FARRELL v. HGP MANAGEMENT LLC (2026)

Introduction

Defendant HGP Management, LLC f/k/a Northside Urgent Care Property, LLC (“Appellant”) appeals the St. Charles County associate circuit court's judgment denying its motion to set aside default judgment entered on behalf of Plaintiff Sandra K. Farrell Revocable Trust, and Sandra K. Farrell, Trustee (jointly “Respondent”). This Court does not have authority to adjudicate the appeal, because Appellant failed to apply for a trial de novo pursuant to section 512.180.1 ¹ before seeking relief on appeal to this Court. Accordingly, we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Sandra K. Farrell Revocable Trust (“Trust”) owns commercial real property located at 514 Jungermann Road, St. Peters, Missouri 63376 (the “Property”). Sandra K. Farrell is the Trustee of the Trust (“Trustee”). The Trust leased the Property to Northside Urgent Care Property, LLC pursuant to a written lease (the “Lease”). Trustee signed the Lease on behalf of Trust, and Mark S. Vincent, Manager of Northside Urgent Care Property, LLC, signed the Lease on behalf of Appellant. Subsequently, the name of Northside Urgent Care Property, LLC was changed to HGP Management, LLC pursuant to an Amendment of Articles of Organization.

Respondent filed a verified petition for rent and possession pursuant to statute section 535.020, RSMo 2016, seeking to enforce the Lease and requesting immediate possession of the premises plus money damages arising from past due rent, late charges, costs, and attorneys’ fees. The verified petition included the Lease and an invoice setting forth the breakdown of monies due to Respondent under the Lease as attached exhibits.

Respondent requested the appointment of a special process server to serve the summons and petition. The court issued a summons for service by posting and mailing to the Property as well as for personal service on Appellant through its registered agent, Mark S. Vincent, the same individual who signed the Lease on behalf of Appellant. The summons noted an initial court appearance date of August 26, 2024.

The process server attempted to serve the registered agent on August 22, but Mr. Vincent refused to accept service. The next day, Respondent requested and received an alias summons for service of process to be obtained on Appellant through the Missouri Secretary of State. The alias summons noted a court appearance date of September 23, 2024. The Secretary received service on September 10 and forwarded the original notice to Appellant's registered agent, Mr. Vincent. Appellant received delivery on September 19, 2024.

On September 23, counsel for Respondent appeared for hearing. There is no record of Appellant appearing, and the court held another hearing on September 30, 2024. After Appellant failed to appear at that hearing, the associate circuit judge entered default judgment in favor of Respondent awarding possession of the Property and monetary damages totaling $175,627.56, consisting of $172,923.52 in unpaid rent and $2,704.04 in attorneys’ fees plus court costs and post-judgment interest. The Sheriff of St. Charles County executed eviction of the Property on October 29, 2024.

Nearly one year after the entry of default judgment and more than forty-five weeks after eviction was executed, on September 11, 2025, Appellant filed a motion to set aside default judgment pursuant to Rule 74.05(d). Appellant argued it: (1) did not receive proper notice of the September 30 court date, (2) was not a party to the Lease, (3) had good cause for the default judgment to be set aside in that it was not properly served, and (4) had a meritorious defense in that Respondent left the Property vacant for multiple years thereby failing to mitigate its damages under the terms of the Lease. Appellant included an affidavit from Anthony J. Bequette, manager of HGP Management, LLC, stating: (1) he never received notice of the lawsuit, (2) he was not an owner of Northside Urgent Care Property, LLC, (3) HGP Management, LLC was not a party to the Lease and never occupied the Property, (4) HGP Management, LLC maintained a registered agent in Missouri who was not served, and (5) the Lease required Respondent to use reasonable efforts to mitigate damages.

Respondent filed a response in opposition making three arguments. First, Respondent argued that Appellant dodged and rejected service and ignored notice revealing intentional and reckless impedance of the judicial process foreclosing any showing of good cause. Second, Respondent argued that Appellant had been properly served – twice – and did not appear despite receiving notice of the initial hearing date thereby becoming a defaulting party. Third, Respondent argued that Appellant lacked a meritorious defense because it was the proper party and failed to present verified evidence that Respondent had a duty and failed to mitigate its damages under the Lease.

