COMMONWEALTH v. ARIEL MATOS (2023)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant was convicted of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon; discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a building; and carrying a firearm without a license. The defendant argues that the trial judge erred when denying his two separate motions for mistrial and in denying his motion for required findings of not guilty. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Background. We summarize the relevant trial evidence as follows. The victim planned to take his five children on a family vacation. Before reaching the airport, he realized he forgot a diaper bag. He ran back in the home to retrieve this item, leaving the children in the car parked in front of their home. He retrieved the bag, exited the home, walked to the backside of the car, and placed the bag in the trunk of the car. While moving toward the driver's side of the vehicle, the victim heard gunshots, turned around, and saw the shooter as a bullet hit the victim's left foot. The shooter approached the victim from approximately fifty feet away. The victim ran in the house to call the police. As he ran in the house, the victim heard more gunshots. Around this time, the victim's neighbor saw a man run down the street to a vehicle parked nearby and drive away from the victim's house in reverse.

At first, the victim told police and other emergency personnel who arrived on scene that he did not know the shooter, but shortly after arriving at the hospital, he identified the defendant as the shooter.¹ The victim and the defendant knew each other because the victim was previously married to and had four children with a woman we shall call “Mary,” who was dating and had one child with the defendant.² The victim had obtained sole custody of his and Mary's children in October of 2014. The Commonwealth argued at trial that the defendant was motivated to harm the victim due to the ongoing custody disagreements between the victim and Mary.

Denial of motions for mistrial. The defendant argues that two pieces of inadmissible evidence were presented to the jury that were sufficiently problematic to merit a mistrial.

First, during the direct examination of Mary, the prosecutor asked whether she saw the defendant in March of 2016 and Mary gave an unresponsive answer, telling the jury that the defendant was in jail in March of 2016.³ After this statement, the defendant moved for a mistrial, which the judge later denied. The judge offered to give a curative instruction, but, at the defendant's request, no curative instruction was given. The testimony was struck from the record.

Later in the trial, the prosecutor accidently played a portion of an unredacted version of an interview of the defendant by police officers, which informed the jury that Mary obtained a restraining order against the defendant and that she lost custody of her children because of a domestic incident with the defendant. The Commonwealth had previously filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce the entire interview as evidence to support its theory that the defendant was motivated by ongoing hostility between the defendant and Mary and by the victim's sole custody of his and Mary's children. The trial judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion, but the parties subsequently agreed that the Commonwealth would not introduce evidence of any prior domestic violence incidents between Mary and the defendant.⁴ After the evidence was inadvertently admitted, the defendant again moved for a mistrial. The judge denied this motion. The judge again offered to give a curative instruction, but, at the defendant's request, no curative instruction was given. The unredacted video was struck from the record and the redacted video was played for the jury.

“We review the denial of motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Durand, 475 Mass. 657, 668 (2016). “A trial judge is in the best position to determine whether a mistrial, an extreme measure available to a trial judge to address error, is necessary, or whether a less drastic measure, such as a curative instruction, is adequate.” Commonwealth v. Amran, 471 Mass. 354, 360 (2015). “When a jury have been exposed to inadmissible evidence, the judge may rely on a curative instruction to 'correct any error and to remedy any prejudice.'” Durand, 475 Mass. at 668, quoting Commonwealth v. Kilburn, 426 Mass. 31, 38 (1997), S.C., 438 Mass. 356 (2003). Even when a jury have been exposed to multiple instances of inadmissible evidence, a mistrial is unnecessary if a curative instruction is given after each instance, “[a]s long as the judge's instructions are prompt and the jury do not again hear the inadmissible evidence.” Id. at 668-669, quoting Commonwealth v. Garrey, 436 Mass. 422, 435 (2002).

Here, the judge acted proactively. In each instance, the judge promptly offered the defendant a curative instruction and struck the inadmissible evidence from the record. In neither instance did the jury hear this information more than once. The judge also told the jury before and after the presentation of evidence to disregard any evidence that was struck from the record. Since the defendant made a tactical decision to decline the judge's offers to give a curative instruction, he “cannot complain of the judge's failure to take these actions.” Commonwealth v. Simmonds, 386 Mass. 234, 242 (1982). Given the judge's offers to give a prompt curative instruction and the fact that the jury was not exposed to each piece of inadmissible evidence more than once, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the defendant's motions for a mistrial.

Denial of motion for required finding of not guilty. At the close of evidence, the defendant made a motion for required findings of not guilty, arguing that the Commonwealth did not present sufficient evidence that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crimes. The trial judge denied this motion. The defendant argues this denial was error. “[A] motion for a required finding of not guilty is properly denied ․ where the evidence, viewed in its light most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all inferences in favor of the Commonwealth, would permit a rational jury to find each essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Earle, 458 Mass. 341, 346 (2010). Here, there was testimony that the victim knew the defendant and identified him as the shooter. Viewing this evidence in its light most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all inferences in favor of the Commonwealth, it is clear that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant was the individual who shot the victim.

For all the above reasons, we affirm.

Judgments affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The victim testified that he did not immediately identify the shooter because he was concerned about the safety of his children, who were still outside in the car.

2.   There is some dispute as to whether Mary and the defendant were dating at the time of the shooting.

3.   There is no evidence that the prosecutor intended to elicit this comment.

4.   The record is unclear as to why this agreement was made.