out of order, as the logical starting point for our discussion is whether Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies prior to proceeding with her civil suit. We find that Plaintiff exhausted her remedies as to her discrimination claims and thus grant Plaintiff's ninth point on appeal, which alleged that the trial court erred in granting the University's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Because we grant that point, we vacate the trial court's judgment and remand the cause regarding Plaintiff's claim of gender discrimination due to pregnancy (Count Three). Due to this disposition, we need not reach Plaintiff's eighth and tenth points on appeal, dealing with the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.³ Because we vacate and remand Count Three – Plaintiff's claim of gender discrimination due to pregnancy - we need not reach Plaintiff's fourth and fifth points that alleged error in dismissing the claim of gender discrimination due to pregnancy.  ⁴ We deny all other points and otherwise affirm the trial court's judgment.

Discussion

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Points on Appeal

The MHRA requires a claimant to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to petitioning the courts for relief. Jeffery v. St. Louis Fire Dep't, 506 S.W.3d 394, 398 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016); Section 213.075.1. If administrative remedies have not been exhausted, the trial court lacks authority to judicially review the matter and dismissal is required. Alhalabi v. Missouri Dep't of Nat. Res., 300 S.W.3d 518, 524 n.1 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009); Coleman v. Missouri Sec'y of State, 313 S.W.3d 148, 158 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).

In order to exhaust administrative remedies, a claimant must give notice of their claims by including them in an administrative complaint and then either adjudicate the claims through the Missouri Commission on Human Rights or obtain a right-to-sue letter. Alhalabi, 300 S.W.3d at 524. At issue here is the adequacy of Plaintiff's administrative complaint. The administrative complaint serves “to give the agency the opportunity to determine the validity of the claim, to investigate, and to determine if there is probable cause that discrimination has taken place.” Williams v. City of Kansas City, 641 S.W.3d 302, 318 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (internal quotation omitted). “The purpose of requiring parties to file a charge of discrimination is to give the charged party notice of the claim, to give the [investigating agency] the opportunity to settle the dispute, and to narrow the issues for prompt adjudication.” Id.

“In order to exhaust all administrative remedies under the MHRA, a claimant must give notice of all claims of discrimination in the administrative complaint.” Farrow v. Saint Francis Medical Center, 47 S.W.3d 579, 594 (Mo. banc 2013) (emphasis added). Though exhaustion requires a claimant to give notice of all claims of discrimination in the administrative complaint, “administrative complaints are interpreted liberally in an effort to further the remedial purposes of legislation that prohibits unlawful employment practices.” Id. at 594 (applying liberal reading of the charge of discrimination); Alhalabi, 300 S.W.3d at 525 (noting Missouri takes a liberal approach to the fulfillment of procedural requirements under the MHRA). “ ‘As a result, administrative remedies are deemed exhausted as to all incidents of discrimination that are like or reasonably related to the allegations of the administrative charge.’ ” Farrow, 47 S.W.3d at 594 (quoting Alhalabi, 300 S.W.3d at 525). “A claim is ‘like or reasonably related’ to the ․ charge [of discrimination] ․ if there is a factual relationship between them.” Williams, , 641 S.W.3d at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Further, the scope of the civil suit may be as broad as the scope of the administrative investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Farrow, 47 S.W.3d at 594 (quoting Alhalabi, 300 S.W.3d at 525).

The University contends multiple claims in Plaintiff's petition were not asserted in Plaintiff's administrative complaint (“charge”) and thus have not been administratively exhausted. The University first notes Plaintiff's petition asserted claims based on her employment being terminated because of her disability and gender (Counts One and Three). The University argues Plaintiff's charge did not and could not include any claim based on her termination. The University argues it was impossible for Plaintiff to claim in her July 2023 charge that her employment was terminated due to discrimination because the charge was filed before Plaintiff's employment ended in September 2023. The University correctly notes Plaintiff never filed an amended charge or new charge. The University thus contends that because Plaintiff at the time of the filing of her charge in July 2023 could not assert a claim based on the termination of her employment, as she was still employed, and because Plaintiff never filed an amended charge or a new charge asserting that her termination was the result of discrimination, Plaintiff never presented any such claim to the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. The University argues that as a result, Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and that dismissal of Plaintiff's disability and gender-pregnancy discrimination counts is required under Missouri law.

Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends she exhausted her administrative remedies and thus alleges the trial court erred in granting the University's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to her termination of employment. Plaintiff maintains she expressly pleaded in her charge that the University had discriminated against her and ultimately terminated her employment due to her disability and gender. She further maintains that even if the trial court accepted a September termination date, she still exhausted her administrative remedies because the alleged discriminatory termination was like or reasonably related to the allegations in her administrative charge and within the scope of the administrative investigation which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charges of discrimination, particularly where, as here, she filed a charge of discrimination claiming that the unlawful discrimination constitutes a continuing action.