On September 22, 2025, Appellant filed a reply arguing that the default judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction providing good cause to set it aside and that it had provided evidence of a meritorious defense by way of the affidavit of Mr. Bequette. On that same day, the associate circuit judge held a hearing and took the matter under advisement.

On September 30, 2025, the associate circuit court denied the motion. On October 6, 2025, Appellant filed its notice of appeal to this Court. This Court issued a show cause order directing Appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction given Appellant's failure to follow the procedures of sections 512.180 and 512.190 requiring a timely application for trial de novo in chapter 535 landlord-tenant cases. The show cause order noted also that the order denying the motion to set aside the default judgment, even if appealable under section 512.020, was not denominated a judgment as required for this Court to have jurisdiction.

Thereafter, the associate circuit court denominated the order denying the motion to set aside default judgment a “Judgment,” and this Court ordered the issue of appellate jurisdiction to be taken with the case.

Discussion

This appeal arises from a special statutory landlord-tenant action before an associate circuit judge under the provisions of chapter 535. Appellant was required to timely file an application for trial de novo pursuant to sections 535.110 and 512.180.1 rather than a direct appeal, but failed to do so. Because this Court lacks statutory authority to entertain a direct appeal, this appeal must be dismissed.

“We are obligated to examine, sua sponte, whether we have jurisdiction to consider an appeal.” Needy v. Hammond, 601 S.W.3d 312, 313 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (internal quotations omitted). “If this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal, the appeal must be dismissed.” Needy, 601 S.W.3d at 313 (citing Fannie Mae v. Truong, 361 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Mo. banc 2012)). “In Missouri, the right to appeal is purely statutory, and ‘where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists.’ ” Needy at 313, (citing Fannie Mae, 361 S.W.3d at 403, quoting Farinella v. Croft, 922 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Mo. banc 1996).

Special Statutory Landlord-Tenant Actions under Chapter 535 Require Trial De Novo, Not Direct Appeal

Chapter 535 of the revised statutes prescribes the procedures for special statutory proceedings identified as landlord-tenant actions. Following the entry of judgment in a chapter 535 landlord-tenant action, section 535.110 states, “Applications for trials de novo and appeals shall be allowed and conducted in the manner provided in chapter 512[.]”

Chapter 512 governs civil appeals. Section 512.020, RSMo 2016, authorizes direct appeals from final judgments and expressly excludes “special statutory proceedings,” including landlord-tenant actions brought under chapter 535. Section 512.020 states in pertinent part, “Any party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in any civil cause from which an appeal is not prohibited by the constitution, nor clearly limited in special statutory proceedings, may take his or her appeal to a court having appellate jurisdiction ․”. (Emphasis added).

Section 512.180 addresses appeals from cases tried before an associate circuit judge. “For certain types of associate circuit judge cases – including Chapter 535 cases – the remedy is a trial de novo; for others, the remedy is an appeal[.]” Sansone Group DDR, LLC v. Pennington-Thurman, 613 S.W.3d 424, 426 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). Section 512.180 states:

1. Any person aggrieved by a judgment in a civil case tried without a jury before an associate circuit judge, other than an associate circuit judge sitting in the probate division or who has been assigned to hear the case on the record under procedures applicable before circuit judges, shall have the right of a trial de novo in all cases tried before municipal court or under the provisions of chapter 482 or 535.

2. In all other contested civil cases tried with or without a jury before an associate circuit judge ․ a record shall be kept, and any person aggrieved by a judgment rendered in any such case may have an appeal upon that record to the appropriate appellate court. (Emphasis added).

In effect, section 512.180.1 carves out specific types of cases before an associate circuit judge that have the right to a trial de novo instead of a direct appeal. A party aggrieved by a judgment in a civil case tried without a jury before an associate circuit judge, other than an associate circuit judge sitting in the probate division or who has been assigned to hear the case under procedures applicable before circuit judges, shall have the right of a trial de novo in all cases tried under the provisions of chapter 535. Section 512.180.1. In all other contested civil cases tried with or without a jury before an associate circuit judge, an aggrieved party may have an appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Section 512.180.2.

