LYDA v. ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY (2026)

Connie Lyda sued Mark Northcott, alleging that she sustained injuries in a motor-vehicle accident caused by Northcott's negligence. Lyda and Northcott entered an agreement pursuant to § 537.065.1,² which specified that Lyda would only seek to recover from Northcott's insurance coverage. After being notified of the § 537.065 agreement, Northcott's insurers intervened in Lyda's lawsuit.

Lyda and Northcott settled Lyda's claims for $6,140,000. Over the insurers’ objections, the circuit court entered judgment in that amount.

The circuit court separately entered partial summary judgment for Northcott and against one of the insurers on Northcott's cross-claim for indemnity, finding that the insurer's homeowner's insurance policy provided coverage for the accident. The circuit court certified both judgments for immediate appeal under Supreme Court Rule 74.01(b).

The insurers have filed separate appeals from the judgment entered in Lyda's favor on her personal-injury claim, and from the judgment granting Northcott partial summary judgment on his cross-claim concerning insurance coverage. This Court consolidated the appeals. We reverse the circuit court's entry of judgment for Lyda, because the judgment denied the insurers their right under § 537.065.4 to contest Lyda's claim on the merits. We conclude, however, that the summary judgment on Northcott's cross-claim was not eligible for certification for immediate appeal under Rule 74.01(b). Because we lack appellate jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal of the circuit court's insurance-coverage ruling.

Factual Background

On September 22, 2019, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Northcott was driving a golf cart in which Lyda was a passenger. Northcott lost control of the golf cart and crashed it. Lyda was ejected. According to her petition, Northcott “was intoxicated and impaired” at the time of the accident. The petition alleges that Lyda “sustained severe injuries, including large skin avulsions on her left foot that exposed tendons and bones, a fracture of the second metacarpal on her right hand, and significant facial lacerations.” Lyda alleged that treatment of her injuries “required, among other things, multiple surgeries and skin grafting.”

The accident occurred while Northcott was driving his golf cart on a private road in the Incline Village subdivision, a gated community located in Foristell in Warren County. Northcott owns and lives in a home in Incline Village.

At the time of the accident, Northcott was insured under an auto policy issued by Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, and by a homeowner's policy issued by Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company. Except where the context requires otherwise, we refer to the insurers collectively as “Allstate” in this opinion.

On January 10, 2023, Lyda filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Warren County against Northcott, alleging that his negligence had caused her injuries. The action was subsequently transferred to the Circuit Court of Boone County.

After being served with Lyda's petition, Northcott notified Allstate, and requested a defense. Allstate refused to defend Northcott without a reservation of rights, and subsequently denied coverage for the accident. On March 30, 2023, Allstate filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to defend or indemnify Northcott under either of its policies.

On May 4, 2023, Northcott and Lyda entered into an agreement pursuant to § 537.065.1, in which Lyda agreed to “forego collecting any compensatory damage judgment against or settlement with Northcott from Northcott's personal assets,” but to instead “pursue as the sole source of payment ․ the assets of Allstate or any other insurer from whom Northcott makes final recovery ․” Northcott agreed to pursue claims against his insurers for indemnity, breach of contract, bad faith, and breach of fiduciary duty; he also agreed to pay Lyda 90% of the net amount he recovered.

The § 537.065 agreement required Northcutt to admit the following facts in Lyda's pending lawsuit:

that he was operating the golf cart, that Lyda was a passenger, that Northcott consumed alcohol prior to the time he was operating the golf cart, that he was tested at a BAC of .114 in the hours after the Crash, that Northcott's negligence caused the Crash, that the Crash occurred within the Incline Village development, and that Lyda suffered injuries from the Crash as set forth [elsewhere in the agreement].

Northcott's counsel advised Allstate of the § 537.065 agreement on the day it was entered. On May 22, 2023, Allstate moved to intervene as of right in Lyda's personal-injury lawsuit pursuant to § 537.065.4. The circuit court granted the motion at a hearing held on June 26, 2023. At the same hearing, the court granted Lyda leave to file a first amended petition asserting a claim for punitive damages.

Allstate's answer admitted that Northcott is a Missouri resident, and that Northcott had an accident while driving a golf cart in which Lyda was a passenger. Allstate's answer otherwise denied the allegations of Lyda's petition, including her allegations that Northcott was intoxicated and impaired; that his negligence caused the accident; and that she suffered severe injuries, and incurred substantial medical expenses, as a result. Allstate's answer also alleged, as affirmative defenses, that Lyda's own negligence contributed to cause her injuries, and that she had assumed the risk of injury associated with riding in the golf cart.

On July 17, 2023, Northcott filed his own answer to Lyda's first amended petition. Unlike Allstate, Northcott's answer admitted all of the factual allegations of Lyda's first amended petition. Because “Northcott admit[ted] he acted in a negligent manner,” his answer “pray[ed] for a Judgment to be entered in this matter [in Lyda's favor] in an amount that is fair and reasonable as determined by the Court or a jury.” Although Northcott's answer admitted the factual allegations in Lyda's first amended petition, he denied her claim that an award of punitive damages was warranted.