We hold Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies as to her claims based on her employment being terminated because of disability and gender discrimination. Plaintiff in her charge pleaded that on April 5, 2023, Supervisor H advised her: (1) that her last day of employment with the University would be the next day (April 6, 2023); (2) that she could not hold Plaintiff's job any longer; and (3) that Plaintiff could re-apply for her position with the University at a later time once Plaintiff was no longer experiencing pregnancy complications. It stands to reason that only former employees would be in a position whereby they need to re-apply for employment with an employer. Plaintiff concluded her charge by expressly pleading that she believed the University discriminated against and ultimately terminated her employment due to her disability and gender. Plaintiff clearly alleged discriminatory termination that occurred prior to her filing her charge.

The University argues Plaintiff “admits” her termination date was in September and/or acknowledges that she was employed through September. The University points to Plaintiff's allegation that, at some point between April 10, 2023, and July 13, 2023, she was informed by the University that she was still an active employee. The University further points to Plaintiff's allegation that on September 5, 2023, the University, in response to a service letter request, informed Plaintiff's counsel that Plaintiff remained employed. Lastly, the University points to Plaintiff's allegation that Plaintiff was informed that all benefits of employment would terminate effective September 30, 2023. The University argues these pleadings are binding upon Plaintiff and are “mutually contradictory and self-destructive” such that no cause of action is stated.

The University mischaracterizes Plaintiff's pleadings as being an admission on the part of Plaintiff. All Plaintiff pleaded is what the University related to her regarding benefits and the fact that the system had her listed as an active employee. There is no unqualified admission by Plaintiff that September was the operative termination date. Rather, Plaintiff pleaded she was advised her benefits would terminate effective September 30, 2023, while also pleading she had previously been advised (in April) that the University could no longer hold her job, that she could re-apply for her position once she was no longer experiencing pregnancy complications, and that the last day of her employment would be April 6.

Even if we take September as the termination date, we still find Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies as to her discrimination claims. Plaintiff's claims based on her employment being terminated because of disability and gender discrimination have a factual relationship in that they are based on the same set of facts set forth in her charge. Thus, said claims are like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in Plaintiff's July 13, 2023 administrative charge. As a result, said claims are deemed exhausted. Further, Plaintiff in her charge pleaded a continuing violation of discrimination. Thus, the scope of the administrative investigation would not be based on a single date or incident but would be more broadly encompassing. The scope of the administrative investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of charge of discrimination earlier in Plaintiff's pregnancy would lead to a discovery that Plaintiff was ultimately terminated. Alhalabi, 300 S.W.3d at 526 (finding administrative charge adequately alleged claim for hostile work environment where scope of the administrative investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination would include an investigation of whether claimant was employed in a hostile work environment).

Furthermore, one of the purposes of the administrative charge is to give a defendant notice of the claim. Williams, 641 S.W.3d at 323. Given the course of events and the allegations set forth in Plaintiff's charge we cannot say the University was never apprised of a claim of discrimination arising out of Plaintiff's termination such that it was taken by surprise by Plaintiff's petition. See Id. at 323.⁵

Our holding that Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies results in two different dispositions of Plaintiff's two discrimination claims. The University sought dismissal of Count Three, Plaintiff's claim of discrimination based on gender-pregnancy, solely on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. This Court presumes the trial court's dismissal was based on one of the reasons stated in the motion to dismiss. Tuttle v. Dobbs Tire & Auto Ctrs., Inc., 590 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Mo. banc 2019). Because we hold that Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies regarding her discrimination claims, there are no grounds asserted in the University's motion to dismiss to support the trial court's dismissal of Count Three. We grant Plaintiff's ninth point on appeal, which alleged the trial court erred in dismissing her petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because she properly exhausted those remedies. As a result, we vacate the trial court's judgment as to Count Three and remand the cause to the trial court.

A different result is reached, however, regarding Plaintiff's disability discrimination claim (Count One). Though we find that Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies regarding her discrimination claims, the University set forth an additional ground for dismissal regarding Plaintiff's disability discrimination count that supports dismissal of that count by the trial court. We turn then to Plaintiff's first and second points on appeal and discussion of Plaintiff's disability discrimination claim.

Disability Discrimination

Count One

First and Second Points on Appeal

We consider Plaintiff's first two points together because both relate to Count One of Plaintiff's petition and whether Plaintiff adequately pleaded a claim for disability discrimination. In her first point, Plaintiff alleges the trial court erred in dismissing her disability discrimination claim because, she contends, she was disabled under the MHRA. In her second point, Plaintiff alleges the trial court erred in dismissing her claim because, she contends, her disability was a motivating factor in adverse employment actions taken against her. For the reasons that follow, we deny these points.

The MHRA provides in pertinent part that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, because of the disability of any individual, to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Section 213.055.1(1)(a) RSMo. (Supp. 2024).⁶ In short, it is unlawful under the MHRA for an employer to discharge an employee because of that employee's disability. Id.

To assert a claim of disability discrimination under section 213.111 of the MHRA, Plaintiff must plead that: (1) she is legally disabled; (2) she was discharged or otherwise subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) her disability was the motivating factor. Emile v. Triumph Foods, LLC, 713 S.W.3d 197, 210 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). Our focus here is on the first element: whether Plaintiff adequately pleaded that she was disabled under the MHRA.