“This Court must conduct a fact-specific inquiry to ascertain if the facts bring the case within section 512.180.1 or section 512.180.2.” Fannie Mae, 361 S.W.3d at 404. “Then it can be determined whether the case is properly before this Court.” Id. “The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to the intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. Section 512.180.1 provides in mandatory terms that a party aggrieved by a judgment in a case tried before an associate circuit judge under chapter 535 “shall have the right of a trial de novo” and not a direct appeal to this Court. Sansone Group DDR, LLC, 613 S.W.3d at 426.

Respondent filed this matter as a special statutory landlord-tenant action under chapter 535. The associate circuit judge hearing the case was not sitting in the probate division and was not assigned to hear the case on the record under procedures applicable to circuit judges. The associate circuit court entered default judgment and the sheriff executed eviction under chapter 535. Nearly one year later, Appellant moved to set aside that default judgment. The associate circuit court denied the motion via a judgment. Consequently, Appellant is “aggrieved by a judgment in a civil case tried without a jury before an associate circuit judge ․ under the provisions of chapter ․ 535” and “shall have the right of a trial de novo.” Section 512.180.1. The clear statutory language of section 512.180.1 requires Appellant to apply for a trial de novo. Failure to apply for a trial de novo pursuant to section 512.180.1 prior to seeking relief in this Court deprives this Court of the authority to adjudicate the claim. Fannie Mae, 361 S.W.3d at 402.

This Court addressed an identical procedural posture in Needy v. Hammond, 601 S.W.3d 312 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). Like the facts in this case, in Needy, a landlord filed a special statutory landlord-tenant action pursuant to chapter 535 in associate circuit court; the tenant failed to appear; the associate circuit court entered a default judgment; the tenant later filed a motion to set aside; the associate circuit court denied the motion; and the tenant attempted to pursue a direct appeal. Id. at 313. This Court held that the tenant's remedy was a trial de novo under section 512.180.1, not a direct appeal. Id. at 314. Because the tenant “fail[ed] to apply for a trial de novo pursuant to Section 512.180.1 prior to seeking relief on appeal,” this Court lacked authority to review the appeal and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Id.

The same result follows here. None of the authorities cited by Appellant persuade this Court to reconsider Needy or its precedent, as none involve or address appellate jurisdiction within the confines of special statutory proceedings under chapter 535. For example, Brown v. Pro Basement, Inc., 686 S.W.3d 352 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) concerns a direct appeal of a judgment denying a tenant's motion to set aside a default judgment in an action for unlawful detainer and breach of lease under chapter 534. Chapter 534, unlike chapter 535, is not specifically included in the applicable version of section 512.180.1 as a type of case where the aggrieved party shall have the right of a trial de novo. Instead, under the applicable version of section 512.180, cases arising from an unlawful detainer under chapter 534 may have a direct appeal pursuant to 512.180.2.

Appellant's reliance on Hutchison v. Vandenburg, 90 S.W.3d 229 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002) is also misplaced. At issue in Hutchison was chapter 482. Chapter 482 contains special provisions for small claims actions that are not at issue here. Hutchison did not address a judgment denying a motion to set aside a default judgment in the context of the special statutory landlord-tenant action under chapter 535, nor did it address section 512.180 which governs appeals in actions before associate circuit judges.

The Court in Hutchison found that section 482.365.2, which governs appeals from small claims proceedings, did not vest the circuit court with jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the small claims division's denial of a motion to set aside default judgment. Id. at 232. While finding that section 482.365.2 did not statutorily authorize a trial de novo, the Court did not address whether another avenue of review was available. Id. Notably, Hutchison did not answer the question whether a party could file a direct appeal from a judgment denying a motion to set aside a default judgment in the context of a small claims matter. As a result, Hutchison does not support Appellant's argument that a direct appeal is the exclusive remedy following the denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment in a special statutory landlord-tenant action under chapter 535. This is particularly true given that Hutchison did not analyze the specific statutes at issue here – sections 535.110 or 512.180 – or even find that a direct appeal was, indeed, the exclusive remedy following the denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment in a small claims action under chapter 482.

