COMMONWEALTH v. RAMBERT (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In 1983, when he was sixteen years old, the defendant was convicted by a jury and also pleaded guilty to numerous crimes for which he received eleven life sentences, two thirty- to forty-year sentences, and sentences to various lesser terms of imprisonment, all to run concurrently. Although the defendant was eligible for parole after serving fifteen years of his life sentences, he was not eligible to apply for parole on the thirty- to forty-year sentences until 2001, after he had served eighteen years. The defendant appeared for hearings before the parole board in 2001, 2008, and 2013. Parole was denied each time.

In 2018, the defendant filed a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), for release from unlawful restraint (rule 30 motion). The defendant claimed that his thirty- to forty-year sentences are presumptively disproportionate under the Federal Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights because there was never a hearing before they were imposed to consider the factors articulated in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477-478 (2012). See Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 686 (2017) (Perez I). A Superior Court judge denied the rule 30 motion, and this panel affirmed that decision in a memorandum and order dated December 10, 2019, issued pursuant to our former rule 1:28. Commonwealth v. Rambert, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 1112 (2019).

On December 24, 2019, the defendant sought reconsideration of the panel's decision in light of the pendency of a decision by our court in a case that raised similar issues and which was argued on September 13, 2019. See Mass. R. A. P. 27 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1656 (2019). On June 9, 2020, our decision in that pending case issued. See Commonwealth v. Washington, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 595 (2020). In that decision, we reiterated that, under Perez I, “a juvenile sentence for a nonmurder offense that commands more time be served before parole eligibility than that required for a murder, without more, is presumptively disproportionate under art. 26.” Washington, supra at 601. We also emphasized that “[t]his presumption arises at the time of sentencing.” Id. In Washington, “[t]here was nothing like a Miller hearing, either at the time that the defendant was sentenced originally or at the time the motion judge made her ruling” on Washington's motion for release from unlawful restraint, “[t]hus, no judge ha[d] made a finding that the circumstances warrant[ed] treating [Washington] more harshly for parole purposes than a juvenile convicted of murder in the first degree.” Id. The order denying Washington's rule 30 motion was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Superior Court “for a Miller hearing and, if necessary, for resentencing.” Id. at 603.

In our view, this case is controlled in all material respects by our decision in Washington. Accordingly, the defendant's motion for reconsideration is allowed, and the Memorandum and Order Pursuant to Rule 1:28, dated December 10, 2019, is vacated. The motion judge's order denying the motion for relief from unlawful restraint is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this decision in accordance with the requirements of Washington, supra.

The order denying the defendant's motion for relief from unlawful restraint is vacated. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the memorandum and order of the Appeals Court.