THOMAS OAKLEY v. VALENTI (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The parties were involved in a two-car traffic accident on Route 20 in Charlton. Alleging that the accident caused her various injuries, the plaintiff brought this personal injury action in Superior Court. After trial, the jury found the defendant negligent in operating her motor vehicle, but also found that the defendant's negligence was not a substantial contributing cause of the injuries that the plaintiff claimed. The plaintiff now appeals the denial of her posttrial motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, a new trial. We affirm.

A party seeking to undo a jury verdict based on a claim that the jury were required as a matter of law to come to a particular result faces a very formidable burden. In reviewing the denial of a JNOV motion, we ask “whether anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.” Esler v. Sylvia-Reardon, 473 Mass. 775, 780 (2016), quoting Phelan v. May Dep't Stores Co., 443 Mass. 52, 55 (2004). Moreover, the obstacles that parties challenging a jury verdict face are particularly daunting where, as here, they are the ones bearing the burden of proof. See Brunelle v. W.E. Aubuchon Co., 60 Mass. App. Ct. 626, 630 (2004), citing J. Edmund & Co. v. Rosen, 412 Mass. 572, 575 (1992) (“When a party has the burden of proof, it can rarely be ruled as matter of law that the burden has been sustained, especially when the burden-carrying party has relied upon oral testimony or inferences from circumstances”). That is because it may well be that the jury simply did not credit the evidence that they mustered to try to prove their case. Nevertheless, the case law recognizes that there may be “exceptional situations -- where the parties agree on all material facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom and disagree only as to the legal effect of the controlling principles, or where the defendant's own binding testimony precludes a verdict in his favor -- that the burden-carrying party may obtain a directed verdict.” Brunelle, 60 Mass. App. Ct. at 630-631. See Hanover Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 153, 165-172 (1999) (upholding allowance of plaintiff's JNOV motion). This is not such a case.

The accident occurred after the defendant had stopped at a gas station. She was pulling out of the gas station to make a left-hand turn onto Route 20 during heavy traffic. This required her to cross two lanes of traffic coming from her left. As she was doing this, her car hit the side of the plaintiff's car. The plaintiff admitted that at the time of the accident, her car was either stationary or moving at less than five miles per hour. As shown in photographs admitted as exhibits, there was very little visible physical damage to either car, and the jury therefore reasonably could have inferred that the defendant's car also was traveling at a low rate of speed when it hit the plaintiff's car.

At trial, the plaintiff claimed that the accident caused her four types of injury. Much of her focus at trial was on two such injuries: an alleged concussion and tinnitus. As the plaintiff now concedes, based on the evidence adduced at trial, rational jurors could have found that any concussion or tinnitus that the plaintiff suffered were not caused by the accident. Therefore, the plaintiff focuses her appeal on the other two alleged injuries: an exacerbation of preexisting neck and back pain, and a form of vertigo known as benign position vertigo.

The plaintiff's arguments regarding her preexisting neck and back pain require little discussion. It suffices to say that nothing in the trial record required the jury to find that the accident caused the worsening of her preexisting condition.

The plaintiff's arguments with regard to her vertigo are more robust. That is because the defendant's own expert witness testified that the plaintiff not only suffered from this condition, but that it likely was caused by the traffic accident.² However, the expert's opinion to was not a binding party admission. See Turners Falls L.P. v. Board of Assessors of Montague, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 732, 737-738 (2002). As the judge correctly instructed, the jury was “free to believe everything ․, some of ․, or none of what the witness[es] sa[id].” In this regard, it bears noting that although the defendant's expert believed it more likely than not that the plaintiff's vertigo was caused by the accident, he testified that “the vast majority of people who have [this type of vertigo] have no history of trauma.” Because the jury were free to reject the expert's conclusion that the low-speed accident caused the plaintiff's vertigo, the plaintiff cannot show that she was entitled to the granting of her JNOV motion.

As noted, the plaintiff requested a new trial as alternative relief to entry of judgment in her favor. The trial judge denied this relief while offering the following explanation: “this court is not persuaded that the ‘verdict is so markedly against the weight of the evidence as to suggest that the jurors allowed themselves to be misled, were swept away by bias or prejudice, or for a combination of reasons, including a misunderstanding of applicable law, [or] failed to come to a reasonable conclusion.’ W. Oliver Tripp Co. v. American Hoechst Corp., 34 Mass. App. Ct. 744, 748 (1993).” Especially in light of the special deference owed to a trial judge in this context, we are unpersuaded that the judge abused her discretion in reaching this conclusion.

Judgment affirmed.

Order denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for new trial affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The expert did not testify at trial, but his video deposition testimony was admitted by stipulation.