SNELL v. LIMA (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The plaintiff, Emory G. Snell, Jr., is a prisoner under the care and custody of the Department of Correction (DOC). The defendants are correctional officers employed by the DOC. On April 5, 2010, Snell filed a complaint alleging that he suffered damages after a variety of items, including, among other things, a hot pot, certain plumbing catalogs, legal materials belonging to other inmates, a radio, and stamps, were improperly confiscated. The complaint sought a declaration of rights, monetary damages, and equitable remedies of replevin and injunctive relief. The defendants filed an answer denying the claims and made a request for a jury trial. Although Snell's complaint did not include a request for a jury trial, he subsequently filed a motion requesting one, which the defendants opposed. Snell's motion was denied by a judge of the Superior Court. Thereafter, the case proceeded to a jury-waived trial before a different Superior Court judge on Snell's claim of conversion.³ At the conclusion of the trial, judgment entered for Snell in the amount of $1,750 plus interest. Snell appeals, claiming that his request for a trial by jury was erroneously denied, that certain of the judge's findings are clearly erroneous, and that the judge's legal conclusions are not supported by the evidence. We agree with Snell that he was entitled to a trial by jury on the conversion claim, and therefore vacate the judgment and remand the matter for retrial.⁴

We begin by addressing the defendants' argument that Snell has failed to preserve his claim that he was erroneously denied a jury trial because he did not object at the beginning of the bench trial when, in the midst of discussing various scheduling matters, the judge stated, “[T]his is not with a jury, and I know you've brought a claim for a jury trial, but most respectfully I'm going to deny it. It's going to be heard by me.”

We are not persuaded that Snell has waived his claim. “Once properly demanded, a jury trial may be waived, but not ‘without the consent of the parties.’ ” Northeast Line Constr. Corp. v. J.E. Guertin Co., 80 Mass. App. Ct. 646, 649 (2011) (Northeast), quoting Mass. R. Civ. P. 38 (d), 365 Mass. 800 (1974). “As the right to a jury trial is fundamental, ‘courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.’ ” Northeast, supra, quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937). “The Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure delineate the specific methods by which the right to a jury trial may be waived. Rule 39(a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, [as amended,] 450 Mass. 1403 (2008), states, in pertinent part,

‘[t]he trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless (1) the parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury [as to some or all of the issues] or (2) the court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist under the constitution or statutes of this commonwealth.’ ”

Northeast, supra.

The mere failure to object does not amount to an affirmative waiver of the right to a jury trial. See Cort v. Majors, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 153-154 (2017) (tenant's statement that he was “prepared” to proceed to trial was not effective waiver on record; “[r]ule 39 requires at least an oral stipulation of waiver”). Contrast Northeast, 80 Mass. App. Ct. at 650-651 (defendant had waived right to jury trial where notations on docket sheet established prima facie evidence, not rebutted by defendant, that parties twice consented to trial without jury by oral stipulation made in open court and entered in record).

We now turn to the question whether the judge erred in denying the defendant's motion seeking a jury trial. He did. It is true, as the defendants argue, that there is no right to a trial by jury when the cause of action arises in equity. See Commonwealth v. Guilfoyle, 402 Mass. 130, 135 (1988). It is also true that some of Snell's claims sought equitable remedies. In these circumstances, while the equitable claims are subject to a bench trial, the right to trial by jury is preserved as to the legal claims. See Dalis v. Buyer Advertising, 418 Mass. 220, 227 (1994) (“The fact that the plaintiff is entitled to both legal and equitable relief may not compromise [his] constitutional right to a trial by jury”). Thus, while the judge had discretion in deciding whether the legal or the equitable claims were to be tried first, he erred by denying Snell the right to a trial by jury on the conversion claim. See id., quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-511 (1959) (“[W]here there are legal and equitable claims present in the same case, the trial court will ‘have to use its discretion in deciding whether the legal or equitable cause should be tried first. Because the right to jury trial is a constitutional one, however, ․ that discretion is very narrowly limited and must, wherever possible, be exercised to preserve jury trial.’ Under State law, as in the Federal system, ‘only [in] the most imperative circumstances ․ can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims’ ”). Here, as the defendants' counsel acknowledged at oral argument, some of the remedies sought in the present case, namely monetary damages, are remedies at law, not in equity. Thus, on the conversion claim seeking monetary damages, Snell was entitled to a jury trial under art. 15 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution.

Having concluded that Snell was entitled to a trial by jury on his monetary claim, we must also decide whether the denial of this right was prejudicial. Even in cases where a jury trial was denied in error, remand is appropriate only in cases where the denial was prejudicial. See Rosati v. Boston Pipe Covering, Inc., 434 Mass. 349, 352 (2001). In light of the fact that Snell presented a prima facie case, the erroneous denial of a trial by jury was prejudicial. See id. Contrast Whalen v. NYNEX Info. Resources Co., 419 Mass. 792, 797 (1995) (erroneous denial of jury trial not prejudicial where plaintiff failed to establish prima facie case). The judgment is therefore vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.

So ordered.

vacated and remanded

FOOTNOTES

3.   By the time of trial, it was undisputed that Snell's property was taken and that the property had been lost such that return was not possible. The judge heard Snell's evidence on the issue of damages. It does not appear that any issues specific to the equitable claims were tried, and the claims other than the conversion claim were dismissed by the amended judgment.

4.   Given our conclusion, we do not address Snell's remaining arguments.