COMMONWEALTH v. REESE (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OUI).² On appeal, the defendant claims there was insufficient evidence to prove that she was the operator of the car. We affirm.

“When analyzing whether the record evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, an appellate court is not required to ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt’ (emphasis in original). Commonwealth v. Velasquez, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 147, 152 (1999), quoting from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979). See Commonwealth v. Hartnett, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 467, 475 (2008). Rather, the relevant ‘question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt’ (emphasis in original). Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, supra” (quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Bell, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 82, 83-84 (2013).

When evaluating sufficiency, the evidence must be reviewed with specific reference to the substantive elements of the offense. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677-678. In the circumstances of this case, to establish the defendant's guilt of OUI in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1), the Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant (1) operated a motor vehicle, (2) on a public way, (3) while under the influence of alcohol. Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 385, 392 (2017). On appeal, the defendant challenges only the first element.

The defendant admitted to the responding police officer that she had operated the car that had driven down an embankment. The defendant properly notes that in order for her admission as to operation to be sufficient, it must be corroborated. See Commonwealth v. Leonard, 401 Mass. 470, 472-473 (1988). The test for corroboration is lenient, and has been compared to the “corpus delicti” rule of Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 458 (1984), which requires that confessions be corroborated, but only by evidence that demonstrates that the “crime was real and not imaginary.” Id.

Here, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, a car, which the defendant admitted driving, had, consistent with the defendant's explanation, crossed the marked center line of a public way, traveled across the lane for oncoming traffic, over a sidewalk and through a snowbank before going down a snow-covered embankment and finally coming to rest thirty feet from the roadway. The defendant was seen walking away from the vehicle. There was an odor of alcoholic beverage about her person, her eyes were reddened and bloodshot, and her speech was slurred. All the above provided more than sufficient corroborative evidence that the crime was real and not imaginary. Finally, the Commonwealth's case did not deteriorate with the presentation of the defense where the defendant's passenger testified that the defendant was the operator of the car and cataloged the amount of alcohol the defendant had consumed that night. See Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 203 (2006) (deterioration only occurs where Commonwealth's evidence of necessary elements “is later shown to be incredible or conclusively incorrect” [quotation omitted] ).

Judgment affirmed.

Order entered July 25, 2019, denying postverdict motion for required finding of not guilty affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   In a separate jury-waived trial, the defendant was convicted of being a subsequent offender.