Northcott's answer also asserted cross-claims against both Allstate entities for (1) indemnity; (2) breach of contract; and (3) breach of fiduciary duty. The indemnity claim sought coverage “[i]n the event Northcott is found liable for the claims asserted by Lyda in the petition,” while the breach of contract claim sought to recover compensatory damages based on Allstate's failure to defend Northcott. The breach of fiduciary duty claim alleged that Allstate had breached its duties to Northcott by “failing to use reasonable diligence to conduct an investigation and coverage analysis of the claims filed against him, ․ failing to promptly notify him of [its] position on coverage, and ․ failing to even respond to his tenders of coverage until after he was already in default to respond to the Petition.” As a result, Northcott alleged that he “was left without direction from his insurer[s] and without a defense of the claims set forth in [Lyda's] Petition,” and thereby suffered compensable damages.

On June 28, 2024, Northcott filed a motion for partial summary judgment, contending that the undisputed facts established that he was entitled to coverage for the accident under the homeowner's insurance policy issued by Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company. Allstate Vehicle and Property filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, claiming that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Northcott under the homeowner's policy.

On September 5, 2024, Lyda and Northcott filed a joint motion for entry of judgment on Lyda's negligence claim. The motion alleged that

Plaintiff Lyda and Defendant Northcott entered into a Settlement Agreement on July 18, 2023 which, among other things, provided Plaintiff with the right to notify Defendant in writing any time at least seven days before trial to elect to settle her claims with Defendant for the amount of $6,140,000 and upon such election that Defendant would consent to entry of judgment in Plaintiff's favor and against Defendant in that amount.

Allstate opposed the motion for entry of judgment. Although it acknowledged that “nothing prevents Plaintiff Lyda and Defendant Northcott from settling the claim that Plaintiff Lyda has brought against Defendant Northcott,” Allstate contended that such a settlement could not bind it. Allstate argued that the settlement between Lyda and Northcott could not deprive Allstate of its right under § 537.065.4 to “meaningfully assert its position” concerning Lyda's claim, including “the right to a trial by jury.” Allstate also argued that entry of judgment finally resolving Lyda's tort claim would deny Allstate its right to a jury trial under the Missouri Constitution, and under the Supreme Court's rules of civil procedure.

Despite Allstate's objections, the circuit court granted Lyda and Northcott's motion for entry of judgment. On October 24, 2024, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Lyda against Northcott for the full amount requested — $6,140,000 — along with post-judgment interest.

On November 13, 2024, Allstate moved to vacate or amend the circuit court's judgment. The motion argued that the judgment should be vacated because it had the effect of nullifying Allstate's rights as an intervenor under § 537.065.4, the Missouri Constitution, and the rules of civil procedure. In the alternative, Allstate asked that the judgment be amended “to reflect it is not binding or enforceable against [Allstate] and [Allstate is] not estopped or in any way preempted from meaningfully litigating the issues of damages and liability with respect to Plaintiff's Lyda's negligence claim against Defendant Northcott.”

On February 17, 2025, the circuit court denied Allstate's motion to vacate or amend the October 24, 2024 judgment. The court also granted Northcott's motion for partial summary judgment against Allstate Vehicle and Property on its homeowner's insurance policy, and denied Allstate Vehicle and Property's cross-motion for summary judgment.

On February 21, 2025, Northcott voluntarily dismissed without prejudice his cross-claims against Allstate Fire and Casualty seeking coverage under the auto policy it had issued. Northcott's remaining cross-claims asserted that coverage existed solely under Allstate Vehicle and Property's homeowner's insurance policy.

On March 10, 2025, the circuit court entered two separate judgments. Each judgment expressly found “no just reason for delay” of an immediate appeal under Rule 74.01(b). The first judgment reiterated the relief previously awarded to Lyda against Northcott in the court's October 24, 2024 judgment: $6,140,000 in compensatory damages, as well as post-judgment interest. The second judgment documented the court's grant of Northcott's motion for partial summary judgment. The second judgment provided:

Northcott's crossclaim against Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company for indemnity under the House and Home Policy is hereby resolved. The only matters still pending before the Court are Northcott's crossclaims for breach of contract (Count II) and breach of fiduciary duty (Count III) against Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company.

Judgment is entered in favor of Crossclaimant Northcott and against Cross Claim Defendant Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company on County I (Indemnity) of Northcott's Cross Claim.

The two Allstate entities filed a joint notice of appeal from the judgment resolving Lyda's negligence claim against Northcott. That appeal was docketed as No. WD87901. Allstate Vehicle and Property filed a separate notice of appeal from the second judgment, which granted summary judgment to Northcott on his cross-claim for indemnity. That appeal was docketed as No. WD87902. This Court consolidated the two appeals.

Discussion

I.

Allstate's first Point argues that the circuit erred in entering judgment for Lyda, and against Northcott. Allstate contends that the entry of judgment denied it the right to litigate the merits of Lyda's claim, including its right to a jury trial, under § 537.065.4, Missouri's rules of civil procedure, and the Missouri Constitution. Because we conclude that the circuit court's entry of judgment denied Allstate its rights as an intervenor under § 537.065.4, we find it unnecessary to address its constitutional and rules-based claims.

We note that Lyda and Northcott filed separate respondent's briefs. Lyda's brief responded to Allstate's challenge to the entry of judgment on the underlying tort claim, while Northcott's brief focused on the insurance coverage issues resolved by the circuit court's separate entry of partial summary judgment against Allstate Vehicle and Property (issues we address in § II below).

