JONES v. BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

This certiorari action arises out of the Boston Housing Authority's (BHA) termination of Everlener Jones's “Section 8” housing assistance. After the BHA terminated her assistance, Jones sought an informal review of that decision by the BHA's department of grievances and appeals, which conducted a hearing. The hearing officer upheld the BHA's decision. Jones subsequently filed a certiorari action in the Housing Court, seeking to enjoin the termination. A Housing Court judge allowed the BHA's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and it is that ruling that is before us now on appeal.

Based on information that one Gary Elliot (the father of Jones's children) was storing drugs, money, or items associated with drug distribution at Jones's residence, police obtained a search warrant for the premises. The search was executed on March 21, 2017, and yielded two firearms and ammunition stored in a black bag in a closet located on the balcony of Jones's apartment. Jones was subsequently charged with possession of a firearm without a firearm identification (FID) card, possession of a large capacity firearm, possession of a firearm with a defaced or altered serial number, and possession of ammunition without an FID card. These criminal charges remained pending when the BHA terminated Jones's Section 8 assistance and also at the time of the BHA's informal review hearing on April 6, 2018.

After that hearing, however, the criminal charges were dismissed by a Superior Court judge, who determined that

“[o]ther than her presence in the apartment the grand jury heard no evidence about any ownership interest [Jones] had in the apartment. The grand jury heard no evidence that [Jones] had a key to the apartment, had clothing or personal papers at the apartment, had previously been seen at the apartment, or had been involved in renting or was on the lease for the apartment. If, as the Commonwealth suggests, [Jones] lived at the apartment, the grand jury was not so informed.”

Given that the Commonwealth failed to introduce any evidence, apart from her presence when the warrant was executed, that connected Jones either to the apartment or to the contraband, the Superior Court judge concluded that the Commonwealth had failed to establish probable cause before the grand jury.² , ³

By contrast, the evidence at the BHA informal review hearing permitted the hearing officer to find (as she did) that Jones was on the lease for the apartment, that she lived there, that the balcony belonged to the apartment, and that the only means of accessing the balcony was through sliding doors from the apartment. The evidence also permitted the hearing officer to find, and she did, that Elliot was the father of Jones's children, and that Jones knew he came to the housing complex -- although she claimed that he came to visit others. Jones did not contest that firearms and ammunition were found in the closet on her balcony. She contended, however, that she had no knowledge of them or of who put them there. She stated that many people came into her apartment when she was not present. The hearing officer also noted Jones's lack of concern about the fact that weapons and ammunition were improperly stored on her premises.

Although Jones's pro se papers cite no legal authority and state no legal argument, we infer that the essence of her appeal is that, given the dismissal of the criminal charges against her, there was no basis upon which to terminate her Section 8 assistance. However, as we have set out above, the evidence in the two proceedings was very different; while the Commonwealth apparently failed to produce any evidence of Jones's connection to the apartment in front of the grand jury, the BHA informal review hearing showed that Jones was the tenant on the lease and lived at the apartment with her children, that the sole means of accessing the balcony was from the apartment, that Elliot was the father of her children, and that he continued to frequent the housing complex. Thus, the fact that the criminal charges were dismissed on a different record, does not bear on the correctness of the hearing officer's decision, which was based on a more robust factual record.

Finally, although Jones has not made any argument on the point, we have reviewed de novo the administrative record to assess whether the Housing Court judge erred in concluding that the hearing officer's decision was based on substantial evidence, and that the hearing officer did not commit any legal error adversely affecting Jones's material rights. See Figgs v. Boston Hous. Auth., 469 Mass. 354, 362 (2014). The evidence supported the hearing officer's conclusion that Jones had breached her obligation not to commit a serious violation of the lease, 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(e), and that there had been a violation of a family obligation, 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i). In addition, the hearing officer correctly took into account the pertinent legal framework, including “whether there were mitigating circumstances that would warrant an outcome other than [Jones's] termination from the Section 8 program.” Figgs, supra at 359. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2).⁴

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The correctness of this ruling is not before us, nor does either party challenge the Superior Court judge's recitation of the grand jury evidence, which we accordingly accept for purposes of this appeal.

3.   Jones never informed the BHA hearing officer that the criminal charges had been brought, let alone dismissed, and she affirmatively denied having been arrested.

4.   Jones states without elaboration that she “should be covered by the women's violence act established by BHA,” which we understand to refer to the provisions of par. (8)(e) of part C of the housing assistance payments contract between the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the BHA. That section provides certain protections for victims of domestic abuse; however, there is no suggestion or evidence of abuse in the record before us.