ADOPTION OF GRACE v. << (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The mother of three girls, Grace, Ella, and Ann, appeals from decrees of the Juvenile Court terminating her parental rights to all three children.³ She argues that termination was not in the children's best interests because at the time of trial the Department of Children and Families (DCF) had not identified an adoptive home for any of the three children and did not otherwise have a viable adoption plan. Grace and Ella also appeal, and join the mother's claim that it was error to terminate the mother's parental rights because the adoption plan presented by DCF was inadequate. Ann requests that we affirm the decree as to her and argues that as to her any alleged inadequacy in DCF's adoption plan presented at trial is moot because she has since been placed in a preadoptive home. We affirm.

Background. 1. Parental unfitness. Neither the mother nor the children challenge the finding of parental unfitness. Accordingly, there is no need to summarize the evidence that supports that decision. It suffices to note that the judge's detailed findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence and that despite the mother's love for her daughters, she “remain[ed] too unstable to assume caretaking responsibilities and further the welfare and best interests of her children.” The judge found that the mother had a history of substance abuse and suffered from various mental health issues including depression, which by the mother's admission impacted her ability to remain sober and provide for the needs of the children. The mother had no stable housing or income, exposed the older children to domestic violence, and failed to adhere to her service plans. The youngest child, Ann, was born with illicit drugs in her system and was hospitalized for two weeks. Ann never resided with the mother as she was placed in foster care upon her discharge from the hospital. On the basis of these facts, among others, the judge properly determined that the mother was unable to resume custody and to parent the children.

2. DCF's adoption plan. At the time of trial, Grace was ten years old, Ella was seven years old, and Ann was two years old. Grace and Ella were residing together in one foster home while Ann was in a different foster placement. Although the judge found that Grace and Ella were healthy, doing well in school, and were friendly, pleasant children, they had not been placed in preadoptive homes. Ann was an active, inquisitive child, but unlike her older sisters, she was anxious and could be fussy. She required early intervention to assist her with emotional regulation. At the time of trial, Ann was also not in a preadoptive home.

DCF submitted a written adoption plan for each of the three children and presented testimony as to those plans from the children's adoption social worker. The social worker testified that DCF's plan for the children was to pursue all recruitment options to identify an adoptive family for all three children. She described ongoing efforts to pair the children with adoptive families, including participation in “adoption parties” where prospective families meet the children or are given information about them. In addition, each child was registered on the Massachusetts Adoption Resource Exchange (MARE) to facilitate recruitment efforts. The children also were profiled in a recruitment video to be viewed by prospective parents.

Discussion. 1. Mother's, Grace's, and Ella's appeal. The mother and the two older children contend that the adoption plans submitted by DCF at trial were insufficiently finalized to allow the judge to terminate the mother's parental rights and, as a result, the termination decrees must be vacated and the case remanded. We disagree. Upon close review, we conclude that the adoption plans submitted by DCF were detailed enough to enable the judge to approve the proposed plans and terminate the mother's parental rights.

When considering the best interests of a child in a termination of a parental rights proceeding, the judge must consider the adoption plan proposed by DCF. See G. L. c. 210, § 3; Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 226 (1998). However, “[t]he adoption plan need not be fully developed to support a termination order.” Adoption of Willow, 433 Mass. 636, 652 (2001), citing Adoption of Vito, 431 Mass. 550, 568 n.28 (2000). Instead we review to determine whether the adoption plan “provide[d] sufficient information about the prospective adoptive placement ‘so that the judge may properly evaluate the suitability of the department's proposal.’ ” Adoption of Willow, supra, quoting Adoption of Vito, supra. It is sufficient that the adoption plan “have content and substance enough to permit the court meaningfully to evaluate and consider ․ what [DCF] proposes to do for the child by way of adoption.” Adoption of Lars, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 30, 31 (1998), quoting Adoption of Stuart, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 380, 393 (1995). In determining whether the termination of parental rights and approval of an adoption plan is in the best interests of the children, a trial judge has considerable discretion, and we afford her decision substantial deference on appeal. See Adoption of Hugo, supra at 225. We will reverse only where the trial judge abused her discretion or committed a clear error of law. Id.

As we have noted, DCF had not identified an adoptive placement for any of the children. However, the social worker testified both to DCF's intent to keep the children together and to the specific characteristics, experience, and qualifications that DCF sought in any prospective preadoptive family. The judge noted that Grace, Ella, and Ann were “very adoptable children” and that they currently had good chances of being adopted. The judge expressed reasonable concern that with the passage of time the children's chances of being adopted would diminish. The goal of recruitment and the measures taken by DCF to facilitate adoption, including the children's participating in adoption parties, producing a video to help with pairing, and registering with MARE, were reasonably calculated to facilitate adoptions that would be in the children's best interests. Accordingly, the judge did not abuse her discretion in concluding that DCF's recruitment plan was in the best interests of each child.

The mother, Grace, and Ella further argue that the adoption plans were insufficient because they did not describe the specific characteristics of the ideal family that DCF would attempt to recruit. For support, they rely on Adoption of Varik, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 762 (2019). In that case, however, DCF's plan not only failed to describe the ideal family for Varick, but also failed to address Varick's specific needs. Id. at 766. Varick, unfortunately, had suffered physical abuse and had behavioral issues that included incidents of lying, stealing, and hoarding food. Id. at 764. Thus, the failure to specify the best appropriate home environment to meet Varick's particular needs rendered the plan deficient. Id. at 771. Fortunately, those same concerns are not present here. The judge described the children's health, behavior, and demeanor, and found that Grace and Ella did well in school and had no chronic medical issues. Although Ann exhibited some problematic behavior, including a tendency to bite and hit, as we have noted, those issues were being addressed through early intervention. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's approval of the recruitment plan as presented and pursued by DCF.

2. Ann's position on appeal. Ann contends that the judge had sufficient information to approve DCF's plan to recruit a suitable adoptive home and terminate the mother's parental rights. As discussed above, we agree with Ann's position. Ann further contends that the mother's challenge to the termination of her parental rights as to Ann is moot because the judge amended DCF's plan from recruitment to an identified adoptive home following a permanency hearing held on October 18, 2019. Given our conclusion that DCF's plan to recruit an adoptive family for the children was sufficient in the circumstances presented, we need not address this argument.

Decrees affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

3.   The parental rights of Grace's putative father were also terminated. He did not participate in the termination proceedings and is not a party to this case. Ella's and Ann's father is deceased.