DOUGHERTY v. MUELLER (2026)

Richard Mueller (“Husband”) appeals from the judgment holding him in civil contempt for violating the judgment dissolving his marriage to Christina Dougherty (“Wife”). Because Husband fully complied with the contempt orders in the judgment, he has purged himself of the contempt, and the appeal is moot. Therefore, we must dismiss the appeal.

Factual and Procedural Background

Wife sought to hold Husband in civil contempt for violating the judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage. After a trial, the trial court found that Husband was in contempt of the dissolution judgment because he (1) failed to pay Wife the full amount necessary to equalize the parties’ attorney fees and litigation expenses under a fee-sharing provision in the dissolution judgment and (2) failed to transfer or direct payments to Wife from certain of Husband's accounts, including his 401(k). In the contempt judgment, the trial court ordered Husband to pay into the court registry the amounts he owed under the fee-sharing provision and for Wife's share of the 401(k). The trial court also ordered Husband to direct transfer of the amounts owed to Wife from his other accounts. Further, the trial court ordered that Husband “be committed to the St. Louis County Department of Justice Services and confined until he purges himself of contempt” by paying the requisite amount into the court registry and directing transfer of the other payments as ordered. The trial court “stay[ed] execution of the above commitment” until a specific date to give Husband time to comply. The trial court also awarded Wife the attorney fees she incurred as a result of having to enforce the dissolution judgment in the contempt proceedings.

As ordered in the contempt judgment, Husband timely paid the money he owed under the fee-sharing provision and for Wife's share of the 401(k) into the court registry and directed transfer from his accounts to Wife. The trial court found that, by doing so, Husband had purged himself of the contempt. Thereafter, Husband filed a motion to vacate the contempt judgment or for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion. Husband appeals.

Discussion

Husband raises two points on appeal. In the first, he claims the trial court ignored the plain language of the fee-sharing provision when finding him in contempt of that provision. Husband's second point contends he was not given adequate notice before the trial court found him in contempt of the provisions regarding Wife's share of certain accounts in Husband's name.

Before reaching the merits of Husband's claims, we must determine whether the trial court's civil contempt judgment is appealable. See Zweifel v. Zweifel, 431 S.W.3d 559, 560 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). We conclude it is not.

“Civil contempt is intended to benefit a party for whom an order, judgment, or decree was entered. Its purpose is to coerce compliance with the relief granted.” In re Marriage of Crow & Gilmore, 103 S.W.3d 778, 780 (Mo. banc 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If, in response to a civil contempt judgment, the contemnor purges the contempt by complying with the orders therein, “[t]he case then becomes moot and unappealable.” Id. “An appellate court will not review contempt proceedings where the contemnor has complied with the order or has purged himself.” Zweifel, 431 S.W.3d at 560 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, Husband chose to purge himself of the contempt by complying with the trial court's contempt orders to pay the amounts he owed under the fee-sharing provision and for Wife's share of the 401(k) and to direct transfer of the amounts owed to Wife from his other accounts. At that point, any issues regarding those orders were rendered moot and became unappealable.

Husband's arguments for why his appeal is not moot are untenable. First, Husband contends he has not fully complied with the contempt judgment or purged himself of the contempt because he has not yet paid the attorney fees Wife was awarded as a result of having to litigate the contempt motion. But the attorney fee award was not one of the orders with which Husband was required to comply in order to purge himself of the contempt. See Marriage of Crow, 103 S.W.3d at 782-83. The purpose of an award of attorney fees in a civil contempt judgment “is to compensate the aggrieved party for losses or damages sustained by reason of the contemnor's noncompliance[,]” not to coerce compliance with the underlying judgment. Id. And while the attorney fee award itself is theoretically appealable—in that it is not rendered moot because of Husband's compliance with the contempt orders, see id.—Husband has not asserted any claim of error regarding the attorney fee award in this appeal.¹ The only claims of error raised in Husband's points on appeal relate to the trial court's findings that he was in contempt of the dissolution judgment, and those issues are moot and unappealable.

Husband also argues that, because he challenged the contempt judgment in a motion to vacate or for a new trial, his compliance with the contempt order cannot be deemed a concession of the correctness of that judgment, as voluntary compliance with a judgment is generally held to be. See In re Booker, 520 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016). We disagree. In Zweifel, the contemnor challenged the contempt judgment in a posttrial motion before complying with the contempt orders, but this Court still found the appeal moot because the contempt had been purged by the time of the appeal. 431 S.W.3d at 560. In this case, Husband filed the posttrial motion challenging the contempt judgment after he purged himself of the contempt, at which point the contempt issues were clearly already moot.

Husband further claims he should not have to risk incarceration to preserve his right to appeal, citing to cases outside the context of an appeal from a contempt judgment. See Casnocha-Jones v. State Bd. of Nursing, 686 S.W.3d 695, 703-04 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (finding that state licensing board's appeal of judgment reversing its revocation of nurse's license was not rendered moot by board's compliance with judgment's order to issue nurse a probationary license); Kubley v. Brooks, 141 S.W.3d 21, 27-28 (Mo. banc 2004) (finding that mother's appeal of child support judgment was not rendered moot by her child support payments because they were involuntarily made under threat of incarceration and contempt). These cases are not on point and do not dictate whether Husband's appeal from a civil contempt judgment is moot. Rather, our determination that Husband cannot appeal is based on the numerous cases holding that full compliance with contempt orders renders moot an appeal of those orders. See, e.g., Marriage of Crow, 103 S.W.3d at 780-81 (citing cases).

Finally, Husband alleges that, because the civil contempt judgment “could act as a stigma or be unfairly or improperly used against [him] in further proceedings,” there is a live controversy for this Court to consider. In support, he cites to cases where the Supreme Court of Missouri found that an appeal from a criminal conviction and an appeal from a juvenile adjudication were not moot even though the criminal defendant had been pardoned and the juvenile offender had aged out of the juvenile court's jurisdiction. See State v. Jacobson, 348 Mo. 258, 152 S.W.2d 1061, 1064 (1941); D.C.M. v. Pemiscot Cnty. Juv. Off., 578 S.W.3d 776, 781-82 (Mo. banc 2019). In those cases, the Court reasoned that the appeals were not moot because the appellants needed the opportunity to remove the stigma associated with the conviction and the adjudication, which also could have impacted punishment in any future criminal prosecutions. Jacobson, 152 S.W.2d at 1064; D.C.M., 578 S.W.3d at 781-82. Here, Husband has not articulated how the existence of the civil contempt judgment in the public record will have anything close to the same impact as a criminal conviction or a juvenile adjudication. His vague speculation about possible negative future consequences does not persuade us that this case presents a justiciable controversy or fits into an exception to the mootness doctrine. See, e.g., In Int. of J.T.S., 462 S.W.3d 475, 480-81 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (holding that desire for personal vindication does not fall within public interest exception to mootness doctrine); Reay v. Philips, 169 S.W.3d 896, 897 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005) (finding that personal interest in removing the “blemish” on appellant's legal record does not fall within public interest exception).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed as moot.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the conclusion section of his reply brief, Husband requests that, after reversing the contempt order, we remand this case and direct the trial court to find that Wife is not a prevailing party entitled to attorney fees. But this request for relief does not present any reviewable claim of error regarding the attorney fee award. See Jones v. Jones, 296 S.W.3d 526, 528 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009) (declining to review request for relief as to attorney fee award raised only in conclusion of brief but not included in a point relied on).

MICHAEL E. GARDNER, Judge

Robert M. Clayton III, Presiding Judge, concurs. Lisa P. Page, Judge, concurs.