RUQAIYAH HUNTER v. DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY (2026)

Ruqaiyah Hunter (Hunter) appeals pro se from the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) affirming and adopting the decision of the Appeals Tribunal (Appeals Tribunal) of the Division of Employment Security (Division) finding that Hunter voluntarily left her employment at Transimpex Translators Interpreters Editors Consultants, Inc. (Employer) without good cause attributable to the work or Employer, thus, disqualifying her from unemployment benefits pursuant to section 288.050.1(1).¹ Hunter's initial brief was struck for its failure to comply with Rule 84.04.² Because Hunter's amended brief also fails to comply with appellate briefing requirements under Rule 84.04, we dismiss the appeal.

Factual and Procedural Background

Hunter began working for Employer in approximately August 2022, last earning $18.00 per hour as an interpreting project coordinator.

In May 2023, Hunter approached Employer's president (Owner) regarding another employee and how that other employee felt mistreated by Owner. After Owner was made aware of the other employee's complaints, Hunter did not perceive that Owner made any changes regarding the other employee's treatment and the other employee resigned. Hunter felt that Owner treated her differently after that incident, and that Owner's communication was condescending and rude. Hunter did not bring her concern to Owner's attention.

November 9, 2023, was Hunter's last day working for Employer. That day, Hunter's direct supervisor informed her that she would be required to track all of her daily completed work tasks. Hunter testified that she believed the directive “was retaliation and a way to push [her] out of the position.” Hunter contacted Owner and told her this was an unreasonable request. Owner said that she would “look into it.” However, that evening, Hunter resigned in an email sent to Owner.

A deputy from the Division found that Hunter was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under section 288.050 because she left her position with Employer voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work or Employer on November 9, 2023. Hunter appealed to the Appeals Tribunal which heard evidence at a telephone hearing and it affirmed the deputy's determination. Hunter then appealed to the Commission and it affirmed and adopted the Appeals Tribunal's decision on June 17, 2025, finding that it was fully supported by competent and substantial evidence and was in accordance with the “relevant provisions of the Missouri Employment Security Law.”³

Hunter appeals pro se.

Discussion

This Court issued an order striking Hunter's initial brief for the following reasons:

1. The Statement of Facts lacks specific page references to the legal file or the transcript as required by Rule 84.04(c).

2. The Point Relied On is not in compliance with the specific requirements of Rule 84.04(d).

3. The Point Relied On does not include a list of cases or other authority upon which that party principally relies as required by Rule 84.04(d)(5).

4. The argument does not include a concise statement describing whether the error was preserved for appellate review and if so how it was preserved. The argument section lacks specific page references to the legal file or the transcript. All as required by Rule 84.04(e).

We granted Hunter fifteen days to file an amended brief correcting the above violations. Hunter filed a motion requesting an extension of time to file her amended brief which we granted. Hunter's amended brief still fails to substantially comply with Rule 84.04's briefing requirements for the reasons discussed infra.

Rule 84.04 Violations

Complying with Rule 84.04 briefing requirements is necessary to ensure this Court does not become an advocate by speculating on facts and arguments that have not been made. Acton v. Rahn, 611 S.W.3d 897, 901 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). The failure to substantially comply with Rule 84.04 preserves nothing for review and is grounds for dismissal. Id. (citation omitted). We hold pro se appellants to the same standards as attorneys and, thus, pro se appellants must substantially comply with Rule 84.04 which sets forth the mandatory rules for appellate briefing. Alagha v. Cottle Auto. Repair, Inc., 715 S.W.3d 580, 584 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025); Eberhardt v. Hagemann Eberhardt, 609 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). We are mindful of the problems that pro se litigants face, but judicial impartiality, judicial economy, and fairness to all parties mandate that we do not grant pro se appellants preferential treatment regarding their compliance with the rules of appellate procedure. Alagha, 715 S.W.3d at 584; Eberhardt, 609 S.W.3d at 898.

Appendix

Under Rule 84.04(h), a party's brief shall be accompanied by an appendix with the following materials:

(1) The judgment, order, or decision in question, including the relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law filed in a judge-tried case or by an administrative agency;

(2) The complete text of all statutes, ordinances, rules of court, or agency rules claimed to be controlling as to a point on appeal; and

(3) The complete text of any instruction to which a point relied on relates.

“The mere inclusion of documents in an appendix to a brief does not make them part of the record on appeal.” Washington v. Zinn, 286 S.W.3d 828, 831 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) (citation omitted). We will not consider documents in an appendix that are not in the record on appeal. Id.