Plaintiff's disability discrimination claim was predicated on her pregnancy and pregnancy-related complications. Plaintiff pleaded that her physical impairment – her pregnancy and pregnancy-related complications – constituted a disability under the MHRA because it substantially limited one or more of her major life activities. Additionally, Plaintiff pleaded she had a “disability” because she had a record of her physical impairment. She also pleaded that her pregnancy and pregnancy-related complications constituted a “disability” under the MHRA because the University regarded her as having a disability. Defendant moved to dismiss Count One on grounds that Plaintiff's pregnancy and related complications do not constitute a “disability” under the MHRA.

As a threshold element of her MHRA claim, Plaintiff must plead facts showing that her pregnancy and pregnancy-related complications qualify as a “disability” within the meaning of the MHRA. Loerch v. City of Union, 643 S.W.3d 597, 602 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022). A qualifying “disability” under the MHRA means: “a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities, being regarded as having such an impairment, or a record of having such an impairment, which with or without reasonable accommodation does not interfere with performing the job[.]” Section 213.010(5); Moore v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 684 S.W.3d 187, 205 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). Establishing the first, “disabled,” element of a disability discrimination claim under the MHRA is a two-part showing. Plaintiff first must show she actually has, is regarded as having, or has a record of having, an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Ashby v. Woodridge of Missouri, Inc., 673 S.W.3d 537, 544 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023). Secondly, Plaintiff must show that, with or without reasonable accommodation, the impairment does not interfere with performing the essential functions of her job. Id. Our focus here is on the first part of this two-part showing – whether Plaintiff adequately pleaded that she actually has, is regarded as having, or has a record of having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

Actual Disability Claim

Under the relevant regulations, a “physical impairment” means: “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement or anatomical loss affecting one (1) or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine[.]” 8 CSR 60-3.060(1)(A)(1).

Plaintiff alleged that in late December 2022 or early January 2023, she found out she was pregnant with twin girls. Her OB/GYN designated her pregnancy as “high risk.” In March of 2023, due to complications with the pregnancy and to concerns about Plaintiff's and the babies’ health, Plaintiff's OB/GYN ordered her to be admitted to the hospital. Plaintiff's OB/GYN would not authorize Plaintiff's to return to work until Plaintiff was seen by either a fetal medicine provider or her OB/GYN. The OB/GYN's concerns about Plaintiff returning to work related to Plaintiff being on her feet throughout the workday. The day before Plaintiff's appointment with the fetal medicine provider, Plaintiff was readmitted to the hospital due to complications related to her pregnancy. These allegations show that Plaintiff had a physiological condition that affected her reproductive system, in other words a “physical impairment.” 8 CSR 60-3.060(1)(A)(1).

Under the MHRA, however, showing an impairment is only the first step in establishing a disability. Heuton v. Ford Motor Co., 930 F.3d 1015, 1020 (8th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff must then plead facts sufficient to show that the impairment substantially limits one or more of her major life activities. Section 213.010(5). A plaintiff is substantially limited in performing a major life activity for purposes of the MHRA if they are unable to perform a major life activity, or they are significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which they can perform a particular major life activity. DeWalt v. Davidson Serv./Air, Inc., 398 S.W.3d 491, 499–500 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013); Heuton, 930 F.3d at 1019. “Major life activities” are defined as activities that affect employability such as ambulation, communication, education, employment, self-care, socialization, transportation, and vocational training. 8 C.S.R. 60-3.060(1)(C); Feldman v. Patrish, L.L.C., 674 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023).

Plaintiff in her petition does not expressly name the major life activity she maintains was substantially limited by her pregnancy and pregnancy-related complications. Rather, she simply makes the conclusory assertion that her physical impairment “substantially limits one (1) or more of Plaintiff's major life activities.” Plaintiff alleged that she was admitted to the hospital on March 24, 2023, due to complications with the pregnancy and concerns about Plaintiff's and the babies’ health on March 24. She alleged that her OB/GYN would not authorize her to return to work until she was seen by either a fetal medicine provider or the OB/GYN. The OB/GYN's concern about Plaintiff returning to work related to Plaintiff being on her feet throughout the workday. These facts lead to a reasonable inference that the affected major life activities implicated were ambulation and employment.

Plaintiff in her petition, however, alleged no restrictions on ambulation ordered by her physician. Nor does Plaintiff allege facts to show that her pregnancy and pregnancy-related complications substantially limited ambulation after her last-alleged hospitalization in late March 2023. Although Plaintiff alleged her physician would not authorize her to return to work until she was seen by either by her physician or a fetal medicine provider, Plaintiff does not allege if or when that appointment took place, or that she was placed on any restrictions related to ambulation or work following that appointment. See Gaal v. BJC Health Sys., 597 S.W.3d 277, 285 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (noting doctor did not place plaintiff on work restrictions despite her diagnosis of mild persistent asthma, even after her return from medical leave).

