PEOPLE v. ENGLISH (2016)

In these consolidated cases, the prosecution appeals by leave granted¹ from the trial court's dismissal of charges against defendants under MCL 333.7410(3) for possessing with intent to deliver drugs on or within 1,000 feet of school property. Based on its interpretation of MCL 333.7410(3), the trial court dismissed the charges against defendants. The trial court reasoned that, although the prosecution presented evidence to establish that defendants were arrested within 1,000 feet of school property while in possession of drugs, the prosecution failed to demonstrate that defendants intended to deliver those drugs to a person on or within 1,000 feet of school property. We conclude that the trial court properly construed MCL 333.7410(3) in accord with the plain meaning of the statutory language, as demonstrated by its grammatical context, and we therefore affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

During a drug raid at the home of defendant English, the police discovered about 14 grams of cocaine, marijuana, a digital scale, sandwich bags, and a handgun. Officers determined that English's property was within 1,000 feet of a high school. As a result, the charges against English included one count of possessing with the intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine within a school zone under § 7410(3).

Similarly, during a drug raid on the apartment and car of defendant Smith, the police discovered 2.2 grams of heroin, baggies, a digital scale, rubber gloves, and a handgun. The officers determined that, at the time of the raid, Smith's heroin was within 1,000 feet of a high school. Thus, the charges against Smith included one count of possessing with the intent to deliver less than 50 grams of heroin within a school zone under § 7410(3).

Following their respective preliminary hearings, English and Smith filed motions in the trial court to dismiss the charges under § 7410(3). Both defendants contended that the statute required the prosecution to show that they intended to deliver the drugs within the school zone. Defendants further contended that there was no such evidence. Thus, defendants argued, the trial court was required to dismiss the charges against defendants under § 7410(3). In both cases, the trial court agreed and dismissed the charges under § 7410(3).

The instant prosecutorial appeals ensued.

II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo the interpretation and application of statutes. People v. Williams, 475 Mich. 245, 250; 716 NW2d 208 (2006). Among other things, the Public Health Code, MCL 333.1101 et seq., criminalizes a wide range of conduct involving controlled substances. The provision at issue here is § 7410(3), which provides, in pertinent part,

An individual 18 years of age or over who violates section 7401(2)(a)(iv ) [[2] by possessing with intent to deliver to another person on or within 1,000 feet of school property or a library a controlled substance ․ shall be punished ․ by a term of imprisonment of not less than 2 years or more than twice that authorized by section 7401(2)(a)(iv )[.] [Emphasis added.]

On appeal, the parties offer three distinct interpretations of the above language. The prosecution argues that § 7410(3) is ambiguous and should be construed such that the phrase “on or within 1,000 feet of school property” modifies the phrase “possessing with intent to deliver[.]” Put differently, under the prosecution's interpretation, a defendant who possesses drugs in a school zone need not intend to deliver those drugs on school property or within 1,000 feet of a school to face an enhanced penalty under § 7410(3). By contrast, although defendant English agrees that § 7410(3) is ambiguous, he contends that the phrase “on or within 1,000 feet of a school” should be interpreted as modifying the phrase “to another person[.]” Under English's proffered interpretation, a defendant who possesses a controlled substance is not subject to an enhanced penalty unless he or she intended to deliver the controlled substance to a person on or within 1,000 feet of school property. On the other hand, defendant Smith argues that § 7410(3) is un ambiguous and that the plain statutory meaning requires the prosecution to show that the defendant intended to deliver a controlled substance to another person on school property or within a school zone. Under the interpretation argued by Smith, a defendant is subject to an enhanced penalty under § 7410(3) only if that defendant intended to deliver a controlled substance to a “person on or within 1,000 feet of school property or a library.” We conclude that the interpretation of the statute asserted by Smith is correct.³

Our conclusion hinges on the grammatical context of § 7410(3) and the application of the “last antecedent” rule.

