MCCARTHY v. MCCARTHY (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant, alleging breach of contract (count I), unjust enrichment (count II), breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (count III), misrepresentation (count IV), conversion (count V), and fraud (count VI). After a jury-waived trial, the judge found the defendant liable for breach of contract (count I) and awarded the plaintiff $159,000 in damages.² On appeal, the defendant claims the judge erred in denying her motion for directed verdict. She also claims the judgment should be reduced by forty percent and that the verdict form violated Superior Court Rule 20 (8). We affirm.

1. Sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant claims that the judge erred in denying her motion for directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence that an agreement had been made. She also claims that the Statute of Frauds bars the plaintiff's complaint. We disagree.

We review the denial of a motion for directed verdict under the same standard used by the trial judge. See O'Brien v. Pearson, 449 Mass. 377, 383 (2007). We “construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and disregard that favorable to the moving party.” Id. This standard requires us to observe “whether ‘anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the [nonmovant].’ ” Dobos v. Driscoll, 404 Mass. 634, 656 (1989), quoting Poirier v. Plymouth, 374 Mass. 206, 212 (1978).

Here, there was ample evidence to support the judge's finding. As part of the evidence, there were the parties' e-mails, which discussed the loan transaction at issue, including the amount owed by the defendant.³ The checks in evidence further substantiated the e-mails. Additionally, the mortgage document in evidence ⁴ describes the defendant as the “borrower” and references the promissory note, of which the plaintiff testified during the trial. See Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., 424 Mass. 501, 509-510 (1997) (trial judge in best position to judge weight and credibility of evidence). The defendant did not testify at the trial, but her admitted deposition testimony established that she had agreed to pay a certain amount of money, although she did not remember how much had been repaid. Based on this evidence, the judge was permitted to find that an agreement had been made between the parties and that the defendant had breached that agreement. See Dobos, 404 Mass. at 656.⁵

The defendant also claims that, even if the evidence was sufficient to support the guilty finding, the judgment should be reduced by forty percent to reflect the amount loaned by the plaintiff's husband. We disagree. The amount of damages awarded is a factual determination that we review for an abuse of discretion. See Twin Fires Inv., LLC v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 445 Mass. 411, 424 (2005). The defendant never raised this issue in her motion for directed verdict, nor did she move to join an indispensable party. In any event, the plaintiff's testimony established that the money loaned to the defendant came from her own bank account. See Demoulas, 424 Mass. at 510. There was no abuse of discretion.⁶

2. Superior Court Rule 20 (8). Finally, the defendant claims that the judge violated Superior Court Rule 20 (8)⁷ by failing to provide a sufficiently detailed verdict form. We disagree. As a preliminary matter, the defendant failed to timely object to the verdict form, and thus the issue is not preserved for appeal. In fact, the defendant, the plaintiff, and the judge discussed and agreed upon the verdict form. Furthermore, the defendant does not explain why the verdict form was erroneous; she simply claims it is not detailed enough. In any event, the verdict form contains special questions for each count of the complaint, which satisfies the parties' agreement and Superior Court Rule 20 (8). We further add that not every violation of a procedural rule requires reversal, especially here, where the defendant suffered no prejudice. See Schulte v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 369 Mass. 74, 79-80 (1975).

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The judge found count II not applicable. Count III was resolved by agreement. The judge found the defendant not liable on counts IV through VI.

3.   In the defendant's own e-mail to the plaintiff, she thanked the plaintiff for working “together on a plan to ․ get [the plaintiff's] money back a lot quicker,” and asked the plaintiff to “lend another 30k.”

4.   The defendant claims that the judge abused his discretion in admitting the mortgage document, signed by the defendant, in evidence. We disagree. Whether to admit evidence is in the judge's discretion, and we do not disturb the judge's ruling absent an abuse of discretion or other legal error. See Zucco v. Kane, 439 Mass. 503, 507 (2003). Here, the mortgage was not admitted as a valid mortgage instrument, but instead as evidence that the defendant borrowed the $200,000 from the plaintiff, along with the reference of the promissory note that the plaintiff testified to at trial.

5.   Accordingly, the defendant's Statute of Frauds claim must fail because the judge did not find, and the defendant did not establish, that she was the guarantor of Dockside's loan. See G. L. c. 259, § 1. Regardless, the e-mail exchanges and the mortgage, which references the promissory note, constitute sufficient writings. See Young v. Young, 251 Mass. 218, 221 (1925) (writing with adequate reference to other writings may satisfy Statute of Frauds); Harvey v. Bross, 216 Mass. 57, 60 (1913) (letters exchanged between parties sufficient for Statute of Frauds).

6.   The defendant also claims that the plaintiff failed to sue the proper defendant. This claim was not raised in the defendant's motion for directed verdict, therefore is not preserved for appeal. However, there is sufficient evidence that the defendant is the proper defendant. See discussion, supra.

7.   Superior Court Rule 20 (8) states, in pertinent part, “ ‘waiver of detailed findings of fact’ means waiver of written judicial findings with the level of detail required by Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a).” Furthermore, the “judge shall, at a minimum, answer special questions on the elements of each claim, at a level of detail comparable to a special jury verdict form pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 49 (a) ․” Rule 20 (8) (a) of the Rules of the Superior Court (2018).