RIVER INVESTMENT GROUP v. Wayne County Treasurer, Defendant. (2010)

Plaintiff appeals by delayed leave granted the trial court's judgment in favor of defendant/counter-plaintiff, Michigan Financial Investments, L.L.C. (MFI). On appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court's earlier order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant, Romel E. Casab, a/k/a E.R. Casab, and MFI (hereinafter collectively referred to as “defendant”)¹ on plaintiff's unjust enrichment and conversion claims. We affirm.

Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims and, accordingly, granted summary disposition in favor of defendant on plaintiff's claims. We disagree.

On appeal, a decision to grant a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Hines v. Volkswagen of Am, Inc, 265 Mich.App 432, 437; 695 NW2d 84 (2005). When reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court must consider the record in the same manner as the trial court. Id. Any court considering such a motion must consider all the pleadings and the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. The motion tests whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. Id. “Summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Brown v. Brown, 478 Mich. 545, 552; 739 NW2d 313 (2007).

Issues of law are reviewed de novo. Slaughter v. Blarney Castle Oil Co, 281 Mich.App 474, 477; 760 NW2d 287 (2008). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law. In re Petition by Wayne Co Treasurer for Foreclosure of Certain Lands for Unpaid Prop Taxes (Wayne Co Treasurer v. Westhaven Manor Ltd Dividend Housing Ass'n), 265 Mich.App 285, 290; 698 NW2d 879 (2005).

Plaintiff's property was foreclosed on by the Wayne County Treasurer (Treasurer) and sold to defendant. Plaintiff sued defendant for unjust enrichment and conversion arising from improvements plaintiff made to the property after the foreclosure, but without notice of the foreclosure. The trial court concluded that MCL 211.78l precludes circuit court jurisdiction over the case. MCL 211.78l provides, in relevant part:

(1) If a judgment for foreclosure is entered under section 78k and all existing recorded and unrecorded interests in a parcel of property are extinguished as provided in section 78k, the owner of any extinguished recorded or unrecorded interest in that property who claims that he or she did not receive any notice required under this act shall not bring an action for possession of the property against any subsequent owner, but may only bring an action to recover monetary damages as provided in this section.

(2) The court of claims has original and exclusive jurisdiction in any action to recover monetary damages under this section.

Plaintiff first argues that MCL 600.6419 and MCL 600.6437 specify that the court of claims has jurisdiction only in actions against governmental entities. Therefore, MCL 211.78l cannot be read to require exclusive court of claims jurisdiction over plaintiff's action against defendant because defendant is not a governmental entity.

This Court's primary goal when considering statutory language is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Alvan Motor v. Dep't of Treasury, 281 Mich.App 35, 39; 761 NW2d 269 (2008). If the statutory language is unambiguous, no judicial construction is required and the plain meaning of the language must be applied. Id. A provision is ambiguous if it irreconcilably conflicts with another provision or if it is equally susceptible to more than one meaning. Id. at 39-40. Every word or phrase should be ascribed its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at 40; MCL 8.3a. Finally, “[i]t is important to ensure that words in a statute not be ignored, treated as surplusage, or rendered nugatory.” Robertson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich. 732, 748; 641 NW2d 567 (2002).

MCL 600.6419 provides, in relevant part:

(1) Except as provided in sections 6419a and 6440, the jurisdiction of the court of claims, as conferred upon it by this chapter, shall be exclusive. The state administrative board is hereby vested with discretionary authority upon the advice of the attorney general, to hear, consider, determine, and allow any claim against the state in an amount less than $1,000.00. Any claim so allowed by the state administrative board shall be paid in the same manner as judgments are paid under section 6458 upon certification of the allowed claim by the secretary of the state administrative board to the clerk of the court of claims. The court has power and jurisdiction:

(a) To hear and determine all claims and demands, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto, against the state and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, or agencies.

(b) To hear and determine any claims or demands, liquidated or unliquidated, ex contractu or ex delicto, which may be pleaded by way of counterclaim on the part of the state or any department, commission, board, institution, arm, or agency of the state against any claimant who may bring an action in the court of claims. Any claim of the state or of any department, commission, board, institution, arm, or agency of the state may be pleaded by way of counterclaim in any action brought against the state, or any other department, commission, board, institution, arm, or agency of the state. [Emphasis added.]

MCL 600.6437 provides:

The court may order entry of judgment against the state or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or agencies based upon facts as stipulated by counsel after taking such proofs in support thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the court as to the accuracy of such facts and upon being satisfied that such judgment is in accordance with applicable law. [Emphasis added.]

