JULIA DIXON v. WANG YEN PING (2023)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in Superior Court against her sister Yunping Wang, niece Ning Jiang (Ning),² and Guobao Jiang, who is Ning's father. As aptly described by the Superior Court judge, “[t]he dispute arises from an unfortunate circumstance, and perhaps breakdown in family communications, causing the [p]laintiff to now claim that her previous generosity extended to [the defendants] has not been repaid.” On Wang and Ning's motion,³ the judge dismissed the complaint for insufficient service of process, lack of personal jurisdiction as to Wang, and failure to state a claim for breach of contract. After the judge then denied the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed.⁴ We affirm.

The judge concluded that the plaintiff failed to show that the defendants were served with the summons and complaint and that dismissal was warranted for this reason alone. We agree. As found by the judge, each of the three return receipts from the United States Postal Service indicates that delivery was made to an address in Portland, Oregon, on August 13, 2020.⁵ Yet the summonses are dated August 19, 2020 -- six days after the delivery date -- suggesting that they were not served. Furthermore, it is unclear from the return receipts who accepted the items; the notation “CV-19” appears in the signature box, and the notation “JL0694” appears in the box labeled “Received by (Printed Name).” Ning averred in an affidavit, and both Ning and Wang averred at the hearing, that they did not sign the receipts. Ning also averred that Guobao Jiang does not live at the address in Oregon. In these circumstances the judge was correct to conclude that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden of establishing valid service of process. See Dumas v. Tenacity Constr., Inc., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 111, 114 (2019). See also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections”). The plaintiff raises no argument to the contrary on appeal.

We also agree with the judge that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Wang would not comport with the long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, or the requirements of due process. It is uncontested that Wang has never lived in Massachusetts, and the plaintiff did not identify any other contacts that Wang has with Massachusetts. Dismissal on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction was therefore proper as to Wang. See Good Hope Indus., Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co., 378 Mass. 1, 5-7 (1979). Again, the plaintiff raises no argument to the contrary on appeal.

Finally, the judge was correct to conclude that the allegations of the complaint failed to state a claim for breach of contract. For a complaint to survive dismissal at the pleadings stage, the plaintiff must give fair notice of her claims by including “factual allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) an entitlement to relief” (quotation and citation omitted). Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008). Here, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff paid for Ning's private high school, gave her food and shelter, and contributed financially to help the defendants immigrate from China. It further alleges that the defendants said they would thank the plaintiff and pay her back but now do not say “hello” or “how are you” to her. Nowhere in the complaint, however, does the plaintiff state how much she would be paid back, over what period of time, or by whom. We note that some of the alleged debts seem to relate to financial help that the plaintiff provided to Ning when Ning was a minor, and “[t]he general rule is that contracts of minors are voidable at the option of the minor.” Frye v. Yasi, 327 Mass. 724, 728 (1951). Even construing the complaint generously, we conclude that its factual allegations do not possess enough heft to plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. The complaint was correctly dismissed for this additional reason.

The order entered October 15, 2021, dismissing the complaint, and the order entered October 28, 2021, denying reconsideration, are affirmed.

So ordered.

FOOTNOTES

2.   We refer to Ning Jiang by her first name solely to distinguish her from Guobao Jiang. We intend no disrespect.

3.   Guobao Jiang did not answer or otherwise respond to the complaint. The judge found it “likely that he has not been properly served with the summons and complaint.”

4.   Although a separate judgment did not enter on the docket, no party contends that the dismissal did not fully resolve the matter or that the appeal is interlocutory, and the plaintiff filed her notice of appeal within thirty days of entry of both the dismissal order and the order denying reconsideration. We will therefore address the merits. See Scannell v. Attorney Gen., 70 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 47 n.2 (2007).

5.   While the date boxes on the return receipts do not fully appear on the copies submitted to this court, the plaintiff has provided tracking information showing a delivery date of August 13, 2020, and she does not dispute the judge's finding on this point.