A.

Lyda's brief argues that Allstate's Point Relied On only challenges the ruling on its motion to vacate the judgment, rather than the circuit court's initial entry of judgment on Lyda's tort claim. Lyda contends that a more deferential standard of review applies to Allstate's arguments, because those arguments only challenge the circuit court's refusal to revisit a previously entered judgment. Lyda has also filed a motion to strike Allstate's brief, or dismiss the appeal, based on the purported defects in Allstate's Point Relied On.

As an initial matter, Allstate's reference to the circuit court's denial of its motion to vacate the judgment is understandable, because the initial judgment entered on October 24, 2024, was interlocutory and not appealable. The circuit court did not enter an appealable final judgment on Lyda's negligence claim until March 10, 2025, after rejecting the arguments Allstate made in its motion to vacate the interlocutory October 2024 judgment. Allstate's motion to vacate was not an “authorized after-trial motion,” because no final judgment had yet been entered. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Kearney, 681 S.W.3d 358, 361 n.3 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (because circuit court judgment was interlocutory, “the clock for the post-judgment motions never began to run”); Keen v. Wolfe, 660 S.W.3d 14, 20 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (rules authorizing filing of authorized after-trial motions do not apply to interlocutory orders).

Allstate's motion to vacate made all of the same substantive arguments, prior to the entry of a final judgment on Lyda's claim, which it now makes on appeal. Moreover, the motion to vacate reiterated arguments Allstate had made before the interlocutory October 2024 judgment was entered. The reference in Allstate's Point Relied On to the circuit court's denial of their motion to vacate does not restrict our scope of review.

Lyda reads Allstate's Point Relied On too narrowly in any event. Although the Point asserts that “[t]he Circuit Court erred in denying [Allstate's] Motion to Vacate Judgment,” it also contends that “the entry of judgment in favor of Respondent Lyda and against Respondent Northcott denied [Allstate] the right to a jury trial ․ guaranteed by R.S.Mo. § 537.065.” Moreover, the Argument section of Allstate's opening brief fully develops its claim that § 537.065.4 prevented Lyda and Northcutt from settling the underlying tort claim and thereby denying Allstate the right to litigate the merits of that claim.

For decades, the Missouri Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that appellate courts should not rely on minor procedural defects in an appellant's briefing to deny review of the merits of the appellant's arguments. For example, the Court recently agreed to address appellants’ arguments, despite Points Relied On which were multifarious and failed to “follow the structure for points relied on laid out in Rule 84.04(d)(1),” where appellants’ briefing nonetheless adequately advised the Court and the other parties of the issues appellants intended to raise. The Court explained that

[t]his Court's preference is to decide cases on their merits rather than on technical deficiencies in the brief and this Court will not exercise discretion to disregard a defective point unless the deficiency impeded disposition on the merits. A brief impedes disposition on the merits where it is so deficient that it fails to give notice to this Court and to the other parties as to the issue presented on appeal.

City of St. Louis v. State, 682 S.W.3d 387, 397 n.7 (Mo. 2024) (cleaned up); see also Bell v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 701 S.W.3d 614, 616 n.1 (Mo. 2024) (noting the Court's “strong preference to resolve matters on the merits when possible”). The Court in the City of St. Louis case chose to review the merits of the appellants’ arguments, despite any deficiencies in their Points Relied On, because their arguments were “readily understandable.” 682 S.W.3d at 397 n.7.

As in the City of St. Louis case, both Allstate's Point Relied On, and the Argument under that Point, make its argument crystal clear; any defects in Allstate's Point Relied On do not “impede[ ] disposition on the merits.” We accordingly deny Lyda's motion to strike Allstate's brief and/or dismiss its appeal, and now turn to the substance of Allstate's claim that the circuit court's entry of judgment erroneously denied Allstate its rights as an intervenor under § 537.065.4.

B.

Section 537.065 applies to claims “on account of personal injuries, bodily injuries, or death.” § 537.065.1. Section 537.065.1 authorizes injured parties and tortfeasors to enter into contracts which provide that the injured party will only seek to execute on a judgment against specific assets or insurance of the tortfeasor. Section 537.065.2 requires that a tortfeasor's insurers be notified of the execution of an agreement pursuant to § 537.065.1 within certain time periods, depending on whether a civil action seeking recovery from the tortfeasor is pending at the time the agreement is entered. Section 537.065.3 provides that “[n]o judgment shall be entered against any tort-feasor after such tort-feasor has entered into a contract under this section for at least thirty days after the insurer or insurers have received written notice as provided in subsection 2 of this section.”

Section 537.065.4 then authorizes insurers to intervene as of right in civil actions pending against an insured-tortfeasor who has entered into a § 537.065.1 agreement. Section 537.065.4 provides in relevant part:

Any insurer or insurers who receive notice pursuant to this section shall have the unconditional right to intervene in any pending civil action involving the claim for damages within thirty days after receipt of such notice. Upon intervention pursuant to this section, the intervenor shall have all rights afforded to defendants under the Missouri rules of civil procedure and reasonable and sufficient time to meaningfully assert its position including, but not limited to, the right and time to conduct discovery, the right and time to engage in motion practice, and the right to a trial by jury and sufficient time to prepare for trial. No stipulations, scheduling orders, or other orders affecting the rights of an intervenor and entered prior to intervention shall be binding upon the intervenor.