Hunter filed a sixty-one-page appendix that includes documents such as extensive email and text message correspondence. Hunter's appendix does not comply with Rule 84.04(h) because she fails to include required materials such as the Appeals Tribunal's decision ⁴ as well as those materials required by subsection (2), and instead includes documents that are not in the record on appeal which was filed in accordance with section 288.210.⁵ Although Rule 84.04(h) allows the appendix to include other materials that are pertinent to the issues discussed in the brief, the authorized record on appeal is the firm boundary of our consideration and additional materials cannot be shoehorned into the record via the appendix. Sharp v. All-N-One Plumbing, 612 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (citation omitted). Section 288.210 also prohibits us from receiving additional evidence that was not before the Commission. Noonan v. Troyeco, LLC, 649 S.W.3d 314, 315 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022). We note that Hunter's inclusion of additional materials in the appendix that are not in the record on appeal is especially problematic because Hunter cites to these documents in her statement of facts. See Sharp, 612 S.W.3d at 244.

Statement of Facts

Rule 84.04(c) requires that “[a]ll statements of facts shall have specific page references to the relevant portion of the record on appeal, i.e., legal file, transcript, or exhibits.” Hunter's amended brief contains a statement of facts section, but the vast majority of her statements do not include specific page references. Sporadic references are insufficient under Rule 84.04(c) because every statement of fact requires a specific page reference, and the lack of page references requires us to improperly speculate on the facts. LT Grp. USA, LLC v. Clark, 667 S.W.3d 631, 634 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023); Sharp, 612 S.W.3d at 245. Furthermore, we cannot spend time searching the record to determine if Hunter's factual assertions in her statement of facts are supported by the record as doing so is essentially “searching for a needle in a haystack.” Phox v. Boes, 702 S.W.3d 498, 504 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (citation omitted).

In regard to the few citations that Hunter does include, the statement of facts further violates Rule 84.04 because all citations are to the appendix which “is not part of the legal file or otherwise part of the record on appeal.” Shelton v. Shelton, 717 S.W.3d 810, 815 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (citation omitted).

Point Relied On

Where the appellate court reviews the decision of an administrative agency each point shall:

(A) Identify the administrative ruling or action the appellant challenges;

(B) State concisely the legal reasons for the appellant's claim of reversible error; and

(C) Explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error.

The point shall be in substantially the following form: “The [name of agency] erred in [identify the challenged ruling or action], because [state the legal reasons for the claim of reversible error, including the reference to the applicable statute authorizing review], in that [explain why, in the context of the case, the legal reasons support the claim of reversible error].”

Rule 84.04(d)(2). Additionally, for each point relied on, the appellant “shall include a list of cases, not to exceed four, and the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions or other authority upon which that party principally relies.” Rule 84.04(d)(5).

Here, Hunter's point on appeal states:

The Missouri Department of Labor and Industrial Relations erred in determining that [Hunter] left work with [Employer] voluntarily without good cause attributable to the wo[r]k or employer thereby disqualifying her for benefits pursuant to § 288.050.1(1), RSMo 1994. The Missouri Department of Labor and Industrial Resolution [sic] did not receive evidence for the reason for the work separation prior to determining [Hunter] to be disqualified ․ [Hunter] has provided more details to the multiple reasons for deciding to separate from the company due to hostile work environment, retaliation and previous concerns not being addressed or rectified. [Hunter] gave the employer multiple chances allowing the employer to address her concerns prior to separation. A reasonable employee would not have stayed in the position with [Employer] with the environment Management created and maintained.

The only change that Hunter made to the point relied on in her amended brief is the addition of the last sentence. Hunter also lists the same two cases below her point relied on, both of which, inter alia, affirm the denial of unemployment benefits based on findings that the employee did not have good cause to leave their employment. See Mitchell v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 922 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996); Citizens Bank of Shelbyville v. Indus. Comm'n, 428 S.W.2d 895, 901 (Mo. App. 1968).

Hunter's point on appeal does not follow the “roadmap” in Rule 84.04(d). See Amrine v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 726 S.W.3d 800, 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). The purpose of the point relied on is to notify the opposing party of the matters which must be contended with and to inform this Court of the issues presented for review. Id. (citation omitted). Deficient points on appeal require us to search the remainder of the brief in an attempt to discern the appellant's assertion. Id. (citation omitted). We are unable to fully discern the issues Hunter presents on appeal solely from her point relied on when it states that the Commission “did not receive evidence,” and she does not cite the applicable standard of review.⁶

Hunter also does not satisfy the Rule 84.04(d)(5) requirement to include a list of cases or provisions upon which she principally relies. Hunter first lists Mitchell below her point relied on but does not cite to or discuss the case at any other point in her brief. Hunter relies on Citizens once in her argument section to support the proposition that “ ‘good cause’ has no fixed meaning but depends on the circumstances of each case.” Citizens, 428 S.W.2d at 897. Beyond this, Hunter does not demonstrate how these cases support her contention that the Commission erred in determining Hunter left Employer voluntarily without good cause.

