MACHADO v. TREASURER AND RECEIVER GENERAL (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The plaintiffs in these consolidated cases are veterans who successfully obtained relief from the denial of their claims for compensation under the Welcome Home Bonus Act (Act), G. L. c. 10, § 78. A judge of the Superior Court concluded that the Veteran's Bonus Appeals Board's (board) denial of their claims was premised on an incorrect interpretation of the Act. The judge ruled that the plaintiffs were eligible for a bonus after they received an honorable discharge at the conclusion of their first deployment, and that a less than honorable discharge after a second deployment did not divest them of their right to the bonus associated with their first (honorable) discharge. The judge granted the individual plaintiffs judgment on the pleadings. He dismissed the class claim as moot, and ordered dismissal of the entire action. A second judge denied a motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the plaintiffs assert that their class claims were not moot and that they were entitled to a ruling on class certification. We vacate the dismissal of the complaints, and remand for further proceedings on class certification.

Both judges rendered their rulings before the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Gammella v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 482 Mass. 1, 19-20 & n.24 (2019), which held that resolution of the individual plaintiffs' claims do not moot claims for class certification. See Cantell v. Commissioner of Correction, 475 Mass. 745, 753-756 (2016); Wolf v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 367 Mass. 293, 298-300 (1975). Were the rule otherwise, successful prosecution of the class representatives' individual claims would invariably render the class claim moot. Gammella, supra at 19. The “plaintiffs brought this case as a putative class action, and the class action allegations contained in the amended complaint remain operative until a judge has considered and rejected them on their merits.” Cantell, supra at 753.⁴

The defendants maintain that this court lacks appellate jurisdiction because the matter has been remanded to the agency. See Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 439 Mass. 729, 730 n.5 (2003) (“[A]n order of remand to an administrative agency is interlocutory and may not be appealed from by the parties to the underlying action”). Only the individual claims have been remanded to the board. The class claims have not been ruled upon.

In a similar vein, the defendants maintain that the plaintiffs must exhaust their administrative remedies before proceeding with class certification. See generally East Chop Tennis Club v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 364 Mass. 444, 448 (1973). The plaintiffs had exhausted their remedies at the time they filed suit. Contrast Gill v. Board of Registration of Psychologists, 399 Mass 724, 726-727 (1987). The remand pertained only to their individual claims, not the request for class certification, a form of relief only the motion judge could allow. Compare East Chop Tennis Club, supra. Any complexity presented by the pursuit of class claims in an administrative law case are better addressed by the parties on remand in the context of determining whether class certification is appropriate, a matter as to which we express no opinion. See generally G. L. c. 231A, §§ 3, 5, 8.

Accordingly, the dismissal of the complaints is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings on class certification consistent with this memorandum and order.⁵

So ordered.

vacated and remanded

FOOTNOTES

4.   At the time these orders entered, class discovery and class certification were stayed by agreement pending resolution of the judge's ruling on the question of statutory interpretation. An agreed upon scheduling order had issued to this effect.

5.   The current judgments contain an anomaly, in that the judge granted judgment on the pleadings to the individual plaintiffs, but then dismissed the complaints in their entirety, including those counts which pertained to the plaintiffs individually. See generally Buffalo-Water 1, LLC v. Fidelity Real Estate Co., LLC, 481 Mass. 13, 18-19 (2018). On remand, judgment should be entered for the plaintiffs, individually, in accordance with the judge's disposition of the motion for judgment on the pleadings.