SKANDHA v. SNOW (2021)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Bodhisattva Skandha, sought public records identifying the last name, first name, and position of all Department of Corrections (DOC) employees who worked at MCI-Norfolk. After his request was not immediately fulfilled, he filed a complaint pursuant to G. L. c. 66, § 10A, against the defendant, Patricia Snow, the records access officer for the DOC. Following the filing of his complaint, Skandha was sent a copy of the requested records. As a result, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint as moot, which was allowed, although for different reasons. Skandha appeals, claiming that dismissal was improper.² We affirm.

Discussion. Generally, courts decide only actual controversies, and refrain from deciding moot cases. See Harmon v. Commissioner of Correction, 487 Mass. 470, 475 (2021). Although a case may contain an actual controversy when filed, a material change in circumstances may render a case moot. See, e.g., Commissioner of Correction v. Ferguson, 383 Mass. 651, 654 (1981). In narrow circumstances though, we may still hear an issue that is moot where it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Haufler, 377 Mass. 209, 211 (1979). However, the issue must be one of public importance, one that is likely to arise again in similar circumstances, and appellate review must be unlikely to be obtained before the question becomes moot again. See Acting Supt. of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 431 Mass. 101, 103 (2000).

Here, because Skandha has received the requested records, he no longer is personally affected by any resulting decision, and accordingly, he ceases to have a personal interest in the case's outcome.³ See, e.g., Harmon, 487 Mass. at 475; Blake v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 369 Mass. 701, 703-707 (1976). Furthermore, this case does not fall in the narrow circumstance of one that is capable of repetition, yet evading review, because it is not of public importance, it is not likely to arise again in similar circumstances, and appellate review undoubtedly could be obtained before the question became moot again. Contrast Guardianship of Doe, 391 Mass. 614, 618-619 (1984) (statute permitting temporary guardianship order for civil commitment of mentally ill person was of public importance and order would likely expire prior to completion of appellate process). The complaint was properly dismissed.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Skandha also alleged breach of fiduciary duty. However, no fiduciary duty existed between the defendant, as the records access officer for the DOC, and Skandha, an inmate. See Doe v. Harbor Sch., Inc., 446 Mass. 245, 252 (2006) (fiduciary duty exists where party allegedly serving as fiduciary acts for benefit of other party in matters within scope of their relationship). Nonetheless, even if there were such a duty, Skandha's complaint is woefully insufficient on its face to maintain a cause of action. See Baker v. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 835, 842 (2017) (to sustain breach of fiduciary duty claim, plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to plausibly suggest entitlement to relief by demonstrating (1) existence of fiduciary duty, (2) breach of that duty, (3) damages, and (4) causal connection between breach of duty and damages). As such, dismissal of Skandha's breach of fiduciary duty claim was proper. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).

3.   As properly noted by the defendant, a complaint pursuant to G. L. c. 66, § 10A, must be brought against an agency or municipality, rather than an individual. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A. Skandha's suit against the defendant, Patricia Snow, is not permitted under this statute. See id.