“When interpreting statutes, [appellate courts] must ascertain the intent of the legislature by considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms and give effect to that intent if possible.” Treasurer of State v. Penney, 710 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Mo. 2025) (cleaned up).

Section 537.065.4 was enacted in its present form during the 2021 legislative session. See H.B. 345, 101st Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Session (2021). The 2021 legislation amended an existing statute. An understanding of the legal backdrop against which the 2021 legislation was enacted is critical in interpreting the legislation's effect. When an existing statute is amended,

[t]he General Assembly is presumed familiar with the construction placed upon the original act, and the new statute must be construed in the light of the problem it seeks to remedy and of the usages, circumstances, and conditions existing at the time the change was made. Thus, in enacting a new statute on the same subject as that of an existing statute, it is ordinarily the intent of the legislature to effect some change in the existing law. If this were not so the legislature would be accomplishing nothing, and legislatures are not presumed to have intended a useless act.

State ex rel. Edu-Dyne Sys., Inc. v. Trout, 781 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Mo. 1989) (cleaned up); accord Penney, 710 S.W.3d at 500. “This Court should never construe a statute in a manner that would moot the legislative changes, because the legislature is never presumed to have committed a useless act.” Rasmussen v. Ill. Cas. Co., 628 S.W.3d 166, 176 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (cleaned up).

Therefore, to interpret the 2021 legislation which adopted § 537.065.4, we must examine the legal backdrop against which the General Assembly acted. Section 537.065 was originally enacted in 1959. See S.B. 259, 70th Gen. Assembly (1959). As originally enacted, § 537.065 allowed injured parties and tortfeasors to agree to limit the injured party's recovery to particular assets and insurance policies. The original statute did not require, however, that the tortfeasor's insurers be notified of such agreements. In Knight by Knight v. Knight, 609 S.W.3d 813 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020), we recognized “the scenario which played out innumerable times” under the original version of § 537.065:

an injured party and an insured/tort-feasor enter an agreement which eliminates the insured's personal liability exposure; they then continue to litigate the injured party's claim in circumstances in which the insured may have little incentive to vigorously defend, and might even be contractually prohibited from doing so; the injured party obtains a substantial money judgment against the insured; and the injured party then seeks to bind the insured's liability insurer to the outcome of the litigation, even though the insurer did not participate in, and might even have been unaware of, that litigation.

Knight, 609 S.W.3d at 822; see also, e.g., Allen v. Bryers, 512 S.W.3d 17, 33 (Mo. 2016) (“where the insurer had the opportunity to defend the insured but wrongfully refused to do so, the insurer is precluded from relitigating any facts that actually were determined in the underlying case and were necessary to the judgment” following insured's entry into § 537.065 agreement with claimant (cleaned up)); Schmitz v. Great Am. Assurance Co., 337 S.W.3d 700, 704 (Mo. 2011) (holding that insurer was bound by results of bench trial following insured's entry into § 537.065 agreement with injured parties, even though at trial the insured “neither objected to the entry of evidence nor offered any defense”).

The General Assembly repealed and reenacted § 537.065 in 2017. See H.B. 339 & 714, 99th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Session, 2017 MO. LAWS 337, 339 (2017). Knight recognized that the 2017 amendments were intended to address the limitations of the original statute: “The legislature presumably recognized that, where some or all of an insured's personal assets are protected from execution by a § 537.065 agreement, the insured may have little incentive to assert a vigorous defense to an injured party's claims, and may even be contractually prohibited from mounting a defense.” 609 S.W.3d at 820.

The 2017 legislation made three primary changes to § 537.065: first, it specified that a tortfeasor could enter into a § 537.065 agreement only if its insurer was given a prior opportunity to defend the tortfeasor, but refused to do so; second, the 2017 legislation provided that no judgment could be entered against a tortfeasor that had entered into a § 537.065 agreement until the tortfeasor's insurers had been be notified of the agreement's execution; and third, the 2017 amendments gave insurers the right to intervene in any pending litigation involving the injured party's claim, so long as the insurer moved for intervention within thirty days of receiving notice from the tortfeasor/insured. See Desai v. Seneca Specialty Ins. Co., 581 S.W.3d 596, 600 (Mo. 2019); Knight, 609 S.W.3d at 821.

Although the 2017 legislation was intended to address the situation where a judgment binding an insurer was procured without the insurer's involvement, it quickly became apparent that the right of intervention granted to insurers in the 2017 legislation could be easily evaded. For example, although an insurer could move to intervene in pending litigation within thirty days of receiving notice of a § 537.065 agreement, that right of intervention could be nullified by notifying the insurer of an agreement when no litigation was pending, or by dismissing without prejudice any lawsuit in which an insurer intervened, and refiling after the insurer's intervention right expired. See, e.g., Barnett v. Columbia Maint. Co., 632 S.W.3d 396, 402-03 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021); Loveland v. Austin, 626 S.W.3d 716, 724-26 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021); Aguilar v. GEICO Cas. Co., 588 S.W.3d 195, 198 & n.7 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019); Britt v. Otto, 577 S.W.3d 133, 140 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019).