Our primary purpose in construing statutes is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent. We begin by examining the plain language of the statute; where that language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed—no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written. [Williams, 475 Mich. at 250 (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

“A statutory provision is ambiguous only if it irreconcilably conflicts with another provision, or when it is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning.” People v. Fawaz, 299 Mich.App 55, 63; 829 NW2d 259 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Legislature is presumed to know the rules of grammar, People v.. Henderson, 282 Mich.App 307, 329; 765 NW2d 619 (2009), and thus “statutory language must be read and understood in its grammatical context,” People v. Houthoofd, 487 Mich. 568, 580–581; 790 NW2d 315 (2010). See also People v. Beardsley, 263 Mich.App 408, 412–413; 688 NW2d 304 (2004) (“Punctuation is an important factor in determining legislative intent, and the Legislature is presumed to know the rules of grammar.”); In re MKK, 286 Mich.App 546, 556; 781 NW2d 132 (2009) (“The Legislature is presumed to be familiar with the rules of statutory construction and, when promulgating new laws, to be aware of the consequences of its use or omission of statutory language”). Under the last antecedent rule, “a modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent, unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation.” Stanton v. City of Battle Creek, 466 Mich. 611, 616; 647 NW2d 508 (2002) (emphasis added), citing Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 237; 596 NW2d 119 (1999) (“It is a general rule of grammar and of statutory construction that a modifying word or clause is confined solely to the last antecedent, unless a contrary intention appears.”).

Absent application of the last antecedent rule, § 7410(3) does appear equally susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation and, therefore, ambiguous. Such potential ambiguities in statutory language are, however, precisely what the last antecedent rule is used to clarify. The “on or within 1,000 feet” phrase in § 7410(3) is both modifying and restrictive, and its “last” antecedent—i.e., “the last word, phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence,” 2A Singer & Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (7th ed), § 47:33, pp 494–497—is the word “person[.]” Thus, unless something in the statute “requires” a different interpretation, Stanton, 466 Mich. at 616, it should be presumed that the Legislature intended the phrase “on or within 1,000 feet of school property or a library” to modify the word “person[.]” Under that construction, § 7410(3) is rendered unambiguous; it imposes criminal liability only if an offender specifically intended to deliver a controlled substance to a “person on or within 1,000 feet of school property or a library[.]”

Notwithstanding the last antecedent rule, the prosecution argues that the above construction is contrary to apparent legislative intent. We disagree. We see nothing in the plain language of § 7410 itself that would require us to disregard the last antecedent rule in this case. Our construction of § 7410(3) under the last antecedent rule is consistent with the remainder of § 7410. Indeed, arguably at least, it is the prosecution's proposed interpretation that would do violence to the apparent legislative intent underlying § 7410(3). As was acknowledged by the prosecution during oral argument, under its interpretation, a drug dealer intending to deliver drugs to a drug house miles away from a school, but who happens to be arrested within 1,000 feet of school property while on his way to the drug house, faces the enhanced penalty of § 7410(3), whereas an enhanced penalty under § 7410(3) is impermissible for a drug dealer who actually intends to deliver drugs to children on school property but is arrested 1,010 feet from school property—in other words, just outside of the prohibited zone. In our judgment, such a result is inconsistent with the legislative intent expressed by the entirety of § 7410 and the other pertinent sections of the Public Health Code.

Similarly, the dissent compares § 7410(3) and § 7410a(1)(b), another section of the Public Health Code, and reasons that our construction is contrary to apparent legislative intent. The dissent finds it significant that § 7410a(1)(b) uses the phrase “who is in a public park or private park” to describe the individual to whom an offender intends to deliver a controlled substance, whereas § 7410(3) contains no such limiting language, because generally, when the Legislature includes language in a related statute that it omits in another, we assume that the omission was intentional. The dissent concludes that the language in 7410a(1)(b) militates against reading § 7410(3) as requiring the defendant's intended deliveree to be on or within 1,000 feet of school property because, had the Legislature wished such an interpretation, § 7410a(1)(b) demonstrates that the Legislature clearly knew how to indicate it.

However, the rule of construction upon which the dissent relies is only applicable when the “related statute” is a prior enactment. As discussed in 2B Singer & Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (7th ed), § 51:2, pp 212–213, “Generally ․ courts presume a different intent when a legislature omits words used in a prior statute on a similar subject.” (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.) See also People v. Watkins, 491 Mich. 450, 482; 818 NW2d 296 (2012) (“It is one thing to infer legislative intent through silence in a simultaneous or subsequent enactment, but quite another to infer legislative intent through silence in an earlier enactment, which is only ‘silent’ by virtue of the subsequent enactment.”). The phrase “on or within 1,000 feet of school property or a library” in § 7410(3) has not changed since 1994. See 174 PA 1994. Contrastingly, § 7410a(1)(b) was added by 261 PA 1998. Thus, § 7410a(1)(b) cannot be rationally utilized as a means of discerning the legislative intent underlying the phrase “on or within 1,000 feet” as used in § 7410(3). When amending § 7410(3) to include such language, the Legislature did not “omit” language it had previously used in § 7410a(1)(b); the latter provision did not exist at that time.