As to the major life activity of employment, a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working means the person is “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.” Loerch, 643 S.W.3d at 602–03 (quotation omitted). “The inability to perform a single, particular job does not amount to a substantial limitation.” Id. “The major life activity of working does not mean working at a particular job of that person's choice.” Brunko v. Mercy Hosp., 260 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted) (superseded by statute on other grounds). “An impairment that disqualifies a person from only a narrow range of jobs is not considered a substantially limiting one.” Id.

It is clear from Plaintiff's petition that she was only precluded from performing her single, particular job as a patient billing services representative. Plaintiff pleaded that her physician had approved her to work remotely. Plaintiff also pleaded the University advised her that she was eligible to apply for any other open positions at the University that fit her present needs. Hence, Plaintiff's pregnancy and pregnancy-related complications did not substantially limit Plaintiff from the life activity of working. Id.

In addition, and critically here, Plaintiff's claim fails because the regulations of the Missouri Commission on Human Rights interpreting the MHRA expressly provide that “[d]isabilites caused or contributed to by pregnancy ․ childbirth and recovery are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such.” 8 CSR 60-3.040(16)(A) (emphasis added). Temporary medical conditions are not considered physical or mental impairments that result in a disability. 8 C.S.R. 60-3.060(1)(B)(1); Feldman, 674 S.W.3d at 64. “Temporary [conditions] are not actionable due to their transitory nature in that the [condition] does not significantly limit the individual permanently.” Cook v. Atoma Int'l of Am., Inc., 930 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996); see also Feldman, 674 S.W.3d at 64. Under the MHRA, “an impairment or injury that is medically treatable without significant residual symptoms does not rise to the level of a disability under the MHRA because a major life activity is not permanently substantially limited.” Roberds v. AT&T Operations, Inc., 2012 WL 4435116, at *11 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 26, 2012) (quoting Cook, 930 S.W.2d at 47).

Plaintiff cites no Missouri case wherein pregnancy and pregnancy-related complications constituted a qualifying disability under the MHRA. Nor does our research reveal any. Numerous federal cases hold that under the ADA, pregnancy does not meet the definition of a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits an individual's major life activities because it is not an impairment, and is not long term or permanent. Roberds, 2012 WL 4435116, at *11.  ⁷ Accordingly, federal courts have rejected arguments that pregnancy is a per se disability. Id. “Further, federal courts generally hold that absent unusual circumstances, pregnancy-related complications do not constitute disabilities as a matter of law.” Id.; see also, e.g., Hammond v. 801 Restaurant Group, LLC, 2021 WL 2438916, at *5 (E.D. Mo. June 15, 2021) (citing 8 CSR 60-3.040(16)(A) and Roberds, 2012 WL 4435116, at *11) (dismissing MHRA disability discrimination claim because the plaintiff had not adequately alleged that she was disabled under the MHRA; complaint was devoid of allegations that plaintiff suffered from any pregnancy-related complications rising to the level of unusual circumstances that could have rendered her disabled for purposes of the statute).

In Roberds, plaintiff sued for disability discrimination under the MHRA based on her pregnancy and related complications, including going on a leave of absence during the final weeks of her pregnancy so she could go on bed rest. The court, relying on Missouri regulation 8 CSR 60-3.040(16)(A) and numerous federal cases, concluded the plaintiff's pregnancy did not constitute a disability under the MHRA. Roberds, 2012 WL 4435116, at *11. The plaintiff's claim failed because the record contained no evidence that the plaintiff experienced one of the “extremely rare circumstances” where pregnancy-related complications rendered her disabled. Id.

Similarly, here, Plaintiff has not pleaded any “unusual circumstances” that would bring her pregnancy and pregnancy-related complications into the realm of a disability under the MHRA. Plaintiff has not pleaded any residual symptoms from her pregnancy, let alone any residual symptoms that were significant, long-term, or permanent. Plaintiff has not pleaded that any residual symptoms from her pregnancy substantially limit one or more of her major life activities on a permanent basis. Plaintiff has not pleaded that her pregnancy and related complications were anything but temporary. Absent such, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that she was disabled.

Accordingly, we hold Plaintiff failed to plead facts demonstrating that she actually has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity and thus has failed to meet the first qualifying means of establishing that she is disabled under the MHRA.

“Regarded As” and “Record Of” Disability Claims

We turn, then, to Plaintiff's claims that she was disabled because the University “regarded” her as having a disability and because she had a “record of” her physical impairment. Again, Plaintiff may also establish she is legally disabled under the MHRA by showing that she is regarded as having, or has a record of having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Section 213.010(5).