In addition, the 2017 legislation failed to specify what rights an insurer would have in litigation between an injured party and an insured tortfeasor, if and when it was allowed to intervene. As Judge Dowd observed in Barnett, “[t]he statute merely gives a right to intervene but does not address the prickly question of what [insurers] get to do once they enter.” 632 S.W.3d at 413-14 (concurring opinion); see also State ex rel. Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. May, 620 S.W.3d 96, 101-02 (Mo. 2021) (Wilson, J., concurring) (expressing uncertainty as to the role an insurer-intervenor could properly play in the underlying tort litigation, following intervention under the 2017 version of § 537.065); Reddick v. Spring Lake Ests. Homeowner's Ass'n, 648 S.W.3d 765, 780 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (“Since the 2017 amendments, Missouri courts ․ have scuffled with the scope of an insurer's statutory rights after intervening.”).

The limited nature of the intervention right granted to insurers under the 2017 amendments was thrown into sharp relief in Knight, 609 S.W.3d 813. In Knight, a minor was injured in a watercraft accident. Id. at 816. The minor (acting through a conservator) filed suit against insured defendants for their negligent supervision of the minor. Id. After the defendants’ insurer denied coverage, the insureds and the minor entered into a § 537.065 agreement. Id. at 817. In the agreement, the insureds agreed to binding arbitration of the minor's personal-injury claim. Id. An arbitration proceeding was held, in which the minor was awarded $6 million in damages. Id. The insureds notified their insurer of the § 537.065 agreement only after the arbitration proceeding had concluded. Id. The insurer was permitted to intervene in the pending litigation, in which the minor was then seeking confirmation of the arbitration award. Id.

Despite the fact that the insured tortfeasors were now bound by an arbitration award, the intervening insurer in Knight argued that it was entitled to relitigate the merits of the minor's tort claim, and the extent of the minor's compensable damages. In a 2-1 decision, this Court rejected the insurer's argument that it had an unrestricted right to relitigate the underlying tort claim, because of the limited nature of the rights afforded to intervening insurers by the 2017 amendments. We explained:

State Farm argues that § 537.065.2 gives it the unconditional right to contest liability and damages on the merits. But the statute does not say that. Instead, it is far more limited. Section 537.065.2 merely requires that insurers be provided with notice of an agreement entered under § 537.065 “[b]efore a judgment may be entered,” and that insurers have the opportunity to intervene in “any pending lawsuit” for thirty days thereafter․

․

․ In amending the statute in 2017, it may be ․ that [the legislature] intended to guarantee insurers an absolute right to contest the insured's liability, and the injured party's damages, on the merits, no matter what proceedings had taken place between the injured party and the insured prior to the insurer's intervention. But even if those were the intentions of the General Assembly ․, those intentions were not enacted into law.

․

Under § 537.065.2, State Farm had only the rights of any intervenor in a lawsuit; it was not given an unconditional right to litigate the injured party's claims on the merits. State Farm was required to “take the action as it found it” at the time of its intervention․ At the time of State Farm's intervention, the only pending question in the litigation was whether the arbitration award should be confirmed, or whether it was instead subject to vacation. At that time, it was not open to State Farm to seek to relitigate [its insureds’] liability to [the minor], or the amount of his recoverable damages.

609 S.W.3d at 821-22, 827. Knight was decided over a vigorous dissent which argued that the intervening insurer was entitled to litigate the merits of the minor's claim, despite the fact that its insureds had agreed to binding arbitration. Id. at 829-38 (Chapman, J., dissenting).

C.

The 2021 amendments to § 537.065 were plainly intended to address the shortcomings of the 2017 legislation, and to give intervening insurers greater rights than typical intervenors. As discussed above, insured tortfeasors and injured parties operating under the 2017 amendments could easily nullify an insurer's intervention rights by strategically timing when they notified the insurer of a § 537.065 agreement. Under the 2021 amendments, however, notice must now be given at a time which allows an insurer a meaningful opportunity to intervene in the litigation which will determine the insured's liability – whether or not that litigation is pending at the time the agreement is executed, or is dismissed and later refiled. § 537.065.2. The 2021 amendment also amended the Uniform Arbitration Act to specify that arbitration awards entered in personal-injury cases are generally not binding against an insurer, unless the insurer has itself agreed to arbitration. § 435.415.2.

Moreover, the 2021 amendments overturned the result in Knight, by guaranteeing an intervening insurer's right to contest the insured's liability, and the extent of the injured party's damages. The amendments do so by specifying that an intervening insurer shall be given “reasonable and sufficient time to meaningfully assert its position including, but not limited to, the right and time to conduct discovery, the right and time to engage in motion practice, and the right to a trial by jury and sufficient time to prepare for trial.” § 537.065.4. Moreover, although Knight held that an intervening insurer must generally “ ‘take the action as it found it’ at the time of its intervention,” 609 S.W.3d at 827, the 2021 amendments now provide that an intervening insurer will not be bound by any agreements of the parties, or any orders of the court, entered prior to the insurer's intervention: “[n]o stipulations, scheduling orders, or other orders affecting the rights of an intervenor and entered prior to intervention shall be binding upon the intervenor.” § 537.065.4.