The Independent Nature of a Rule 74.05(d) Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment Does Not Confer Right to Direct Appeal in Chapter 535 Cases

Next, Appellant argues that the designation of the motion to set aside a default judgment as an “independent action” under Rule 74.05(d) mandates a direct appeal of the judgment denying the motion to this Court, even when that judgment arises within a chapter 535 landlord-tenant action. This argument conflates the nature of the independent action under Rule 74.05(d) with the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain a direct appeal in specific types of cases.

The Supreme Court of Missouri “may establish rules relating to practice, procedure and pleading for all courts,” but the “rules shall not change substantive rights ․ or the right of appeal.” Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 5. “The right to appeal is purely statutory, and ‘where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists.’ ” Needy at 313. Appellant correctly notes a motion to set aside a default judgment is an independent action pursuant to Rule 74.05(d) and the trial court's decision to grant or deny the motion is treated as an independent judgment. Brungard v. Risky's Inc., 240 S.W.3d 685, 687 (Mo. banc 2007). It does not follow, however, that the designation of the motion and resulting judgment as independent vests this Court with jurisdiction of a direct appeal where a trial de novo has been expressly designated as the means of review by the legislature. Section 512.180.1 mandates that a party aggrieved by a judgment in a civil case tried without a jury before an associate circuit judge shall have the right of a trial de novo in cases tried under the provisions of chapter 535. Because this case arises under chapter 535, Appellant's remedy is a trial de novo.

Appellant argues that Steele v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 688 S.W.3d 192 (Mo. banc 2024) dictates that a direct appeal is proper, but Steele did not address statutory appellate authority pursuant to sections 512.180 and 535.110. Steele addressed whether Rule 75.01 could be used as a mechanism to file a motion to set aside a default judgment and get around the requirements of Rule 74.05(d) that the defaulting party show good cause and a meritorious defense. 688 S.W.3d at 199.

In Steele, an employee filed a petition against his employer in circuit court alleging the employer retaliated and discriminated against him for filing a worker's compensation claim. Id. at 195. The circuit court entered a default judgment in favor of the employee pursuant to Rule 74.05. Id. The employer filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, citing Rules 75.01, 74.05(d), and 74.06(b)(1). Id. The circuit court entered a judgment overruling the employer's motion to set aside the default judgment concluding that the employer failed to show good cause, a meritorious defense, or excusable neglect. Id. at 196. The employer filed a motion for new trial, which was also denied. Id.

On appeal, the employer argued the circuit court erred in denying its motion to set aside the default judgment, because the employer alleged and proved both good cause and a meritorious defense pursuant to Rule 74.05(d). Id. at 197. Additionally, the employer argued that the circuit court erred in failing to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 75.01 which provided an alternative basis to set aside the default judgment based on good cause alone. Id. at 198. The Supreme Court of Missouri held the appropriate procedural mechanism to set aside a default judgment is an independent action under Rule 74.05(d) and that “Rule 75.01 does not provide an end-run around express provisions of Rule 74.05(d) governing independent actions to set aside default judgments and requiring the defaulting party to show good cause and a meritorious defense.” Id. at 199.

Steele does not undermine Needy. Although Steele confirms that Rule 74.05(d) is the proper mechanism by which a party may move to set aside a default judgment and that such a motion is an independent action, Steele does not hold that a party is entitled to a direct appeal of a judgment denying a motion to set aside a default judgment entered by an associate circuit court in a chapter 535 landlord-tenant action. 688 S.W.3d at 199.

Conclusion

Chapter 535 landlord-tenant actions are special statutory proceedings that pursuant to section 512.180.1 have the right to a trial de novo. Because Appellant failed to apply for a trial de novo before seeking relief on appeal to this Court, this Court does not have jurisdiction. The appeal is dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2018 unless otherwise stated.

Kathleen S. Hamilton, Judge

John P. Torbitzky, Chief Judge and Philip M. Hess, Judge concur.