A second means of establishing a “disability” under the MHRA is to show that a plaintiff is “regarded as having such an impairment.” Section 213.010(5). The term “regarded as having such an impairment” means a person either “[h]as a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by an employer or by others as constituting such a limitation,” or “[h]as none of the impairments defined in [8 CSR 60-3.060(1)(A)] ․ but is treated by an employer or by others as having an impairment which substantially limits a major life activity[.]” 8 CSR 60-3.060(1)(E) (emphases added); Heuton, 930 F.3d at 1019. The “regarded as” means of establishing a disability “is intended to combat the effects of archaic attitudes, erroneous perceptions, and myths that work to the disadvantage of persons with or regarded as having disabilities.” Brunko, 260 F.3d at 942. The third means of establishing a “disability” under the MHRA is to show that a plaintiff has a record of such an impairment. Section 213.010(5). State regulations define “record of such an impairment” to mean that “a person has a history of, or has been misclassified, as having a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated by an employer as constituting such a limitation.” 8 CSR 60-3.060(1)(D) (emphases added).

Thus, for both her “regarded as” and “record of” claims, Plaintiff must plead that the University treated her as having an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. Plaintiff failed to do so. Plaintiff in her petition simply makes the conclusory assertion that her physical impairment constituted a disability under the MHRA because “Plaintiff has a record of said physical impairment,” and “[a]lternatively, Defendant regarded Plaintiff as having one or more physical impairments.” Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, will not pass muster. Wilkinson, 2023 WL 2536374, at *1.

Plaintiff's “regarded as” and “record of” claims of disability fail for two additional reasons. First, if a restriction is based upon the recommendation of physicians, then it is not based upon myths or stereotypes about the disabled and does not establish a perception of disability. Breitkreutz v. Cambrex Charles City, Inc., 450 F.3d 780, 784 (8th Cir. 2006) (superseded by statute on other grounds); Brunko, 260 F.3d at 942. Here, Plaintiff alleged that she notified the University of her physician's restrictions that she could not return to work out of concern for her being on her feet during work. As a result, the University's perception regarding Plaintiff's condition and any treatment of Plaintiff's pregnancy and pregnancy-related complications as substantially limiting a major life activity were based on Plaintiff's own doctor's recommendation and cannot establish her “regarded as” or “record of” disability claims. See Id. Second, the University advised Plaintiff that she was eligible to apply for any other open positions at the University that fit her present needs. Hence, by Plaintiff's own pleadings, the University did not treat Plaintiff's pregnancy and pregnancy-related complications as substantially limiting Plaintiff's major life activity of working. Brunko, 260 F.3d at 942.

Based on the foregoing, this Court holds that Plaintiff's pregnancy and pregnancy-related complications do not constitute a “disability” under the MHRA. Plaintiff has not pleaded facts to support that she has “a physical or mental impairment” that “substantially limits one or more of [her] major life activities.” Neither has Plaintiff adequately pleaded that the University regarded her as having such an impairment, nor has she adequately pleaded that she had a record of such an impairment. Because Plaintiff failed to plead facts demonstrating that she is legally disabled under the MHRA, the trial court properly dismissed Count One – Plaintiff's disability discrimination claim – for failure to state a claim. We deny Plaintiff's first point.

Second Point on Appeal

In her second point on appeal, Plaintiff challenges the dismissal of her disability discrimination claim because, she contends, her disability was a motivating factor in the adverse employment actions taken against her. In addition to pleading facts to show that Plaintiff has a “disability” under the MHRA, Plaintiff must plead facts showing that her disability was the motivating factor in her discipline and discharge.

The University's motion to dismiss did not raise this motivating-factor issue as a ground for dismissal. We will affirm the dismissal if it can be sustained on any grounds raised in the motion to dismiss. Sullivan, 677 S.W.3d at 848. Because the motivating-factor issue was not raised in the motion to dismiss, and nothing in the record suggests it was reached by the trial court, the trial court could not have ruled and dismissed on grounds that Plaintiff failed to adequately plead motivating factor. Nor was it necessary for the trial court to do so after finding Plaintiff had no disability. Plaintiff's claim fails on the disability element. Thus, it necessarily follows that a disability could not have been a motivating factor. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review regarding the issue and we decline to consider it here. “We will not convict the trial court of error on an issue that we cannot find was ever presented for it to decide.” Horton, 700 S.W.3d at 315. In any event, given our disposition of Point One finding that Plaintiff does not have a “disability” as defined under the MHRA, Plaintiff's second point also fails. We deny Plaintiff's second point.

Hostile Work Environment Due to Disability

Count Two

Third Point on Appeal

We now turn to Plaintiff's third point on appeal, in which Plaintiff alleges the trial court erred in dismissing her hostile work environment claim that was based on her alleged disability. Plaintiff contends the trial court so erred because the University's conduct related to her disability had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance.

Plaintiff, in Count Two of her petition, brought a claim against the University alleging hostile work environment due to her disability. The University moved to dismiss the claim on grounds that pregnancy is not a disability under the MHRA and because Plaintiff did not allege harassment that was severe or pervasive as a matter of law. The first ground asserted by the University – that pregnancy is not a disability under the MHRA – is dispositive of this claim and thus we need not reach the second ground (severe or pervasive).

To assert a claim of hostile work environment under the MHRA, Plaintiff must plead that: (1) she is a member of a group protected under the MHRA; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) her membership in the protected group was a motivating factor in the harassment; and (4) a term, condition, or privilege of her employment was affected by the harassment. Matthews, 685 S.W.3d at 367.

