SABREE v. BENNETT (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0.

The plaintiff, G. Saif Sabree, is currently an inmate at the Massachusetts Treatment Center (MTC). Representing himself, he filed a complaint against the defendants in Superior Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from alleged discriminatory practices. Sabree sought to bring the action “on behalf of himself and all other black prisoners, presently, formerly and who may be similarly situated in the future at [MTC].” Upon the defendants' motions, the complaint was dismissed. We affirm.

In his complaint, Sabree claimed that the defendants engaged in race and gender discrimination against him and other black inmates committed to MTC. In particular, he alleged that, in a facility with mostly white female staff members, he and the other black male inmates are subjected to more stringent treatment parameters than are white inmates. As a result, he claimed, black prisoners are less likely to complete the sex offender treatment program as compared to white inmates, and thereby are less likely to qualify for parole, transfer to other facilities, and other privileges. Sabree also alleged that black inmates are less likely to secure high-paying job assignments than white inmates, and that sex offenders of all races are treated unfairly as a result of restrictions on their access to lower security housing.

At the time that Sabree filed his complaint, three of the defendants were employed by the Department of Correction (DOC defendants) and three were employed by MHM Correctional Services, Inc., a privately owned company that administers the sex offender treatment program at MTC (MHM defendants). Both the DOC and the MHM defendants moved to dismiss Sabree's complaint. The judge below allowed the defendants' motions to dismiss, ruling that:

“After a hearing and careful consideration of the parties' written submissions, this motion is ALLOWED insofar as Plaintiff's complaint contains no allegations of discrimination directed at Plaintiff, nor does the complaint allege any actual damages suffered by Plaintiff. The complaint makes unsupported and conclusory allegations, and fails to make any allegations against a number of defendants aside from identifying them as parties. Plaintiff has furthermore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Finally, the court finds for all the reasons stated [in MHM'S Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 6F], that Plaintiff raises a serious issue concerning an abuse of the justice system through his repeated filing of frivolous pleadings. Continuing to do so may cause the court to impose sanctions.”4

“We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo,” Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011), accepting as true the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint and any favorable inferences that reasonably can be drawn from them. See Lopez v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 696, 700-701 (2012). “What is required at the pleading stage are factual ‘allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ an entitlement to relief. ․” Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. ․” Twombly, supra at 555.

On appeal, Sabree argues that the judge erred in dismissing his complaint before allowing him to pursue discovery and without first ruling on his motion for class certification. Notably, Sabree does not dispute the judge's determination that, beyond naming them as parties, he failed to identify in his complaint how the DOC or MHM defendants engaged in gender or race-based discrimination against him. Nor does Sabree dispute that he failed to plead any personal injury or harm as a result of this alleged discrimination. Indeed, Sabree's complaint contains no factual allegations regarding how this alleged discrimination at MTC personally harmed him; instead, the complaint consists of generalized statements regarding discriminatory practices there. The judge correctly determined that the complaint failed to set forth facts raising a reasonable expectation that discovery would reveal evidence of the alleged misconduct. See Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636.

Furthermore, Sabree does not dispute that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this action, as required under State and Federal law. See G. L. c. 127, §§ 38E, 38F; and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000), the Federal Prison Litigation Reform Act. Even assuming, arguendo, that Sabree's complaint adequately pleaded facts suggesting an entitlement to relief, his failure to exhaust administrative remedies alone warranted a dismissal of his claims. See Ryan v. Pepe, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 833, 839 (2006) (“Both Federal and State law now expressly require inmates to exhaust available grievance procedures before going to court”). Accordingly, we discern no error in the judge's decision to dismiss Sabree's claims or her decision to do so without first ruling on the motion for class certification.⁵

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

4.   In their motion to dismiss, the MHM defendants indicated to the court that including the present action, Sabree had filed at least ninety lawsuits.

5.   Insofar as Sabree can be taken to raise additional issues on appeal, his remaining contentions do not rise to the level of appellate argument, and we do not address them. See Zora v. State Ethics Comm'n, 415 Mass. 640, 642 n.3 (1993). In any event, “our review of the record shows that none of [the remaining contentions have] merit.” Id.