In conclusion, because the last antecedent rule renders § 7410(3) unambiguous, we rely on the plain meaning of the statutory language here and need not resort to less precise methods of reading “the tea leaves of legislative intent.”⁴ As the trial court did, we construe § 7410(3) as requiring proof that the defendant specifically intended to deliver a controlled substance to a “person on or within 1,000 feet of school property or a library[.]” In the cases now before us, it is undisputed that such evidence was lacking. Thus, we affirm.

Because I conclude that the Legislature intended MCL 333.7410(3) to apply where an offender possesses a controlled substance either inside or outside of a school zone with the intent to deliver the controlled substance within a school zone, and not where a controlled substance is possessed inside a school zone but with no intent to deliver the controlled substance within the school zone, I concur in the lead opinion. Ultimately, in my view, MCL 333.7410(3) is targeted at drug traffickers who intend to distribute controlled substances within a school zone and not at traffickers who may simply live in or be traveling through a school zone with controlled substances present in their home or vehicle. Accordingly, I agree with my colleague's position in the lead opinion that we should affirm the circuit courts' orders dismissing the charges under MCL 333.7410(3). Because I reach that conclusion partly on the basis of an analysis that contemplates the legislative history of MCL 333.7410(3), I write separately.

In general, this Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court's ruling with respect to a motion to dismiss criminal charges. People v. Adams, 232 Mich.App 128, 132; 591 NW2d 44 (1998). We review de novo, however, the construction of a statute. People v. Williams, 475 Mich. 245, 250; 716 NW2d 208 (2006). In People v. Peltola, 489 Mich. 174, 181; 803 NW2d 140 (2011), our Supreme Court recited the well-established rules of statutory construction:

Our overriding goal for interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent. The most reliable indicator of the Legislature's intent is the words in the statute. We interpret those words in light of their ordinary meaning and their context within the statute and read them harmoniously to give effect to the statute as a whole. Moreover, every word should be given meaning, and we should avoid a construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. If the statutory language is unambiguous, no further judicial construction is required or permitted because we presume the Legislature intended the meaning that it plainly expressed. [Citations and quotation marks omitted.]

When a statute is ambiguous, judicial construction is proper in order to ascertain the statute's meaning. In re MCI Telecom. Complaint, 460 Mich. 396, 411–412; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). In interpreting an ambiguous statute, “we should give effect to the interpretation that more faithfully advances the legislative purpose behind the statute.” People v. Adair, 452 Mich. 473, 479–480; 550 NW2d 505 (1996). A statute is ambiguous where an irreconcilable conflict exists between statutory provisions or when a statute is equally susceptible to more than one meaning. People v. Hall, –––Mich. ––––, ––––; ––– NW2d –––– (2016); slip op at 7.

MCL 333.7410(3) provides:

An individual 18 years of age or over who violates section 7401(2)(a)(iv ) by possessing with intent to deliver to another person on or within 1,000 feet of school property or a library a controlled substance described in schedule 1 or 2 that is either a narcotic drug or described in section 7214(a)(iv ) shall be punished, subject to subsection (5), by a term of imprisonment of not less than 2 years or more than twice that authorized by section 7401(2)(a)(iv ) and, in addition, may be punished by a fine of not more than 3 times that authorized by section 7401(2)(a)(iv ).[ 1]

The issue that arose in these consolidated cases regards whether the statute demands proof of an intent to deliver a controlled substance “to another person on or within 1,000 feet of school property” (school zone), or whether it suffices to show an intent to deliver to another person anywhere, including outside of a school zone, as long as the controlled substance was possessed within a school zone. Stated otherwise, the issue is whether the school-zone requirement pertains to the possession of controlled substances or to the intended delivery-destination of controlled substances.

Our Supreme Court has observed that “[i]t is a general rule of grammar and of statutory construction that a modifying word or clause is confined solely to the last antecedent ․“ Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 237; 596 NW2d 119 (1999); see also Stanton v. Battle Creek, 466 Mich. 611, 616; 647 NW2d 508 (2002) (referring to the “last antecedent” rule of statutory interpretation). The lead opinion relies on the last antecedent rule to conclude that MCL 333.7410(3) is unambiguous and that defendants' construction of the statute is correct. I find the lead opinion to be fairly persuasive. My hesitancy in fully embracing the lead opinion is premised on the awareness and appreciation that the last antecedent rule controls “unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation[,]” Stanton, 466 Mich. at 616, or “unless a contrary intention appears[,]” Sun Valley, 460 Mich. at 237.