Here, Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support a claim of hostile work environment based on disability because Plaintiff failed to plead facts demonstrating that she is legally disabled under the MHRA. In asserting her hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff pleaded that she is a member of a class of persons protected by the MHRA by virtue of her perceived or actual disability. However, as discussed above, Plaintiff did not plead facts to support her claim that she had a qualifying disability under the MHRA. As a result, Plaintiff cannot sufficiently plead the first and third elements of a hostile work environment claim, namely that she is a member of a group protected under the MHRA by virtue of her disability, and that her membership in the protected group was a motivating factor in the harassment. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed Count Two for failure to state a claim. We deny Plaintiff's third point.

Hostile Work Environment Due to Gender-Pregnancy

Count Four

Sixth Point on Appeal

We now turn to Plaintiff's sixth point on appeal, in which Plaintiff alleges the trial court erred in dismissing Count Four, her claim against the University for hostile work environment due to her gender-pregnancy. Plaintiff alleges the trial court erred in dismissing this count because the University's conduct related to her gender-pregnancy had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance.

Again, to assert a claim of hostile work environment under the MHRA, Plaintiff must plead that: (1) she is a member of a group protected under the MHRA; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) her membership in the protected group was a motivating factor in the harassment; and (4) a term, condition, or privilege of her employment was affected by the harassment. Matthews, 685 S.W.3d at 367 (emphases added). The University moved to dismiss Count Four on the ground that Plaintiff did not allege harassment “that was severe or pervasive as a matter of law.”

A hostile work environment, by its very nature, involves repeated conduct over time. Gill v. City of St. Peters, 641 S.W.3d 733, 740 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022). In most claims of a hostile work environment, the discriminatory acts are not the type that can be identified separately as significant events; rather, the day-to-day harassment is primarily significant in its cumulative effect. Matthews, 685 S.W.3d at 367. Generally, the discriminatory conduct occurs over a series of days, or perhaps even years, and in direct contrast to discrete acts, one act of harassment may not be actionable on its own. Shiffman v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Club, LLC, 687 S.W.3d 443, 470 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024).

Conduct creates a hostile work environment when the conduct either creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment or has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance. Matthews, 685 S.W.3d at 367. Harassing conduct affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment, the fourth element that must be shown, if the harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an abusive working environment. Id. at 368. The harassing conduct must be so intimidating, offensive, or hostile that it poisoned the work environment, and permeated the workplace with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, both when viewed subjectively by the plaintiff and when viewed objectively by a reasonable person. Young v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections, 691 S.W.3d 815, 824 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (internal quotation omitted).

While the severity or pervasiveness of harassing conduct is generally a question for a jury, some behavior “objectively does not rise to the level of actionable harassment as a matter of law.” Young, 691 S.W.3d at 824. “Hostile work environment claims must meet demanding standards and courts are to filter out those complaints concerning the ordinary tribulations of the workplace.” Moore, 684 S.W.3d at 209 (internal quotation omitted).

Turning to Plaintiff's petition, we find it fails in two respects: first, some of Plaintiff's allegations are mere conclusions and lack ultimate facts; and second, the harassing conduct alleged cannot objectively be viewed as so severe or pervasive as to constitute actionable harassment.

To begin, Plaintiff in her petition generally alleged she:

was subjected to severe and unwelcome discrimination based on her gender (pregnancy) by Defendant's supervisory agents, including, but not limit to, that contained within this Petition.

And, she generally alleged and concluded that:

The disability -offensive, -harassing, and -discriminatory conduct was sufficiently severe and/or pervasive that a reasonable person in Plaintiff's position would find Plaintiff's work environment to be hostile and/or abusive.

Again, threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, do not pass muster. Wilkinson, 2023 WL 2536374 at *1. Missouri is a fact-pleading state. Matthews, 685 S.W.3d at 366. Though the petition need not plead evidentiary or operative facts showing an entitlement to the relief sought, the petition, at a minimum, must plead ultimate facts demonstrating such an entitlement. McConnell v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 606 S.W.3d 181, 190 (Mo. App. 2020). “Ultimate facts are ․ issuable, constitutive, or traversable facts essential to the statement of the cause of action.” Musser v. Musser, 221 S.W. 46, 50 (Mo. 1920). “In other words, ultimate facts are those the jury must find to return a verdict for the plaintiff.” McConnell, 606 S.W.3d at 190 (internal quotation omitted).

“Although we treat all of the factual allegations in a petition as true, and liberally grant to plaintiffs all reasonable inferences therefrom, conclusory allegations of fact and legal conclusions are not considered in determining whether a petition states a claim upon which relief can be granted.” McConnell, 606 S.W.3d at 190 (internal quotation omitted). “It is axiomatic that legal conclusions cannot be pleaded as ultimate facts.” Id.