In Knight, this Court stated that “it was open to the General Assembly to state explicitly ․ that an intervening insurer would in all instances have the right to defend the insured's liability and damages on the merits,” whatever agreements the insured and the injured party executed. 609 S.W.3d at 822. That is precisely what the legislature did in § 537.065.4, by specifying that an intervening insurer must be provided with an opportunity to “meaningfully assert its position,” without regard to “stipulations, scheduling orders, or other orders ․ entered prior to intervention.”

Section 537.065.4 expressly states that an intervening insurer is not bound by any “stipulations” entered into prior to its intervention. Under Lyda's argument, however, the intervening insurer's litigation rights could be extinguished by an agreement entered between the injured party and the tortfeasor/insured after the insurer's intervention. All an injured party and insured tortfeasor would need to do is wait for the insurer to intervene, and then settle the underlying tort claim. Such an outcome would have the effect of completely nullifying the expanded intervention rights created by the 2021 amendments to § 537.065. Yet, under well-established rules of statutory construction, “[t]his Court should never construe a statute in a manner that would moot the legislative changes, because the legislature is never presumed to have committed a useless act.” Rasmussen v. Ill. Cas. Co., 628 S.W.3d 166, 176 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (cleaned up).

This Court has recognized that § 537.065 permits an insurer to intervene in order to contest the merits of the injured party's tort claim against the insured. See Reddick v. Spring Lake Ests. Homeowner's Ass'n, 648 S.W.3d 765, 777-81 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (holding that intervening insurer had right to file motion to dismiss the underlying tort claim, on the basis that its insured owed no duty of care to the injured plaintiff, despite a § 537.065 agreement in which the tortfeasor/insured agreed to “consent to the entry of judgment,” and “waive[d] his right to contest liability”); Knight, 609 S.W.3d at 820 (“By enacting [the 2017 amendments to § 537.065], the legislature has declared that ․ a liability insurance carrier has a sufficient interest in the determination of the insured's liability to support the insurer's intervention in the underlying litigation, as a matter of right.” (emphasis added)). Since § 537.065.4 gives insurers the right to independently contest the insured's tort liability, separate and apart from the insured's own right to contest a claim, no “consent judgment” can be entered on that claim unless the intervening insurer joins in it.

Lyda argues that § 537.065.4 permits an insurer to intervene solely to litigate the question of insurance coverage. But, separate and apart from § 537.065.4, insurers already had the right to bring declaratory judgment actions to litigate their coverage obligations with respect to pending tort claims. See McCrackin v. Mullen, 701 S.W.3d 868, 874-75 (Mo. 2024); Allen v. Bryers, 512 S.W.3d 17, 32 (Mo. 2016). Indeed, Allstate had already filed such a declaratory judgment action in federal court, prior to its intervention in Lyda's suit. The 2021 amendments to § 537.065.4 would have accomplished nothing, if they only recognized insurers’ preexisting right to litigate coverage questions while underlying tort litigation was ongoing.

Lyda also contends that § 537.065.4 is intended to allow intervening insurers only “to litigate coverage-related facts.” (Emphasis added.) But because of the variety of insuring clauses, definitions, conditions and exclusions a liability policy may contain, virtually any fact litigated in an underlying tort action could be relevant to the coverage afforded by a liability insurance policy: e.g., when injuries occurred, and when the insured became aware of those injuries; the relationship between the insured and the injured party (such as whether they were members of the same family or household, or employer-employee); whether the insured acted negligently, intentionally, or criminally; whether the insured was intoxicated; whether the injuries occurred in the course of particular activities (such as during the operation of a motor vehicle, or during the insured's performance of an activity for compensation); whether the injured party bears any responsibility for the injury-causing events; the amount of the insured's monetary liability; the nature of the injured party's injuries; and the items for which the injured party seeks compensation (such as medical expenses; lost wages or profits; injuries to property; or emotional harms). Lyda's claim that § 537.065.4 only permits an insurer to litigate “coverage-related facts” has no logical stopping point.

Finally, Lyda points out that an earlier version of the 2021 legislation contained different language describing an intervening insurer's rights. As originally introduced, the second and third sentences of § 537.065.4 would have read as follows:

Upon intervention under this section, the intervenor shall have all rights afforded to defendants under the Missouri rules of civil procedure including, but not limited to, the right to conduct discovery, the right to engage in motion practice, and the right to a trial by jury. The intervenor shall also have the right to assert any rights or raise any defenses available to the tort-feasor and to assert any rights or raise any defenses that would have been available to the tort-feasor in the absence of the contract entered into under this section or other agreement between the parties to that contract.

H.B. 345, 101st Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Session (as introduced Dec. 7, 2020).