Subsection (2) of MCL 333.7410 enhances the punishment for delivering a controlled substance to another person within a school zone, and subsection (4) enhances the punishment for possessing a controlled substance within a school zone. These provisions are concerned with the actus reus of the offenses, i.e., the location of the wrongful deeds that comprise the physical components of the crimes, People v. Likine, 492 Mich. 367, 393 n 43; 823 NW2d 50 (2012), reflecting a legislative intent to punish more severely drug crimes physically committed within a school zone. Interpreting the words in subsection (3) of MCL 333.7410 in light of their context in the overall statute and reading them harmoniously with subsections (2) and (4), Peltola, 489 Mich. at 181, there is a plausible argument that subsection (3) should also be interpreted with a focus on the actus reus of the offense, which is possession of a controlled substance, not the intended destination of the substance's delivery. As pointed out by the dissent, federal courts have construed 21 USC 860(a), which contains language that gives rise to the same interpretation problems posed by MCL 333.7410(3), applying this very logic, concluding that 21 USC 860(a) only requires proof of an intent to deliver drugs somewhere, as long as the drugs were possessed within a school zone. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 313 F3d 1228, 1239 (CA 10, 2002); United States v. Ortiz, 146 F3d 25, 28 (CA 1, 1998); United States v. McDonald, 301 U.S. App DC 157, 160; 991 F.2d 866 (1993); United States v. Rodriguez, 961 F.2d 1089, 1092 (CA 3, 1992). In light of my discussion, I am not unflinchingly confident that the last antecedent rule governs, considering that the overall language of MCL 333.7410 arguably reveals a legislative intention that is contrary to the intention deciphered upon application of the last antecedent rule of statutory construction.

In my view, analysis under the last antecedent rule should be supplemented with an examination of the legislative history of MCL 333.7410(3), given that the question regarding whether § 7410(3) is ambiguous is too close to call with any degree of certainty. The Michigan Supreme Court “has recognized the benefit of using legislative history when a statute is ambiguous and construction of [the] ambiguous provision becomes necessary.” In re Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 468 Mich. 109, 115 n 5; 659 NW2d 597 (2003). The Court warned “that resort to legislative history of any form is proper only where a genuine ambiguity exists in the statute[,]” and that “[l]egislative history cannot be used to create an ambiguity where one does not otherwise exist.” Id.

Before the enactment of 1999 PA 188, which was made effective November 24, 1999, MCL 333.7410(3) enhanced criminal penalties for “possessing with intent to deliver to a minor who is a student on or within 1,000 feet of school property a controlled substance ․“ See 1994 PA 174 (emphasis added). Although the phrasing still lacked absolute clarity, the reference to “a minor who is a student” plainly signaled the Legislature's intention that an offender had to have intended delivery within a school zone.² A minor student and a school zone go hand in hand. The question becomes whether 1999 PA 188, which replaced the phrase “a minor who is a student” with “another person,” revealed a legislative intent to expand the scope of the statute to encompass an intent to deliver anywhere, not just school zones, as long as the possession occurred within a school zone. The only information that I could locate speaking to the reason behind the amendment of MCL 333.7410 under 1999 PA 188 is found in Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 218, July 29, 1999, which provided as follows with respect to the argument supporting the amendment:

Although the current law is well-meaning, apparently it is ineffective because an element of the offense is delivery to a student who is a minor. A successful prosecution requires the testimony of the student. A student, however, may be afraid of testifying against a drug dealer, reluctant to admit to receiving drugs, or otherwise unwilling to testify. If the enhanced penalties applied to delivery to anyone within a drug-free school zone, however, law enforcement agencies could place young-looking undercover officers in schools to pose as students. By making this change, the bill could have a big impact on combating drug-trafficking in and around schools. Reportedly, offenders in Florida are being prosecuted under a similar law.

Accordingly, the 1999 amendment simply reflected a desire not to require the involvement of a student minor for purposes of a criminal prosecution, as opposed to an effort to abolish the need to prove an intent to deliver controlled substances within a school zone. I fully appreciate that “legislative analyses should be accorded very little significance by courts when construing a statute.” In re Certified Question, 468 Mich. at 115 n 5. But even if one disregards the Senate analysis quoted above, the amendment of MCL 333.7410 under 1999 PA 188 clearly concerned only the identity of the person to whom a drug delivery was intended to be made, not the location of the intended delivery. Given the legislative history of MCL 333.7410(3), I conclude that the Legislature intended the statutory provision to apply where an offender possesses a controlled substance either inside or outside of a school zone with the intent to deliver the controlled substance within a school zone, and not where a controlled substance is possessed inside a school zone but with no intent to deliver the controlled substance within the school zone.