Plaintiff's two allegations are merely conclusions that, pursuant to our standard of review, we do not consider. Roesch v. Sheffer, 2025 WL 1634431 *3 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025). Plaintiff's conclusions provide no specifics whatsoever as to what conduct by the University constituted unwelcome, improper harassing conduct. Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts, let alone ultimate facts, showing an entitlement to the relief sought.

Plaintiff for the first time on appeal points to the allegations in paragraphs 40, 50, 56, and 64 of her petition as conduct by the University that constituted unwelcome harassment based on her gender-pregnancy. These pleadings are as follows:

40. Plaintiff did not immediately receive a response from [Supervisor H].

50. In response, Plaintiff informed [Supervisor H] that, pursuant to Defendant's policies, it was Plaintiff's understanding that she was eligible for up to 14 weeks of non-FMLA medical leave.

56. In Plaintiff's aforementioned April 7, 2023, text message, Plaintiff also advised [Supervisor H] that: As I previously informed you, my OB/GYN has approved me to work remotely. I know that you said I would not be permitted to work remotely in my current position, but are there any other positions at Washington University that I may qualify for that do permit remote working? Other than my approved two-week medical leave and informing you that my doctor's orders permitted me to work from home, there hasn't been any other conversation about potential reasonable accommodations that would allow me to remain employed at the university during the remainder of my high risk pregnancy? Would it be possible for me to meet with you and/or a Washington University HR representative to engage in an interactive process to discuss potential reasonable accommodations that would work for both Washington University and my high risk pregnancy?

64. When Plaintiff further inquired about still being listed as an active employee, [short-term disability representative] advised Plaintiff that Defendant was required to maintain Plaintiff in the system as an “active” employee (even though her employment was explicitly terminated) in order for Plaintiff to continue qualifying for her short-term disability benefits.

Expanding on these pleadings, Plaintiff argues the University engaged in unwelcome harassment based on her gender-pregnancy by denying remote work, thus excluding her from the workplace, despite medical clearance. Plaintiff contends the University disregarded medical documentation regarding her pregnancy confirming she could continue to work with accommodation. Plaintiff further argues the University engaged in unwelcome harassment because rather than engaging in an interactive process, the University terminated her employment while she remained on medically-authorized leave and because the University maintained inconsistent employment-status designations for her as both “terminated” and “active” for benefits purposes. Plaintiff argues her petition alleges a course of conduct that, taken as true, includes pregnancy/pregnancy-complications-based hostility affecting the terms and conditions of employment. She contends the University's conduct reflected hostility and indifference to her condition, and that “taken together, these actions were demeaning, unprofessional, and objectively unwelcome.”

The question is whether the University's alleged conduct was so severe or pervasive that it altered Plaintiff's conditions of employment and created a discriminatorily hostile, abusive environment in which to work. Bracely-Mosely v. Hunter Engineering Co., 662 S.W.3d 806, 819 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). In other words, either the conduct “was severe (i.e., grave or acute) or pervasive (i.e., ubiquitous or rampant), or it was not.” Id. Likewise, either Plaintiff's “conditions of employment were altered and a discriminatorily hostile, abusive work environment was created, or they were not.” Id.

We conclude the University's alleged conduct could not objectively be viewed as so severe or pervasive that it altered Plaintiff's conditions of employment and created a hostile work environment in which to work. Plaintiff's relied-upon allegations relate to Plaintiff forwarding a letter to her supervisor about short-term disability leave and not getting an immediate response (paragraph 40); being eligible for non-FMLA medical leave (paragraph 50); sending a text message to her supervisor about working from home as an accommodation (paragraph 56); and being told that she needed to remain an active employee to receive short-term disability benefits (paragraph 64). Objectively, this alleged conduct is neither severe nor pervasive. At best, these allegations describe two isolated incidents where Plaintiff's supervisor did not immediately respond to Plaintiff's email and where the short-term disability representative informed Plaintiff the University was required to maintain Plaintiff as an “active” employee in order for her to receive short-term disability benefits. In total, the essence of Plaintiff's petition is that Plaintiff developed pregnancy complications and informed her supervisor of the complications and that she was not yet cleared to return to work. In communications with her supervisor, Plaintiff was told that her position was not a remote position and that her job could not be held for her. This does not bespeak harassment. Plaintiff's petition does not allege that anyone ever made an unwelcome or derogatory comment about her gender or pregnancy. Plaintiff does not allege that she was subjected to any conduct that intimidated, ridiculed, insulted, or threatened her based on her gender or pregnancy. Further, Plaintiff's petition does not allege any facts showing the University's conduct created a discriminatorily hostile work environment in which to work. Plaintiff's petition does not allege any facts showing the University's conduct was so intimidating, offensive, or hostile that it poisoned the work environment. Plaintiff's petition does not allege any facts showing the alleged conduct permeated the workplace with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. Nor could she, where Plaintiff was on leave and not in the workplace. Further, the alleged conduct reflects no animus toward Plaintiff's gender-pregnancy. To the contrary, the University kept Plaintiff classified as an active employee so she could maintain benefits during her pregnancy. Objectively, this would not be viewed as hostile.

