FIDOW v. STATE (2024)

OPINION

Appellant challenges the district court's order denying his postconviction petition to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that: (1) the amendment to Minnesota Statute section 609.0342 reducing the maximum sentence for gross misdemeanors by one day renders his initial sentence of 365 days illegal and (2) his plea was unintelligent because he was misinformed about the maximum sentence. Because his initial sentence was legal at the time it was imposed, and because he was correctly advised of the maximum sentence at the time he entered his guilty plea, we affirm.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minneosta charged appellant Sadak Qasim Fidow with two gross-misdemeanor counts: second-degree driving while impaired (DWI)—operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of .08 or higher within two hours, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 1(5) (2020) and third-degree driving while impaired (DWI)—operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 1(1) (2020). According to the complaint, in July 2021, a Minnesota State Trooper stopped a vehicle operated by Fidow after observing him weaving in and out of his lane at 3:00 a.m. Fidow submitted to alcohol testing, which revealed that his alcohol concentration was over 0.16.

In September 2021, Fidow pleaded guilty to second-degree DWI, pursuant to a gross-misdemeanor plea agreement.¹ At the plea hearing, Fidow's attorney made a record of the plea agreement's terms, which included a discussion of the maximum penalty for a gross-misdemenaor offense. The district court asked Fidow whether he understood the discussion of the plea agreement, whether he had had enough time to speak with his attorney about the agreement, and whether he wanted to take part in the agreement. Fidow confirmed that he had discussed the agreement with counsel and understood its terms.

Fidow was sworn in and was advised by counsel of his rights. Fidow's counsel explained to him that, because of COVID-19, the hearing was being held over Zoom and that she could not physically hand him the plea petition form to sign but confirmed that she and Fidow had reviewed it together and that he was comfortable with her signing on his behalf, which he affirmed. Fidow's attorney offered, and the court received, the written waiver of rights, and the district court again asked Fidow if he had “any questions for [the district court] about [his] rights here in court.” Fidow responded, “No,” and then answered questions to establish the factual basis for a plea. Based on Fidow's responses, the district court found that Fidow made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea. Per the plea agreement, the district court sentenced Fidow to 365 days in the Hennepin County Adult Correctional Facility, but stayed 320 of those days for four years and ordered Fidow to serve the remaining 45 days on electronic home monitoring. The district court ordered Fidow to complete a post-DWI chemical-health assessment and follow all recommendations, attend a victim-impact panel, and have no same or similar offenses for the next four years.

In May 2023, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz signed an omnibus criminal justice bill into law. See 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 6, § 6, at 918. This bill included Minnesota statutes section 609.0342:

(a) Any law of this state that provides for a maximum sentence of imprisonment of one year or is defined as a gross misdemeanor shall be deemed to provide for a maximum fine of $3,000 and a maximum sentence of imprisonment of 364 days.

(b) Any sentence of imprisonment for one year or 365 days imposed or executed before July 1, 2023, shall be deemed to be a sentence of imprisonment for 364 days. A court may at any time correct or reduce such a sentence pursuant to rule 27.03, subdivision 9, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and shall issue a corrected sentencing order upon motion of any eligible defendant.

Minn. Stat. § 609.0342 (Supp. 2023). The bill specified that this became “effective the day following final enactment and applie[d] to offenders receiving a gross-misdemeanor sentence on or after that date and retroactively to offenders who received a gross-misdemeanor sentence before that date.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 6, § 6, at 918.

In September 2023, Fidow filed a petition for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. In a supplemental petition filed in October 2023, Fidow argued that his gross-misdemeanor sentence from 2021 was illegal and that he was misinformed about the maximum sentence for the offense. Therefore, he argued that his original guilty plea was not intelligent. Alternately, Fidow requested that if the district court did not grant his request to withdraw his plea that it should reduce his sentence to the statutory maximum of 364 days. The postconviction court corrected Fidow's sentence to reflect a 364-day sentence under section 609.0342, but denied his request to withdraw his plea. Fidow appeals.