In sum, while application of the last antecedent rule brings me very close to a conclusive determination that a prosecutor must establish an intent to deliver a controlled substance within a school zone for purposes of charges brought under MCL 333.7410(3), any lingering doubts I may have had on the matter are eliminated on consideration of the statute's legislative history, which reinforces the result produced in applying the last antecedent rule of statutory construction.

I respectfully concur in the lead opinion.

In these consolidated cases, the prosecution appeals by leave granted¹ the trial court's dismissal of charges under MCL 333.7410(3) against each defendant for possessing with intent to deliver drugs within 1,000 feet of a school. The trial court dismissed the charges against the defendants because the prosecution did not show that English and Smith, who each possessed drugs within a school zone, intended to deliver those drugs within a school zone. Because I would conclude that the enhanced penalty statute prohibits possessing drugs “within 1,000 feet of a school,” I would reverse and remand.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

During a drug raid at the home of Lymance English, police discovered about 14 grams of cocaine, marijuana, a digital scale, sandwich bags, and a handgun. Officers determined that English's property was within 1,000 feet of a high school. As a result, English's charges included one count of possessing with the intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine within a school zone under MCL 333.7410(3).

Similarly, during a drug raid on the apartment and car of Brandon Smith, police discovered 2.2 grams of heroin, baggies, a digital scale, rubber gloves, and a handgun. Officers also discovered a cell phone with messages ordering heroin. Officers determined that Smith's car and apartment were within 1,000 feet of a high school. Smith's charges included one count of possessing with the intent to deliver less than 50 grams of heroin within a school zone under MCL 333.7410(3).

Following their respective preliminary hearings, English and Smith filed motions before the trial court to dismiss the charges under MCL 333.7410(3). Both defendants contended that the trial court must dismiss their charges because the statute required the prosecution to show that they intended to deliver the drugs within the school zone. According to English and Smith, there was no indication that either defendant delivered the drugs from their homes or that they intended to deliver the drugs within the school zone. In both cases, the trial court agreed that MCL 333.7410(3) required the prosecution to show that the defendant intended to deliver the drugs within the school zone and dismissed the charges pertaining to MCL 333.7410(3).

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo the interpretation and application of statutes. People v. Williams, 475 Mich. 245, 250; 716 NW2d 208 (2006). This Court also reviews de novo the constitutionality of a statute. People v. Douglas, 295 Mich.App 129, 134; 813 NW2d 337 (2011).

III. STANDARDS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

When interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Williams, 475 Mich. at 250. The language of the statute itself is the best indication of the Legislature's intent. Id. We must read the statute as a whole and should not read statutory provisions in isolation. People v. Feezel, 486 Mich. 184, 205; 783 NW2d 67 (2010) (opinion by Cavanagh, J.) To promote harmony and consistency, we must read subsections of cohesive statutory provisions together. Id.

If the language of the statute is unambiguous, we must enforce the statute as written. Id. Instances of truly ambiguous language are rare. People v. Gardner, 482 Mich. 41, 50 n 12; 753 NW2d 78 (2008). But if the statutory language is ambiguous, judicial construction is appropriate. Feezel, 486 Mich. at 205 (opinion by Cavanagh, J.).

IV. ANALYSIS

The Public Health Code prohibits a wide range of conduct concerning, among other things, controlled substances. MCL 333.1101 et seq. The statute at issue is MCL 333.7410(3), which provides as follows:

An individual 18 years of age or over who violates section 7401(2)(a)(iv ) [[2] by possessing with intent to deliver to another person on or within 1,000 feet of school property or a library a controlled substance ․ shall be punished ․ by a term of imprisonment of not less than 2 years or more than twice that authorized by section 7401(2)(a)(iv )․ [Emphasis added.]

This statute, which provides that the sentence is “twice that authorized” by its counterpart MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv ), is an enhanced sentencing provision.

Because the only difference between MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv ), which prohibits possession of controlled substances, and MCL 333.7410(3) is the location in which the drugs are possessed, I would conclude that the Legislature intended it to apply to defendants who possessed drugs within the school zone, regardless of where they intended to deliver them. MCL 333.7410(3) applies when a defendant possesses with intent to deliver a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school or library, regardless of the location of the person to which the defendant intends to deliver the substance.