In sum, the alleged conduct here was not, as a matter of law, “sufficiently severe or pervasive” that it altered the conditions of Plaintiff's employment and created a discriminatorily hostile work environment in which to work. As pleaded, Plaintiff failed to meet the demanding objective standard for a hostile work environment claim. The alleged conduct does not rise to the level of actionable harassment so as to support a claim of hostile work environment due to gender-pregnancy. We hold Plaintiff failed to state a claim for hostile work environment under the MHRA. Hence the trial court did not err in dismissing Count Four. We deny Plaintiff's sixth point.

Implicit Denial of Plaintiff's Request for Leave to Amend Her Petition

Seventh Point on Appeal

We lastly turn to Plaintiff's remaining point on appeal – her seventh point – wherein she alleges the trial court abused its discretion when it implicitly denied her alternative request to file an amended petition by failing to rule upon her request.

On sustaining a motion to dismiss a claim, the trial court “shall freely grant leave to amend and shall specify the time within which the amendment shall be made or amended pleading filed.” Rule 67.06. Nevertheless, a party “does not have an absolute right to file an amended petition.” Gross, 591 S.W.3d at 494 (quoting Doran v. Chand, 284 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009)). Denial of leave to amend is within the discretion of the trial court, and we presume the trial court's ruling is correct. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate that the trial court clearly and palpably abused its discretion. Id.

The University filed its motion to dismiss in mid-August 2024. A hearing on the motion was held over five months later, in late January 2025. We do not have a record of the hearing, and so we cannot ascertain what Plaintiff argued in this regard. The trial court issued its order granting the University's motion to dismiss in mid-April 2025, eight months after the University's motion was filed. While Plaintiff requested leave to amend her petition should the trial court be inclined to grant the University's motion to dismiss, in the eight months between filing and decision on the University's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff never set forth a single additional fact she intended to plead, nor did she attach a proposed amended petition. In fact, Plaintiff has never explained – either to the trial court or in her briefing to this Court – how she would cure her pleading deficiencies if given the opportunity to amend. Where plaintiffs neither recite any new or additional facts or claims they wish to assert in an amended petition nor attach a proposed amended petition to their response to the motion to dismiss, the trial court does not abuse its discretion in not granting plaintiffs leave to amend their petition. Doran, 284 S.W.3d at 666.

A party “does not have an absolute right to file an amended petition.” Gross, 591 S.W.3d at 494. For the reasons explained above, we find the trial court did not clearly and palpably abuse its discretion in dismissing Plaintiff's petition with prejudice without granting leave to amend. Plaintiff, over the course of eight months, made neither an effort to actually amend her petition nor to inform the court how she would do so if granted the opportunity. We deny Plaintiff's seventh point.

Conclusion

We vacate the trial court's judgment as to Count Three, Plaintiff's claim of gender discrimination due to pregnancy as she exhausted her administrative remedies. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court's judgment. We remand the cause to the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “In reviewing the trial court's dismissal of a petition for failure to state a claim, we assume that all assertions set forth in the petition are true.” Puckett v. Nodaway Cnty., 726 S.W.3d 691, 694 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (internal quotation omitted).

2.   Plaintiff did not provide this Court with a transcript of the hearing and arguments before the trial court.

3.   Plaintiff's eighth and tenth points on appeal alleged the trial court erred in granting the University's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff argued in her eighth point that the timing of Plaintiff's termination is a question of fact for the jury to resolve and similarly argued in her tenth point that the issue of whether she exhausted her administrative remedies is not ripe for adjudication.

4.   Plaintiff's fourth and fifth points on appeal challenged the dismissal of Plaintiff's gender discrimination claim (Count Three) because she is a member of a protected class and because her sex was a motivating factor in her discharge. Furthermore, the University's motion to dismiss did not raise these issues as grounds for dismissal. Because these issues were not raised in the motion to dismiss, and nothing in the record suggests they were reached by the trial court, the trial court could not have ruled and dismissed on grounds that Plaintiff failed to adequately plead motivating factor or that she was a member of a protected class. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review regarding the issues and we decline to consider them here. “We will not convict the trial court of error on an issue that we cannot find was ever presented for it to decide.” Horton, 700 S.W.3d at 315.

5.   The University notes other claims of Plaintiff's for which the University contends Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies because the claims were not part of Plaintiff's charge. In particular, the University in its motion to dismiss noted Plaintiff's allegations of failure to reinstate and Plaintiff's allegation that her termination was a result of a disparate impact on female employees. Plaintiff did not address these grounds in her memorandum opposing the University's motion to dismiss. We do not know what was argued at the hearing on the University's motion before the trial court. These issues are not addressed on appeal, by either party. The issues are thus deemed abandoned.

6.   All statutory references are to RSMo. (Supp. 2024).

7.   When reviewing cases under the MHRA, we are guided by both Missouri law and any applicable federal employment discrimination case law that is consistent with Missouri law. Matthews, 685 S.W.3d at 366.

Angela T. Quigless, Judge

Renee D. Hardin-Tammons, Presiding Judge, and Thomas C. Clark, II, Judge, concur.