Lyda contends that, while this earlier version of § 537.065.4 would have permitted intervening insurers to fully litigate the underlying tort claim, the legislation as ultimately enacted does not. We are unpersuaded. Although the earlier bill contains different language than the legislation finally enacted, they share the same objectives. Moreover, the legislation finally enacted arguably gives an intervening insurer more robust procedural rights than the original proposal. Thus, the enacted version's second sentence not only specifies particularly procedural rights of an intervening insurer, but also guarantees that the intervenor shall have “reasonable and sufficient time to meaningfully assert its position.” In addition, the original proposed legislation only prevented agreements between the injured party and the insured from limiting an intervening insurer's right to litigate the underlying tort claim. In contrast, the final legislation provides that an intervening insurer's rights are unaffected not only by any “stipulations” of the parties, but by any pre-intervention “scheduling orders, or other orders” entered by the court. Our interpretation of § 537.065.4 is unaffected by any difference in wording between the version of § 537.065.4 which was originally proposed, and the version ultimately enacted.

Once Allstate intervened in Lyda's lawsuit against Northcott, Lyda and Northcott could not reach a settlement, without Allstate's consent, which had the effect of fully and finally resolving Lyda's negligence claim. Despite any agreement between Lyda and Northcott, § 537.065.4 gave Allstate the right to defend Lyda's negligence claim on the merits, including the right to a jury trial on that claim. The circuit court erred by entering judgment on Lyda's negligence claim, and that judgment is reversed.³

II.

Allstate Vehicle and Property has separately appealed from the circuit court's grant of partial summary judgment to Northcott on his cross-claim for indemnity. That appeal has been assigned No. WD87902. We conclude that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal, and accordingly dismiss it.

For ease of reference, we refer to Allstate Vehicle and Property as “Allstate” throughout the remainder of this opinion.

Although none of the parties raised any issue concerning our appellate jurisdiction, we have the obligation to consider jurisdictional issues sua sponte.

Before addressing the merits of an appeal, this Court must first determine whether it has jurisdiction. “For this Court to have jurisdiction, the judgment entered by the circuit court and appealed by the parties must have been a ‘final judgment’ as that phrase is used in section 512.020(5).” To be “final,” the judgment must either dispose of all claims (or the last claim) in a lawsuit, or be certified by the circuit court for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 74.01(b). A judgment is eligible for certification under Rule 74.01(b) as a “final judgment” only if it disposes of a “judicial unit” of claims, meaning the judgment resolves “all claims by or against at least one party” or “disposes of one or more claims that are sufficiently distinct from the claims that remain pending in the circuit court.” A circuit court has discretion over whether an eligible judgment should be certified under Rule 74.01(b).

Matthews v. Harley-Davidson, 685 S.W.3d 360, 365 (Mo. 2024) (citing and quoting Wilson v. City of St. Louis, 600 S.W.3d 763, 765, 768, 771 (Mo. 2020)). Although the decision whether or not to certify an eligible judgment may be discretionary, “[t]he question of whether a judgment is eligible for certification under Rule 74.01(b) is a question of law on which the circuit court has no discretion ․” Sykora v. Farmers Ins. Co., 702 S.W.3d 94, 100 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (cleaned up).

We conclude that the circuit court's partial summary judgment ruling did not resolve a distinct “judicial unit,” and was therefore not eligible for certification under Rule 74.01(b). The partial summary judgment clearly does not resolve “all claims by or against at least one party,” since it only resolves one of the three cross-claims Northcott has asserted against Allstate. Nor does the partial summary judgment resolve a distinct “claim” or “judicial unit.”

To determine how many pending claims exist that must be disposed, the focus is on the number of legal rights asserted in the action. A claim is the aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts. If a complaint seeks to enforce only one legal right, it states a single claim, regardless of the fact that it seeks multiple remedies. If multiple forms of relief are sought with respect to one set of facts, it is still one claim, and an order resolving some prayers for relief and not others does not fully resolve that claim and is not a judgment.

Rhodes v. Mo. Hwys. & Transp. Comm'n, 718 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Mo. 2025) (cleaned up). “In other words, a judgment resolves a ‘distinct’ judicial unit if it resolves claims that do not arise from the same set of facts, and the same transactions and occurrences, as the counts yet to be disposed of in the circuit court.” Wilson, 600 S.W.3d at 770 (cleaned up).

The circuit court's partial summary judgment only resolves Northcott's claim for indemnity, which sought to establish Allstate's liability for any judgment ultimately awarded to Lyda against Northcott. The partial summary judgment explicitly states that it did not resolve Northcott's claims for breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty. The breach of contract claim prayed for recovery of the defense costs which Northcott incurred in responding to Lyda's claim. The breach of fiduciary duty claim sought damages for Allstate's failure to diligently investigate and respond to Northcott's demand for coverage, which allegedly “left [Northcott] without direction from his insurer and without a defense of [Lyda's] claims.”

The indemnity, breach of contract, and fiduciary duty claims all arose out of the same operative facts, and together constitute a single “claim” or “judicial unit.” Sykora, 702 S.W.3d 94, involved a judgment certified under Rule 74.01(b), which resolved a claim for equitable garnishment; the equitable garnishment claim asserted that an insurer had a duty to defend a wrongful-death action against an insured, and indemnify the insured for the resulting judgment. Id. at 98. A separate claim against the insurer for bad-faith failure to settle remained pending in the circuit court, however. Id. at 98-99. This Court held that the equitable garnishment and bad-faith-failure-to-settle claims were part of a single “judicial unit,” and that the judgment on the equitable garnishment claim was accordingly not eligible for certification under Rule 74.01(b).

