ADOPTION OF EAMON v. << (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The mother of Eamon, born in 2009, and Frank, born in 2013, appeals from decrees entered by a judge of the Juvenile Court terminating her parental rights to both children.³ She does not challenge the judge's conclusion that she is currently unfit to care for her sons. She claims, however, that the judge erred in terminating her parental rights because it was not in the children's best interests to do so. She also asserts that the adoption plan proposed by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) was not adequate. The children have submitted a joint brief in which they contend that the decrees should be affirmed. We affirm.

Background. Because the mother concedes that she is currently unfit to care for her children and does not claim that any of the judge's findings of fact are clearly erroneous, it is not necessary to provide a detailed summary of the circumstances that led to the removal of Eamon and Frank from the mother's care. It suffices to note that the judge's conclusions are supported by clear and convincing evidence of the mother's longstanding history of substance abuse, untreated mental health issues, unstable housing, relationships with violent men, and failure to engage in services to improve her ability to parent effectively.

Discussion. As the mother correctly observes, the standard for termination of parental rights involves a two-step analysis. The judge must determine first that a parent is unfit, and second that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children. See Adoption of Nancy, 443 Mass. 512, 515 (2005). As we have noted, we are concerned only with the second step of the inquiry. We review the judge's decision for an abuse of discretion. See Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 225 (1998), cert. denied sub nom. Hugo P. v. George P., 526 U.S. 1034 (1999) (“best interests” standard requires trial judge to make discretionary decision that will not be overturned unless it amounts to abuse of discretion or clear error of law).

At trial, the judge heard testimony from the DCF social worker and adoption social worker.⁴ Eamon was nine years old and Frank was five years old at that time. Frank and his twin brother, now deceased, tested positive for narcotics at birth due to the mother's substance abuse. Eamon and Frank each have medical and behavioral needs that require specialized care. Eamon was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). He was described as prone to tantrums that he was unable to deescalate safely. Eamon, unfortunately, suffered from trauma with the death of Frank's twin, who died of meningitis; Eamon reported that he saw him die. When Eamon was removed from the mother's care, he was placed in a kinship foster home, which has become his preadoptive home. The judge found that, since being placed in this foster home, Eamon has performed well and behaved appropriately in school, during extracurricular activities, and at camps.

Frank was born prematurely with chronic heart and lung complications. He also has been diagnosed with PTSD and ADHD and suffers from asthma. Like Eamon, he exhibited significant aggressive behaviors when he was removed from the mother's care, which have diminished since he was placed in the same foster home, now his preadoptive home, as Eamon. When Frank arrived at the foster home at the age of four, he was not toilet trained and could barely talk. Sixteen months later, his speech had improved, and he was able to express his needs. In addition, Frank was placed in an individualized education program at his kindergarten to address ongoing developmental delays and language issues, and had not missed any medical appointments since being placed in the foster home.

The thrust of the mother's argument is that termination is not in the best interests of the children because they have a strong attachment to her and have not formed a similar bond with the foster parents.⁵ It is true that the mother has a bond with her sons, and the judge recognized that bond by ordering posttermination and postadoption visitation. Thus, the children will continue to have the benefit of a relationship with their mother. It is not true, however, that the children have not formed a bond with their foster family. As the judge found, Frank demonstrates affection for his foster mother and Eamon calls her “mom,” and both children have “improved greatly” in the home. The judge adequately addressed criticism of the foster parents' parenting techniques, finding that “more psychoeducation needs to be provided to the foster family regarding parenting children with a trauma history.”

Lastly, the mother argues that DCF did not have an appropriate plan for adoption. We disagree. To begin with, DCF's adoption plan was the only one presented to the judge for consideration and was sufficiently detailed to enable the judge to evaluate its appropriateness. The adoption social worker testified that Eamon and Frank had been placed in the foster home since April 7, 2017, and the plan was to pursue a home study of this family and arrange for eventual adoption. Although, as noted, the judge found that further education was needed for the foster parents to adjust their parenting technique to a child with Eamon's unique needs, the judge was confident that both foster parents would listen to the clinicians and be cognizant of the children's trauma history. The plan also provided for the recruitment of a different adoptive family in the event that the current family should not be approved. We conclude that DCF's plan was sufficient in substance to allow for meaningful review, see Adoption of Willow, 433 Mass. 636, 652-653 (2001), and that the judge did not abuse her discretion in approving the plan, see Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. at 225.

Decrees affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

3.   The parental rights of Frank's father and Eamon's putative father were also terminated. Neither father has pursued an appeal.

4.   The mother was not present at trial and the judge drew an adverse inference from her absence.

5.   The mother asserts that the judge made her decision without reviewing all of the evidence. We acknowledge that the judge made comments about the mother's unfitness prior to reviewing the exhibits. We are confident that the judge did review, as she said she would, the exhibits before reaching a final decision.