MCL 600.6419 confers jurisdiction over claims against the state and its subunits to the court of claims. Parkwood Ltd Dividend Housing Ass'n v. State Housing Dev Auth, 468 Mich. 763, 767-768; 664 NW2d 185 (2003). MCL 600.6437 authorizes the court of claims to “order entry of judgment against” the state and its subunits. However, nothing in either statute states that the court of claims may not exercise jurisdiction over any other case, if the Legislature were to confer to it additional jurisdiction. See id. at 767 (“The jurisdiction of the [c]ourt of [c]laims is provided by statute.”). MCL 211.78l (2) states that the court of claims has jurisdiction “in any action to recover monetary damages under this section.” Nothing in the statutes cited by plaintiff preclude reading MCL 211.78l (2) to confer jurisdiction to the court of claims over an action arising out of that section and plaintiff cites no authority for that proposition. Plaintiff also argues relatedly that its action against defendant does not arise out of this section. We address this argument separately, infra; assuming, for the moment, that this action arises out of MCL 211.78l, plaintiff's instant argument is unavailing.

Plaintiff next argues that this action is not an “action to recover monetary damages under this section” for two reasons. MCL 211.78l (2). First, plaintiff argues that MCL 211.78l contemplates actions for the failure to receive adequate notice of foreclosure, which plaintiff does not attribute to defendant. Relatedly, plaintiff argues that because MCL 211.78l only contemplates actions for failure of notice, it only contemplates actions against the entity charged with providing notice, not a private party such as defendant. Thus, plaintiff's action is not an “action ․ under this section.”

MCL 211.78l (1) first contemplates an action by a party “who claims that he or she did not receive any notice required under” the General Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq. Plaintiff does claim that it did not receive notice of the foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff argues that it does not allege any wrongdoing on the part of defendant with respect to the lack of notice; it is only a fact to explain why plaintiff continued to make improvements to the property after it had been sold to defendant. Nevertheless, the language of MCL 211.78l (1) is unambiguous: plaintiff is an owner of an extinguished or unrecorded interest in property and claims injury from the fact that it did not receive notice required under the GPTA. See Alvan Motor, 281 Mich.App at 39-40 (no judicial construction required where statutory language is unambiguous).

Next, MCL 211.78l (1) prohibits bringing “an action for possession of the property against any subsequent owner.” Defendant is the subsequent owner, but plaintiff does not seek possession of the property from defendant. MCL 211.78l (1) specifies that rather than bring an action for possession, an aggrieved former interested party “may only bring an action to recover monetary damages.” Finally, MCL 211.78l (2) provides that the court of claims has “original and exclusive jurisdiction” in such an action. Nothing in MCL 211.78l requires an action under that section be against a governmental entity.²

Plaintiff next argues that because the court of claims ordered plaintiff's claim against the Treasurer in the court of claims joined with its claim against defendant and the Treasurer in the circuit court, this conferred jurisdiction to the circuit court over plaintiff's case. As noted above, MCL 211.78l (2) confers exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under MCL 211.78l. Assuming, arguendo, that the court of claims mistakenly transferred a case to the circuit court, plaintiff has provided no authority for the proposition that the order of joinder would overrule a clear prescription of the Legislature. Further, the order of joinder was with respect to plaintiff's case against the Treasurer and has no relation to plaintiff's claims against defendant. This argument is unavailing.

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred when it failed to provide notice of entry of the final judgment until one day prior to the deadline to file a timely appeal. Plaintiff was not prejudiced by this alleged delay because this Court granted plaintiff's application for delayed leave to appeal. River Investment Group LLC v. Casab, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 17, 2009 (Docket No. 290645). This issue is moot.

Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was not timely filed. This issue is waived because plaintiff failed to state it in the statement of questions presented in its brief on appeal. English v. Blue Cross, 263 Mich.App 449, 459; 688 NW2d 523 (2004). Moreover, plaintiff's arguments in its motion to reconsider are identical to its other arguments on appeal, which we have concluded are unavailing.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.  Casab is the principal of MFI. Casab and MFI filed a joint brief on appeal. The Wayne County Treasurer was dismissed from the case by stipulation.

2.  To the extent that the intent of the Legislature was to provide jurisdiction only over actions against governmental bodies, see Court of Claims Act, MCL 600.6401 et seq. (creating court of claims for purpose of hearing actions against governmental bodies), the responsibility to alter the statute lies with that branch of government, not with this Court. Hakari v. Ski Brule, 230 Mich.App 352, 358; 584 NW2d 345 (1998).

PER CURIAM.