In this case, the Sykoras’ two claims – the equitable garnishment claim (which the judgment resolves) and the bad faith failure to settle claim (which the judgment does not resolve) – arise “from the same set of facts, and the same transactions and occurrences.” ․ Both counts in the Sykoras’ second amended petition allege that [the insured] caused [the decedent's] death; the Sykoras obtained a judgment against [the insured]; and Farmers is obligated to pay that judgment pursuant to the Policy.

Both claims also involve “the same transactions and occurrences.” The Sykoras allege in both counts that Farmers carried an insurance policy that covered [the insured]; Farmers was made aware of the Sykoras’ claim and judgment against [the insured]; and Farmers wrongfully denied [the insured] coverage pursuant to that policy. The Sykoras seek damages on both claims related to Farmers alleged wrongful denial of insurance coverage. Both claims also involve similar legal theories: that Farmers knew or should have known that its Policy covered [the insured], but Farmers failed to provide [him] with a defense, and Farmers is now liable for damages arising from their failure to provide [the insured] with a defense.

Id. at 102 (citation omitted).

The Eastern District reached the same result in Columbia Mutual Insurance Co. v. Epstein, 200 S.W.3d 547 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006). The Court explained that claims for insurance coverage, and claims that an insurer breached its fiduciary duties and acted in bad faith in denying coverage, were not distinct, but instead raised substantially overlapping factual and legal issues:

While the trial court determined Columbia's duties, and hence Epstein's rights, as to defense and indemnification, the trial court left ․ Epstein's counterclaim for vexatious refusal to pay and bad faith open for future adjudication. Furthermore, claims are separate only if they require proof of different facts and application of distinguishable law. Both issues in this case arise out of the same contract – the Columbia insurance policy issued to Epstein. The trial court determined that Columbia has a duty to defend and indemnify Epstein, and Columbia has appealed that determination, denying that the insurance policy affords coverage for the claims alleged in the [the injured parties’] petition. Through his counterclaim, Epstein alleges that Columbia's position as to coverage is unreasonable and, thus, its refusal to pay is vexatious and in bad faith. These two aspects of the case do not represent two distinct, different, or separate transactions nor does their resolution involve proof of different facts and distinguishable law. Columbia's determination of coverage is not distinct, different, or separate from the reasonableness of its determination. Both actions require proof of facts as to the nature of the coverage afforded by the insurance policy issued to Epstein, and both actions rely on interpretation of the policy language as to such coverage.

Id. at 551.

The same analysis applies here. Northcott's claims for indemnification, for recovery of his defense costs, and for damages for Allstate's alleged breach of its fiduciary duties, all involve the same underlying question: does Allstate's homeowner's insurance policy provide coverage for the September 22, 2019 accident? That central underlying question requires the resolution of common factual issues concerning the circumstances of the accident, and of common legal issues concerning the interpretation of Allstate's policy. Although Northcott's three cross-claims may seek different relief, all of the claims arise out of “the same set of facts, and the same transactions and occurrences.” Wilson, 600 S.W.3d at 770. The circuit court's partial summary judgment did not resolve a distinct “judicial unit,” and it was therefore not eligible for certification for immediate appeal under Rule 74.01(b).

Allstate was aware of these jurisdictional problems. Allstate told the circuit court that it was proposing that the court enter two separate judgments (one resolving Lyda's negligence claim, and the other addressing Northcott's cross-claim for indemnity) because of counsel's “concerns on the potential immediate appealability of the Court's ․ resolution of Northcott's Indemnity Claim.” Despite the concerns expressed to the circuit court, the jurisdictional statement of Allstate's opening Brief did not identify any potential jurisdictional problem. When this Court requested supplemental briefing on the jurisdictional question, however, Allstate responded that it was “unable to identify any colorable argument that the partial summary judgment that is the subject of WD87902 is immediately appealable.”

The circuit court erroneously certified its partial summary judgment on Northcott's cross-claim for indemnity for immediate appeal under Rule 74.01(b). This Court lacks jurisdiction over appeal No. WD87902, and that appeal is accordingly dismissed.

Conclusion

In appeal No. WD87901, we deny Lyda's motion to strike Allstate's brief and/or dismiss its appeal. The circuit court's judgment on Lyda's negligence claim against Northcott is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We dismiss appeal No. WD87902, which challenges the circuit court's grant of partial summary judgment to Northcott on his indemnity cross-claim.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Unless otherwise indicated, statutory citations refer to the 2016 edition of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, updated by the 2025 Cumulative Supplement.

3.   As Judge Wilson recognized in his concurring opinion in State ex rel. Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. May, 620 S.W.3d 96, 101-02 (Mo. 2021), it is highly unusual for an intervenor to be permitted to independently defend a claim which directly implicates the rights of someone else, rather than the intervenor's own interests. Yet, as explained in the text, that is what the 2021 amendments to § 537.065.4 do. We anticipate that the rights granted to intervening insurers under the current version of § 537.065.4 may raise a host of novel procedural questions during the proceedings on remand. For example, difficult issues may arise concerning the management of a trial in which two separate parties are defending a single negligence claim asserted against a single defendant – particularly where one of the defending parties concedes liability, while the other contests it. Those issues are not presented in the current appeal, however, and we accordingly do not address them.

Alok Ahuja, Judge

All concur.