ISSUES

I.  Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Fidow's postconviction request to withdrawal his guilty plea where a newly enacted statute reducing the maximum sentence for gross misdemeanors made his sentence illegal, and where the district court corrected his sentence pursuant to Minnesota Statute section 609.0342(b).

II. Was Fidow's guilty plea unintelligent and therefore invalid because he was misinformed about the maximum sentence for the offense?

ANALYSIS

Fidow argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his guilty plea because the parties agreed to an illegal sentence. He also argues that the district court corrected the sentence in a manner contrary to the parties plea agreement and that his guilty plea was unintelligent because he was not correctly advised about the maximum sentence. “We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.” Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Id. (quotation omitted). While “legal issues are reviewed de novo,” our “review of factual issues is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the postconviction court's findings.” Id. (quotation omitted). Unless clearly erroneous, we will not reverse the postconviction court's findings. Id.

The district court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea at any time “upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1; see State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 715-16 (Minn. 1994) (applying Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd.1, in a postconviction challenge). “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid. To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010) (citations omitted).

First, Fidow argues that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because the parties agreed to an illegal sentence and the district court's correction of that illegal sentence is contrary to the party's agreement. Second, Fidow argues that his plea was unintelligent because he was misadvised of the maximum sentence. We address each argument in turn.

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fidow's postconviction request to withdrawal his guilty plea where a newly enacted statute reducing the maximum sentence for gross misdemeanors made his sentence illegal, and where the district court corrected his sentence pursuant to Minnesota Statute section 609.0342(b).

Fidow argues that the postconviction court abused it discetion by denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea and correcting his sentence “in a manner contrary to the parties’ plea agreement.” In his supplemental petition for postconviction relief, Fidow asked the court to reduce his sentence to the newly enacted statutory maximum of 364 days, which it did. However, he now claims that, because the postconviction court “correct[ed] a sentence that was part of a plea agreement, [he] must be allowed to withdraw from the plea agreement if he so chooses.” In sum, Fidow argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by granting the relief he sought in his petition—a one-day reduction in his sentence to comport to the legislative change to the maximum penalty for a gross misdemenaor.

The parties agree that any party who enters into a plea agreement that involves an illegal sentence has the right to withdraw from the agreement. Fidow argues that if a later amendment changes a sentence and that sentence allows retroactive application that the prior sentence is an illegal one. He cites State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn. 1998), to support his argument. In Garcia, the prosecution promised the defendant an 81-month sentence as part of the plea agreement, which did not include a conditional-release term. 582 N.W.2d at 882. The supreme court held that, because the legislature mandated that conditional release terms be included under the relevant statute, the initial promise was unauthorized by law at the time of sentencing and, therefore, the defendant was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. Id.

Unlike Garcia, Fidow reached a plea agreement that included a sentence that was a legal sentence at the time it was imposed. At the time of Fidow's sentencing hearing in 2021, a maximum sentence of 365 days was valid for gross misdemeanors. See Minn. Stat. § 609.0341, subd. 1 (2020) (stating that gross misdemeanors shall “provide for a maximum fine of $3,000 and for a maximum sentence of imprisonment of one year”). Two years later, the legislature adjusted the maximum sentence for gross misdemeanors from 365 days to 364 days. The state correctly points out, a 365-day sentence today would be illegal under section 609.0342, however the initial plea made by Fidow was authorized by law at the time of sentencing.

Fidow insists that plea withdrawal is a permissible remedy under section 609.0342. Fidow relies on the omitted-case canon which holds that nothing is to be added to what a statute states or reasonably implies and argues that the statute “is silent on the question of whether [sentence correction] is the exclusive remedy.” This canon undermines his argument, however. See Wallace v. Comm'r of Tax'n, 289 Minn. 220, 184 N.W.2d 588, 594 (1971) (affirming the well-settled principle that “courts cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks”); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 (2012) (“Nothing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies ․ That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered.”). The statutory text of section 609.0342 does not cover plea withdrawal as a potential remedy, and accepting Fidow's argument would have this court add language to the text that the legislature did not supply.²

Based on the record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fidows request to withdraw his guilty plea because when the district court accepted Fidow's initial plea agreement that included the 365-day sentence, it was legal at the time imposed. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it subsequently corrected Fidow's maximum sentence to 364 days under section 609.0342.

