WOJCIK v. MELROSE HOUSING AUTHORITY (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The plaintiff, Patricia Wojcik, commenced an action for certiorari review of a decision by the Melrose Housing Authority (authority), to terminate the plaintiff's benefits under the Federal Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program (Section 8).² A judge of the Housing Court (motion judge) considered the parties' cross motions for judgment on the pleadings and upheld the authority's decision in a written memorandum. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). The plaintiff appeals from the judgment dismissing her claim, and the order denying her motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

Background. We draw the facts from the administrative record. On September 12, 2016, the owner of the apartment complex in which the plaintiff resided (landlord) wrote the plaintiff a letter accusing her of “continu[ing] to engage in inappropriate conduct that constitutes serious repeated violations of [her] lease agreement, as well as a nuisance, despite several warnings by management.” Specifically, the landlord alleged that the plaintiff and her guests continued to smoke inside the plaintiff's apartment after receiving written notice that smoking was prohibited.

On November 2, 2016, the plaintiff was arrested for operating with a suspended license and was transported to the police station, where she screamed and resisted being put into a holding cell. The plaintiff also was accused of grabbing and pulling an officer's arm, “hurting” the officer but not resulting in injury. A criminal complaint issued charging the plaintiff, among other things, with assault and battery on a police officer.³

On December 16, 2016, the landlord notified the plaintiff of its intent to terminate her lease due to serious, repeated violations of paragraphs sixteen, eighteen, and thirty of the lease, as well as two addenda attached thereto. Neither the lease nor the addenda are in the record before us. However, in its letter to the plaintiff (eviction letter), the landlord stated that the plaintiff agreed pursuant to paragraph sixteen of the lease “that [she] and all guests and occupants would comply with written apartment rules and community policies.” Pursuant to paragraph eighteen:

“You agreed that you, your occupants and/or guests would not engage in a loud or obnoxious manner, not disturb or threaten the rights, comfort, health, safety, or convenience of others in or near the apartment community, and not engage in or threaten violence. You further agreed to not disrupt the landlord's business operations. Pursuant to [p]aragraph 30 of your [a]partment [l]ease [c]ontract, you agreed that you would be in default if you violate any term of the lease contract including but not [limited to] violation of apartment rules, and/or safety, health laws, or if you engage in any conduct prohibited by paragraph 18 of the lease.

“Pursuant to the Smoke-Free Community Lease Addendum, you agreed and understood that the community was a smoke-free community and smoking is not permitted anywhere within the community. You further agreed that a breach of the Addendum constitutes a breach of the [a]partment [l]ease [c]ontract. Pursuant to [p]aragraph 8 of the Section 8 Tenant-based Assistance Housing Choice Voucher Program Tenancy Addendum, you agreed that management could terminate your tenancy in accordance with the lease, for your serious or repeated violation of the lease, and/or other good cause.”

The eviction letter stated that the plaintiff's tenancy was being terminated because (1) the plaintiff and her guests continued to smoke on the property; (2) there had been “multiple complaints of yelling, screaming, and excessive noises emanating from [the plaintiff's] apartment”; (3) the plaintiff was arrested on November 2, 2016, and charged with a crime; and (4) “on or about November 30, 2016, an individual, believed to be [the plaintiff's] guest, was observed loitering in the lobby and was disoriented causing concern to the safety of the other residents.” The landlord further concluded that this conduct, along with the plaintiff's “repeated[ly] calling the management office and making inappropriate statements and/or requests,” constituted “good cause” to terminate the plaintiff's tenancy under the Section 8 addendum.

On February 8, 2017, the authority's Section 8 program coordinator notified the plaintiff of the authority's intent to terminate her Section 8 benefits based on (1) her having engaged in violent criminal activity on November 2, 2016, in violation of Section 8 regulations,⁴ and (2) her material violation of the terms of her lease, as set forth in the eviction letter, in violation of 24 C.F.R. § 982.551(e). On February 28, 2017, in connection with a summary process action initiated by the landlord in the District Court, the plaintiff and the landlord entered into a stipulation “acknowledging and agreeing to a mutual termination of the lease/tenancy.” In exchange for the landlord dismissing the action with prejudice, the plaintiff agreed to vacate the premises by a date certain and: (1) to comply with all terms of her lease regarding guests and behavior, recognizing that she is “responsible for the conduct of her guests, invitees, and household occupants as though such conduct were her own”; (2) “not to cause or create any unreasonable disturbances ․ that interfere with resident's [sic] right to quiet enjoyment and/or management's ability to perform its duties”; (3) that the apartment complex is a smoke-free community, that smoking is prohibited by her lease, and that she and her guests would stop smoking on the property; and (4) not to enter the property management office.

A little more than a week later, on March 9, 2017, the authority held an informal hearing to discuss the decision to terminate the plaintiff's Section 8 benefits. The authority's executive director acted as the hearing officer. The plaintiff appeared and was represented by counsel on a limited basis.⁵ The plaintiff did not contest the facts surrounding her November 2 arrest, but argued that the assault and battery she committed upon the police officer does not qualify as a violent crime under Section 8 regulations because the officer was not seriously injured. After examining the eviction letter, which she acknowledged receiving, the plaintiff further stated that the lease violations set forth in the letter “are not a direct result of her actions but that they [were] caused by family and friends.” The hearing officer documented in a letter to the plaintiff his decision to terminate the plaintiff's Section 8 benefits, based on her engagement in (1) violent criminal activity, and (2) “a series of actions in material non-compliance with [her] lease obligations.”