Argument

In the argument section, each claim of error shall “include a concise statement describing whether the error was preserved for appellate review; if so, how it was preserved; and the applicable standard of review.” Rule 84.04(e). All factual assertions in the argument section require “specific page references to the relevant portion of the record on appeal, i.e., legal file, transcript, or exhibits.” Id. The argument section “must explain why, in the context of the case, the law supports the claim of reversible error” and it should advise this Court “how principles of law and the facts of the case interact.” Maxwell v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 671 S.W.3d 742, 749 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (citation omitted).

First, Hunter's argument section fails to comply with Rule 84.04(e) because it still does not include a preservation statement, as we noted in our order striking Hunter's initial brief. This statement is essential to our review of the case. Amrine, 726 S.W.3d at 810 (citation omitted). Hunter also does not include a single citation to the record on appeal, or to any document for that matter. We previously advised Hunter to correct this deficiency, among others, and she failed to do so. “We cannot comb the legal file for facts to better understand [Hunter's] argument, nor can we do so and remain steadfast to our role as the neutral arbiter of the case.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Last, Hunter's argument section fails to explain why the law supports her claim of reversible error. As best as we can discern, Hunter's argument is that she was not given the opportunity to submit evidence “in the form of emails and colleague statements” and, thus, the Commission erred in concluding that Hunter left her employment voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work or Employer. In the beginning of her argument section, Hunter provides a brief discussion of case law discussing what constitutes “good cause” to terminate employment but she does not provide any legal discussion in regard to her main contention that she was unable to submit evidence. Hunter additionally fails to elaborate on the “evidence” she is referring to and how its exclusion constituted reversible error by the Commission. Simply put, Hunter's argument section “fail[s] to clarify the grounds on which she claims reversible error or provide appropriate analytical support[.]” Crawford v. Peterson, 698 S.W.3d 172, 178 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024).

Hunter's briefing deficiencies are so substantial and material that we must dismiss her appeal.

Conclusion

Hunter's appeal is dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016) as currently supplemented.

2.   All rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2025).

3.   We note that this is the second appeal involving Hunter and Employer that has come before this Court. In Hunter v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 713 S.W.3d 697 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025), Hunter appealed the Commission's decision affirming the Appeals Tribunal's determination that Employer had good cause to file an untimely protest against Hunter's claim for unemployment benefits. The Commission did not determine whether the denial of Hunter's unemployment benefits was correct, although the Division incorrectly made that determination while her first appeal to the Commission was pending. Id. at 699-700. We dismissed that appeal because Hunter failed to address the issue of whether Employer had good cause to file an untimely protest, instead addressing the merits of her claim for benefits in her argument on appeal. Id. at 701. We noted that a remand ordered by the Appeals Tribunal could now occur and that the Division could make a determination on the merits of Hunter's claim for unemployment benefits. Id. The Division then entered a new decision on the merits determining that Hunter lacked good cause to voluntarily terminate her employment, which is the appeal currently before us.

4.   Unlike the Commission's decision, the Appeals Tribunal's decision includes extensive findings of fact and law. The Commission adopted the Appeals Tribunal's decision as the decision of the Commission in the matter and, thus, the Appeals Tribunal's decision contains “relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Rule 84.04(h)(1).

5.   Section 288.210 concerns the judicial review of the Commission's decisions and instructs that an “appeal may be taken by filing notice of appeal with the [C]ommission, whereupon the [C]ommission shall, under its certificate, return to the court all documents and papers filed in the matter, together with a transcript of the evidence, the findings and the award, which shall become the record of the cause.”

6.   Under our applicable standard of review, we may reverse or otherwise modify the Commission's decision only if: (1) it acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the award was procured by fraud; (3) the facts found by the Commission do not support the award; or (4) there was no sufficient competent evidence in the record warranting the award. Johnson v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 318 S.W.3d 797, 799 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (citation omitted).

Janet Sutton, Judge

Karen King Mitchell, P.J., and Lisa White Hardwick, J. concur.