GOLRICK v. RACE STREET PROPERTIES LLC (2023)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

This is a pro se consumer action brought pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 9, by a former homeowner, Jeanne Golrick (plaintiff), against Race Street Properties, LLC (defendant), the warehouser retained to store the plaintiff's personal property following foreclosure and sale of the plaintiffs’ home and a final judgment of eviction by summary process in the District Court. The c. 93A action was brought in the Superior Court, alleging, among other things, overcharging, improper posting and fees, and storage of property more than twenty miles from the premises from which the personal property was removed, all in violation of G. L. c. 239, § 4. Judgment entered for the defendant in the c. 93A action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the case was dismissed without prejudice. We affirm the dismissal without prejudice, although for reasons different from those of the motion judge.

Discussion. 1. Jurisdiction. The defendant contends that jurisdiction over the plaintiff's c. 93A action alleging a violation of G. L. c. 239, § 4, lies solely in the District Court. See G. L. c. 239, § 4 (h). While the Superior Court has jurisdiction over actions brought under c. 93A, see G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (1); Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 479 Mass. 312, 329 n.15 (2018), this case raises an unanswered question of statutory interpretation, namely, whether the District Court has exclusive authority to decide c. 93A actions brought pursuant to § 4 (h), either as a matter of jurisdiction, or as a matter of our one-trial system. See generally Herman v. Home Depot, 436 Mass. 210, 212-215 (2002).

The defendant submits that a plaintiff seeking relief under G. L. c. 239, § 4, must either file a complaint with the commissioner of the division of professional licensure under § 4 (g) or bring suit under § 4 (h) in the court where the summary process case was heard (here, the District Court), and that the Legislature's articulation of these two routes of redress is an expression of legislative intent that these two options are exclusive, precluding suit in the Superior Court. The plaintiff claims that her c. 93A action is separate and distinct from both the foreclosure and the eviction, and that the word “may” in § 4 (h) means that her claims may be heard on the merits in the Superior Court.

Ultimately, we do not reach this question, because the matter must be heard in the District Court for a different reason. The Superior Court hears civil actions only where damages are likely over $50,000. See G. L. c. 212, § 3; Standing Order of the Supreme Judicial Court “Regarding Amount-in-Controversy Requirement Under G. L. c. 218, § 19 and G. L. c. 212, § 3,” adopted July 17, 2019, effective January 1, 2020. The damages claimed in this suit are far less. It is the District Court that hears civil cases for damages under $50,000. Id. See G. L. c. 218, §§ 19, 19A. The dismissal in this case was without prejudice, meaning that the case may be refiled as a new case in the District Court where the summary process action was heard, provided it is filed within the four-year limitations period for consumer actions under c. 93A. See G. L. c. 260, § 5A. It is well settled that the District Court has jurisdiction over c. 93A claims in housing and other matters and is authorized to award both damages and equitable relief. See Herman, 436 Mass. at 212-215.³

In plain English, this legal ruling means that the case can not be heard in the Superior Court, but can be heard in the District Court where the summary process action was heard as long as the plaintiff files a new complaint in the District Court within four years of the wrongful acts alleged, and serves the complaint in the manner required by Rule 4 (a), 365 Mass. 733 (1974), and Rule 4 (d) (2), as amended, 370 Mass. 918 (1976), of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure.⁴

The panel expresses no opinion regarding the merits of the case.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

3.   We do not understand the dicta in Exxon Mobile Corp., 479 Mass. at 329 n.15, to require a different result. See M.G. Perlin & J.M. Connors, Civil Procedure in the Massachusetts District Court § 1.2, at 4, n.14.1 (5th ed. Supp. 2022).

4.   In view of this disposition, we need not reach the other grounds argued on appeal.