SKANDHA v. MCFARLAND (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The plaintiff, an inmate at a Massachusetts Correctional Institution, brought this action for compensatory and punitive damages against the defendant, legal counsel for the Department of Correction (DOC), claiming breach of an “agreement that the defendant would provide sealed dry cereal in place of Cream of Wheat, which was contaminated according to the plaintiff's Buddhist Pure Land Religious beliefs and practices.” The plaintiff is subject to an order in the Superior Court for Suffolk County requiring prior judicial review of any complaint before acceptance for filing. See Skandha v. Clerk of the Superior Court for Civil Business in Suffolk County, 472 Mass. 1017, 1019 (2015). A Superior Court judge conducted this review and denied the plaintiff leave to file his complaint, finding that “[t]he complaint fails to allege a claim upon which relief can be granted, as it seeks to hold an attorney liable for acts taken in his official capacity as representative of the DOC.” The plaintiff appeals.

The judge did not err in screening out the complaint. The contract at issue is a purported settlement agreement of an earlier case brought by the plaintiff against several DOC officials. The defendant in this case represented the DOC officials in the earlier case and, according to the plaintiff, signed the agreement on their behalf.² As the judge correctly concluded, the defendant is not liable for the DOC's alleged breach of that agreement merely because he signed it in his official capacity as legal counsel for the DOC.

The plaintiff argues on appeal that his claim sounds in tort, but the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state any sort of viable tort claim. The complaint contains only a summary assertion that “[t]his tort claim is for a breach of contract.” This is wholly inadequate to state a claim for relief. See Anderson v. Fox Hill Village Homeowners Corp., 424 Mass. 365, 368 (1997) (“failure to perform a contractual obligation is not a tort in the absence of a duty to act apart from the promise made”). See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (complaint must allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” which requires more than mere “labels and conclusions”).

Order dated May 1, 2019, affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The agreement itself is not in the record.