II. Fidow's guilty plea was intelligent and therefore valid because he was correctly informed about the maximum sentence for the offense at the time of his guilty plea.

Fidow argues that he did not make an intelligent plea because he was misadvised about his maximum sentence. Therefore, he claims that he has the right to withdraw from the guilty plea.

“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 93. Withdrawal is permitted, however, at “any time before sentencing if it is ‘fair and just’ to do so” or when it “is necessary to correct a ‘manifest injustice.’ ” Id. (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subds. 1-2). “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” Id. at 94. A constitutionally valid guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)). The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.

“The intelligence requirement ensures that a defendant understands the charges against him, the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” Id. at 96. “ ‘Consequences’ refers to the plea's direct consequences,” notably fines and maximum sentences. Id. Moreover, an intelligent guilty plea must “represent a knowing and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action available.” Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).

Fidow contends that his plea agreement was unintelligent because he was misadvised and lacked understanding about his maximum sentence—a direct consequence of his plea agreement of which he should have been made aware. Without expressly saying so, he appears to argue that not only does section 609.0342 retroactively convert his 365-day sentence to 364 days, it also retroactively renders his guilty plea unintelligent. We reject this claim. Fidow was correctly advised of his maximum sentence for a gross misdemeanor at the time, which was 365 days. Notably, Fidow does not assert that he misunderstood the charges against him or the rights that he waived. He was properly advised by the district court of the consequences of pleading guilty, and confirmed that he understood his rights, and that he felt comfortable moving forward with the plea agreement.

There is nothing in the record to support Fidow's assertion that his guilty plea is now unintelligent as a result of the legislature amending the maximum sentence for gross misdemeanors two years later. As mentioned earlier, section 609.0342 operates retroactively to reduce the sentences of offenders with 365-day gross-misdemeanor sentences to 364 days. There is nothing in the statute to justify his interpretation that it retroactively invalidates the plea agreements of those same offenders, and he cites no case law. Accepting Fidow's argument would lead to an absurd result by requiring his defense attorney and the district court to have known—two years in advance—that the legislature would reduce the maximum sentence by a single day. “It is well settled that courts may presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd result.” State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 916 (Minn. 1996) (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (1994)). In addition, “courts should give a reasonable and sensible construction to criminal statutes.” Id.

In sum, the record supports that Fidow's plea was intelligent. The subsequent amendment to section 609.0342 does not now render his guilty plea unintelligent. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fidow's request to withdraw his guilty plea.

DECISION

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fidow's motion to withdraw his guilty plea where a newly enacted statute reducing the maximum sentence for gross misdemeanors made his sentence illegal and the district court corrected his sentence pursuant to Minnesota Statute section 609.0342(b) and Fidow's guilty was intelligent because he was correctly advised about the maximum sentence for his gross-misdemeanor offense at the time of his guilty plea.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the hearing, Fidow was provided a certified court interpreter, sworn in by the court.

2.   A reading of the statute also demonstrates that the legislature provided clear instructions on how to address cases like this one. Section 609.0342(b) states “[a]ny sentence of imprisonment for one year or 365 days imposed or executed before July 1, 2023, shall be deemed to be a sentence of imprisonment for 364 days. A court may at any time correct or reduce such a sentence pursuant to rule 27.03, subdivision 9, of the rules of criminal procedure and shall issue a corrected sentencing order upon motion of any eligible defendant.” Minn. Stat. § 609.0342(b) (emphasis added). The legislature did not retroactively make sentences prior to the enactment of the change illegal, it converted them to 364-day sentences to comport with this legislation, and instructed Minnesota courts to issue corrected sentences, which was done in this case.

HARRIS, Judge