DENNIS THOMPSON v. GENESCO INC (2026)

Introduction

Dennis Thompson (Thompson) appeals the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Genesco, Inc., d/b/a Johnston & Murphy (Genesco) on Thompson's claims alleging violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227 (2018) (the TCPA). Thompson raises four points on appeal. In his first three points, Thompson argues the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment (1) because there were disputed issues of material fact, (2) because he had standing to bring the case, and (3) because the TCPA and its implementing regulations, 47 C.F.R. sec. 64.1200,¹ apply to text messages. In point four, Thompson also requests we reverse denial of his motion for class certification. Beginning with point two, as we must, we affirm and find Thompson lacks standing to bring this lawsuit. Accordingly, we do not reach the other points relied on and dismiss the remainder of the appeal.

Factual and Procedural Background

On the afternoon of December 9, 2022, Dennis Thompson was browsing the Johnston & Murphy website on his phone when he encountered an ad offering him a ten-percent discount on one purchase. The ad asked just one small thing in return: Thompson had to tap the ad, which would cause his phone to text “JOIN” to a specified number. He did. And there began the controversy.

Thompson received a reply without delay asking him to confirm his opt-in with a “Y,” which he did. This prompted another message confirming that Thompson had opted in and informing him of the simple words he could invoke should the need arise: “HELP” for assistance, and “STOP” to block further messages. Thompson then received his ten-percent coupon which he used that same day. But he also received something else: “numerous” advertising text messages—three in a span of seven weeks—from which there could be no reprieve.²

Rather than opting out, Thompson filed a Class-Action Petition ³ in the circuit court, seeking statutory damages for each “illegal” text.⁴ Thompson specifically alleged violations of 47 C.F.R. sec. 64.1200(d), which regulates telemarketers’ internal do-not-call procedures. Genesco removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. On January 8, 2024, the district court determined Thompson lacked standing and remanded the case to the circuit court.⁵

Undeterred, Thompson submitted his second amended petition and moved for class certification; Genesco moved for summary judgment. On August 11, 2025, the circuit court granted Genesco's motion for summary judgment and denied Thompson's class certification as moot. This appeal follows.⁶

Discussion

Point II: Appellant Lacks Standing

In point two, Thompson argues the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Genesco because Thompson has standing to bring this claim. We disagree. Because any injury Thompson might have suffered has no causal link to Genesco's internal do-not-call list, he has no standing to sue. We affirm the circuit court's grant of summary judgment and dismiss the remainder of this appeal.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo, without deference to the circuit court. Lisle v. Meyer Elec. Co., Inc., 667 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Mo. banc 2023). “Summary judgment will be affirmed when the moving party has established a right to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of facts as to which there is no genuine dispute.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). We review the record below “in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered, and that party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the record.” Glendale Shooting Club, Inc. v. Landolt, 661 S.W.3d 778, 782 (Mo. banc 2023) (quoting Brockington v. New Horizons Enters., LLC, 654 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Mo. banc 2022)). Standing is a question of law which we review de novo. Schweich v. Nixon, 408 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Mo. banc 2013) (per curiam).

Analysis

Before addressing a controversy on the merits, Missouri courts must first determine whether a case is justiciable. Id. at 775. “A party's standing to bring an action is a justiciability requirement under both federal and Missouri laws.”⁷ Spicer v. Spicer, 568 S.W.3d 480, 489 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019). To prove standing, a plaintiff must first show “that he or she has ‘a personal stake arising from a threatened or actual injury.’ ” Id. (quoting Corozzo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 S.W.3d 566, 574 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017)). “[A] plaintiff must show that he or she suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016)). This must be more than “a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm.” Corozzo, 531 S.W.3d at 576 (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341). Then, if an injury is proven, a plaintiff must also demonstrate the injury resulted from “the putatively illegal action” complained of. Weber v. St. Louis Cnty., 342 S.W.3d 318, 323 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotation omitted).

Assuming without deciding that Thompson had a cognizable injury, he cannot satisfy the causal element of standing. 47 C.F.R. sec. 64.1200(d) could only apply to an injury traceable to Genesco's internal do-not-call list (or alleged lack thereof). Because Thompson never requested to be placed on Genesco's list, any injury could not be traceable to said list.⁸ The comparator cases cited by Thompson offer no support because they uniformly involve litigants who, unlike Thompson, received unauthorized communications.⁹ Thompson clearly authorized the texts he complains of here and never revoked that authorization.

Thompson also insists that he has standing because he is a member of the class that the TCPA is meant to protect. He is not: the TCPA generally protects against “unwanted” texts, and 47 C.F.R. sec. 64.1200(d) protects “persons who request not to receive telemarking calls made by or on behalf of [a specific] person or entity.” Thompson's “JOIN” text was an invitation, and his failure to request placement on Genesco's do-not-call list left that invitation open and keep him from being counted as a member of the class of people protected by 47 C.F.R. sec. 64.1200(d).

Ultimately, Thompson's admissions that he solicited text messages from Genesco and never retracted that solicitation doom his quixotic crusade. Point two is denied and the circuit court's grant of summary judgment is affirmed. Accordingly, we dismiss the remainder of this appeal.

Conclusion

We affirm the circuit court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   C.F.R. references are to the Code of Federal Regulations (2022).

2.   Except, of course, replying with “STOP” as instructed.

3.   Thompson insisted in his petition that he never gave Genesco consent to send him text messages, but after Genesco provided a record of Thompson's texts, Thompson admitted that he texted “JOIN” to a Genesco number and “Y” to confirm his desire to opt-in.

4.   Thompson requested $500 or $1,500 for each “illegal” text message.

5.   See Thompson v. Genesco, Inc., No. 4:23-CV-00292-SRC, 2024 WL 81187 at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan 8, 2024).

6.   Genesco requests attorney's fees on appeal, which we deny.

7.   Unlike Article III jurisdictional justiciability, Missouri justiciability is a “prudential” doctrine. Schweich, 408 S.W.3d at 773. Still, the tests are similar, and Missouri courts have borrowed from federal standing jurisprudence in shaping Missouri's applicable standard. See, e.g., Corozzo v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 S.W.3d 566, 574-76 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016)); Spicer v. Spicer, 568 S.W.3d 480, 489 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019).

8.   Or, as the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri put it: “That internal list, whether extant or not, is useless to Thompson if it never would have featured his name or phone number.” Thompson, 2024 WL 81187 at *5.

9.   For example, Thompson cites to All Am. Painting, LLC v. Fin. Sols. & Assocs., 315 S.W.3d 719 (Mo. banc 2010) for support. But All American Painting explicitly found standing for litigants who received unauthorized facsimiles from an advertiser.

Virginia W. Lay, Judge

Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge, concurs. Philip M. Hess, Judge, concurs.