The plaintiff commenced this action for certiorari review of the hearing officer's decision, and both parties moved for summary judgment. Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974). Treating the motions as requests for judgment on the pleadings, the motion judge reviewed the administrative record and concluded that there was a “reasonable basis to find” that the plaintiff engaged in violent criminal activity on November 2, 2016. The motion judge further held that the District Court stipulation entered in the eviction proceeding provided “sufficiently reliable evidence to serve as the basis for the hearing officer's ruling” that the plaintiff committed serious or repeated lease violations. Indeed, as the judge noted, the plaintiff “admitted to the lease violations” at the hearing but blamed them on “family and friends.” The motion judge affirmed the hearing officer's determinations, and judgment entered dismissing the plaintiff's claim. The judge then denied the plaintiff's request for reconsideration.

Standard of review. Because the authority's decision to terminate the plaintiff's Section 8 benefits was a discretionary one, see Wojcik v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 66 Mass. App. Ct. 103, 112 (2006), the motion judge's review was “limited to determining whether the decision is legally erroneous or so devoid of factual support as to be arbitrary and capricious” (citation and quotations omitted). Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 509 v. Auditor of the Commonwealth, 476 Mass. 80, 85 (2016). See T.D.J. Dev. Corp. v. Conservation Comm'n of N. Andover, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 124, 128 (1994) (standard of review in certiorari proceeding “varies according to the nature of the action for which review is sought”). Our task in reviewing the appeal from the motion judge's decision is to review the entire administrative record and decide whether the judge “correctly determined that the record before [him] showed no error of law in the [authority's] decision which adversely affected one of [the plaintiff's] material rights.” Carney v. Springfield, 403 Mass. 604, 605 (1988).

Discussion. The plaintiff claims that the hearing officer's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the assault and battery she committed on the police officer did not constitute “violent criminal activity” within the meaning of Section 8 regulations. The plaintiff also claims that the hearing officer erroneously relied on unreliable hearsay to find that she had committed multiple lease violations. Finally, the plaintiff alleges that the hearing officer's decision is inadequate to satisfy due process.

We need not decide whether the plaintiff's conduct in grabbing and pulling an officer's arm, resulting in pain but no other injury, constitutes “violent criminal activity” within the meaning of Section 8 regulations, because, we conclude, the record contains substantial evidence that the plaintiff violated the terms of her lease. First, the plaintiff admitted to the lease violations and blamed them on family and friends. Second, she implicitly acknowledged as much when she stipulated that she was responsible for her guests' behavior and that neither she nor her guests would thereafter smoke on the premises, create disturbances, engage in criminal activity, or interfere with the landlord's business operations. Presumably, the plaintiff would not stipulate to stopping behavior in which she denied engaging. On this record, we have no trouble concluding that a “reasoning mind” could have found “by reference to the logic of experience” that the plaintiff violated the terms of her lease. Citrix Sys., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 484 Mass. 87, 95 (2020), quoting New Boston Garden Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 466 (1981) (discussing substantial evidence test).

To satisfy due process, a hearing officer “must hear evidence and find facts relating to ‘all relevant circumstances.’ ” Wojcik, 66 Mass. App. Ct. at 112, quoting 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2). Relevant circumstances include, but are not limited to, “the seriousness of the case, the extent of participation or culpability of individual family members, [and] mitigating circumstances related to the disability of a family member.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)(i) (2016). The hearing officer then “must issue a written decision, stating briefly the reasons for the decision.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(6) (2015).

The hearing officer heard evidence of serious, repeated lease violations by the plaintiff, her family, and her friends. He found that the plaintiff and her associates had engaged in the behavior attributed to them. The hearing officer also considered the plaintiff's disabilities and her “explanation of circumstances and factors ․ that led to [her] conduct.” However, he found, these mitigating factors were “outweighed by the nature of [the plaintiff's] conduct and the likelihood that it will continue to occur.” Significantly, the plaintiff had every right and opportunity to call witnesses at the hearing, including any whose hearsay statements were contained in the landlord's letters to the plaintiff. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(5). Accordingly, the hearing officer affirmed the decision to terminate the plaintiff's Section 8 benefits. The hearing officer transcribed his findings and reasoning into a letter to the plaintiff. The mandates of 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)(i) were satisfied, and so too was due process.⁶ See Wojcik, 66 Mass. App. Ct. at 110 (Section 8 regulations “provide for the elements of due process”).

Judgment affirmed.

Order denying motion for reconsideration affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The Housing Choice Voucher Program was established by Congress and allows low-income families seeking assistance to apply to a local public housing authority. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a) (2015). “If approved, the local housing authority will issue a section 8 voucher,” which the family may use to “locate a suitable apartment in the private market and enter into a lease that is in accordance with the applicable housing authority guidelines.” Wojcik v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 66 Mass. App. Ct. 103, 103 n.2 (2006). “Once the housing authority has approved the lease, the family may then pay thirty percent of its adjusted monthly income to the owner of the unit in satisfaction of its rent obligation. Under its own agreement with the owner, the housing authority then pays the owner the difference between what the tenant has paid and the monthly rent charged” (citations omitted). Id.

3.   Ultimately, the charges appear to have been dismissed.

4.   See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.551(l) (2016); 982.552(c)(1)(i), (iv), and (xi) (2016); 982.553(b) and (c) (2016).

5.   Counsel's representation was limited to challenging the authority's decision to terminate Section 8 benefits due to the plaintiff's engagement in violent criminal activity. Counsel departed the hearing after arguing that issue.

6.   We discern no abuse of discretion by the judge in denying the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).