Defendant English contends that two of the possible meanings of MCL 333.7410(3) are consistent with the trial court's dismissal of the charges—that the defendant intended to deliver to a person within 1,000 feet of a school, or that the person to whom the defendant intended to deliver was within 1,000 feet of a school. The prosecution's construction is more reasonable to accomplish the purpose of the statute as an enhanced penalty provision.

The Public Health Code is “intended to be consistent with applicable federal and state law and shall be construed, when necessary, to achieve that consistency.” MCL 333.1111. See Feezel, 486 Mich. at 208 (opinion by Cavanagh, J.). 21 USC 860(a) prohibits “possessing with intent to distribute ․ a controlled substance in or on, or within one thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public or private elementary, vocation, or secondary school,” and anyone who does so is guilty of a crime with an enhanced minimum sentence. This statute is analogous with MCL 333.7410(3). Both statutes provide enhanced sentencing provisions for persons who possess with the intent to distribute a drug within a school zone. While there are minor differences, such as the statute including requirements regarding the age of the offender, the types of conduct these statutes prohibit are substantially similar.

I also find federal law on this point persuasive. Under 21 USC 860(a), it is the location of the drugs, not the intended location of distribution, that is pertinent to the crime. United States v. Rodriguez, 961 F.2d 1089, 1092 (CA 3, 1992); United States v. Harris, 313 F3d 1228, 1239–1240 (CA 10, 2002).³ Construing MCL 333.7410(3) consistent with applicable federal law, the phrase “within 1,000 feet of a school” describes the location where the defendant possesses the drugs, not the location of the other person or where the defendant intends to deliver the drugs.

Defendant Smith contends that this construction leads to supposedly absurd results because a defendant could be guilty of MCL 333.7410(3) for driving through a school zone while possessing a substance that he or she intends to deliver elsewhere. That a statute appears to be inconvenient or unwise is not a reason for this Court to avoid applying statutory language. Johnson v. Recca, 492 Mich. 169, 187; 821 NW2d 520 (2012). The purpose of the statute is to attempt to protect children from exposure to drugs. People v. McCrady, 213 Mich.App 474, 485; 540 NW2d 718 (1995). Given this purpose, requiring drug dealers to drive around school zones to avoid enhanced sentences appears consistent with the statute. I am less concerned with the resulting inconvenience to drug dealers than with interpreting the statute consistent with the Legislature's intent.

I would conclude that MCL 333.7410(3) prohibits a defendant from possessing drugs within a school zone with intent to deliver them regardless of the intended location of delivery. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for reinstatement of the charges.

FOOTNOTES

1.  People v. English, 499 Mich. 872 (2016); People v. Smith, 499 Mich. 873 (2016).

2.  MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv ) regards “possess[ing] with intent to ․ deliver” less than 50 grams of a controlled substance that is a narcotic drug.

3.  Having agreed with defendant Smith that § 7410(3) is unambiguous, we need not consider his alternative argument that, were we to reach the opposite conclusion, we should declare § 7410(3) to be void as unconstitutionally vague.

4.  See People v. Maynor, 256 Mich.App 238, 261; 662 NW2d 468 (2003) (Whitbeck, C.J., concurring).

1.  MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv ) concerns the manufacture, creation, or delivery of a controlled substance, or the possession with intent to manufacture, create, or deliver a controlled substance, “in an amount less than 50 grams,” which offense constitutes “a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years or a fine of not more than $25,000.00, or both.”

2.  Conceivably, the earlier language could be construed as concerning the possession of a controlled substance within a school zone with an intent to deliver the controlled substance to a student minor, regardless of the student minor's whereabouts. This would be a strained and wholly unreasonable interpretation of the earlier version of MCL 333.7410(3).

1.  People v. English, 499 Mich. 872 (2016); People v. Smith, 499 Mich. 873 (2016).

2.  MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv ) prohibits a person from “possess[ing] with intent to ․ deliver a controlled substance” that is a narcotic drug in an amount less than 50 grams.

3.  This is consistent with unpublished cases from this Court which have determined the same, or in which we have upheld convictions without any discussion of the location of the defendant's intended delivery. However, at least one unpublished case has ruled insufficient a jury instruction that did not specify that the defendant's intended deliveree was in the school zone.

WILDER, P.J.