SKANDHA v. BATES (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The plaintiff, Bodhisattva Skandha, is an inmate currently incarcerated at Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk (MCI-Norfolk). He appeals from an order dismissing his complaint in which he seeks to prevent the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) from serving him a powdered drink mix instead of real fruit juice. The complaint alleges, in relevant part, that the plaintiff is a practicing Pure Land Buddhist who, since 2010, has received religious vegan meals from a special menu. Beginning in 2010, in accordance with that menu, he was provided with fresh, chemical-free fruit juice for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Beginning in February 2013, the DOC began substituting a certain powdered drink mix for the real juice at the lunch and dinner meals. The plaintiff contends that the powdered drink mix is contaminated with certain chemicals that are forbidden by his religion and harmful to his health.

The defendant, William Bates, is the Director of Food Services at MCI-Norfolk. He moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), on the ground that principles of res judicata preclude the plaintiff from pursuing his claim. The defendant argued that the plaintiff made essentially the same claim in a prior action filed in Worcester Superior Court, Skandha v. Casey, No. 1485-cv-01519 (the prior action). In the prior action, the plaintiff sought to prevent the DOC from serving him other food items to which he objected on religious grounds. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that serving him bulk breakfast cereal was forbidden by his religion because it was contaminated. At the time the plaintiff brought the prior action case, he was being served the powered drink mix at issue here. The prior action was dismissed by stipulation with prejudice in September 2014. Because, the defendant asserted, the plaintiff could have but did not challenge DOC's substitution of powdered drink mix for fresh fruit juice in the prior action, the plaintiff is barred from doing so now. In a well-reasoned memorandum of decision, a judge of the Superior Court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.

“We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting as true the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint as well as any favorable inferences that reasonably can be drawn from them” (quotation and citation omitted). United Oil Heat, Inc. v. M.J. Meehan Excavating, Inc., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 579, 581 (2019). We have conducted an independent de novo review and for substantially the same reasons articulated by the judge we conclude that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. As the judge observed, three elements are required for successful application of the doctrine of res judicata: “(1) the identity or privity of the parties to the present and prior actions, (2) identity of the cause of action, and (3) prior final judgment on the merits.” DaLuz v. Department of Correction, 434 Mass. 40, 45 (2001). All three elements are met here. In particular, we note that it does not matter that the prior action involved a challenge to breakfast cereal while the present case involves powdered drink mix. A claim is the same for res judicata purposes where the underlying facts are substantially similar and reasonably related in time. See St. Louis v. Baystate Med. Ctr., Inc., 30 Mass. App. Ct. 393, 399 (1991). The plaintiff had the incentive and opportunity to litigate the substitution of the powdered mix for fruit juice when he brought the prior action. See Santos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 687, 692 (2016). He could have included the claim he now raises in the prior action and his failure to do so bars him from asserting it now.

The plaintiff also filed an objection to defense counsel's appearance on the ground that she is not a Special Assistant Attorney General. The defendant has not claimed any cognizable injury in connection with this argument, and thus lacks standing to challenge defense counsel's appearance on this ground. See Enos v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs, 432 Mass. 132, 135 (2000).

Order of dismissal affirmed.