AMINIPOUR v. CAMARGO (2020)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The plaintiffs, Habib and Shahin Aminipour appeal from the order denying their motion for reconsideration, after a judge of the Land Court allowed the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment.⁴ We affirm.

Background. The plaintiffs own unit one in a three-unit residential condominium in Belmont known as 179 Belmont Street Condominium (Belmont St. condominium). Defendants Hugo and Eleanna Camargo own unit two, and Donald Misquitta, individually, and Derek Misquitta, nonparties, own unit three. The Belmont St. condominium has three, unmarked parking spaces in the common area. The original master deed and the unit deeds provide that each unit has appurtenant to it the exclusive right to use one parking space. In their amended complaint, however, the plaintiffs asserted that they have the exclusive right to two spaces and that they and the owners of unit two share the rights to the third space. They asserted that an actual controversy had arisen between the plaintiffs and defendants as to rights in the third parking space that could be resolved only by a declaratory judgment. In cross motions for summary judgment, the plaintiffs relied on a series of documents purporting to assign the exclusive rights to two and one-half parking spaces to them. Specifically, they contended that the documents, negotiated with previous owners, read together, validly amended the master deed and assigned the exclusive interest in two and one-half parking spaces to unit one. The defendants contended that none of the documents submitted by the plaintiffs effectively amended the master deed, or otherwise modified the unit owners' exclusive rights to use one parking space.

In a detailed and well-reasoned decision, the judge allowed the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that a transfer of interests in the parking spaces could be effected only by amendment to the master deed, and “the 1987 Parking Designation” did not effectively amend the master deed because, if for no other reason, it was not recorded within six months of its execution. The judge also concluded that a purported 2000 amendment to the master deed was void ab initio as an impermissible delegation of the condominium trust's powers under G. L. c. 183A, and the owner of unit three lacked authority under the master deed and the condominium statute (G. L. c. 183A) to designate any particular space and transfer his or her interest in it to the owner of unit one. Consequently, she concluded, “the 2000 Parking Space Assignment was ineffective to transfer any parking rights to [the] [p]laintiffs.”⁵ The judge declared that the master deed, as originally drafted, continued to control and the right to exclusive use of one parking space remained assigned to each unit.

The plaintiffs then filed a motion to reconsider, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 59 (e), 365 Mass. 827 (1974), arguing that the summary judgment decision created a fundamentally unfair result. Notably, the plaintiffs did not assert any error in the judge's conclusions; rather, they argued, for the first time, that the judgment (1) violated the Declaratory Judgment Act, (2) undermined long-standing expectations, and (3) created a windfall, particularly for the nonparty owner of unit three, while depriving the plaintiffs of rights for which they had paid consideration. The judge denied the motion “for the reasons set forth in the [d]efendant's opposition.”

The plaintiffs now raise essentially the same arguments as they presented in their motion to reconsider, conceding that they failed to raise any of those arguments before the defendants' motion for summary judgment was allowed.

Discussion. “A motion under rule 59 (e) ․ [is] addressed to the judge's discretion” and our review is to determine whether the judge's denial of a motion for reconsideration was an abuse of discretion. R.W. Granger & Sons, Inc. v. J & S Insulation, Inc., 435 Mass. 66, 79 (2001). See Piedra v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 39 Mass. App. Ct. 184, 188 (1995). Here, the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration raises issues not raised before the judge in the summary judgment proceedings. The judge was not required to consider them and neither are we. “A motion for reconsideration is not the ‘appropriate place to raise new arguments inspired by a loss before the motion judge in the first instance.’ ” Merchants Ins. Group v. Spicer, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 271 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Gilday, 409 Mass. 45, 46 n.3 (1991). See O'Malley v. O'Malley, 419 Mass. 377, 381 (1995) (challenge to judge's order came too late when raised for first time in motion to amend or to vacate). “It is, of course, axiomatic that an appellate court need not consider a claim that is asserted for the first time after judgment has entered below.” R.W. Granger & Sons, Inc., supra at 73.

Exceptional circumstances may prompt a reviewing court to examine questions of law that were neither argued nor ruled upon in a court or agency below. McLeod's Case, 389 Mass. 431, 434 (1983). To the extent that this exception applies to arguments first raised below in a motion for reconsideration, “we must determine whether there was any error and, if any, whether such error requires us to conclude that the [decree] is ‘inconsistent with substantial justice.’ ” White v. White, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 132, 134 (1996), quoting Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor, Inc., 390 Mass. 6, 9 (1983). The plaintiffs do not argue that the judge's rationale for granting summary judgment to the defendant was erroneous. Instead, they contend that we should review the claims raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration because of the clear injustice that would otherwise result. We disagree.

We address each of the plaintiffs' arguments. They first argue that the judgment exceeds the scope of the Declaratory Judgment Act, see G. L. c. 231A, because the judgment affects the owner of unit three who was not joined as a defendant. The plaintiffs sought and received a declaration as to their rights in the condominium's parking area.⁶ Contrary to the plaintiffs' argument, the judge did not expand the scope of the issue raised by the pleadings; her review of the referenced documents related to all three parking spaces was necessary to resolve the issue presented.⁷

Despite the fact that they commenced the declaratory judgment and accordingly named the parties, the plaintiffs seek to place the burden on the defendants to have joined the owners of unit three as defendants. The plaintiffs cite no authority (i) to suggest that it was the defendants' obligation to join another defendant who might be affected by the plaintiffs' requested declaration, or (ii) for the proposition that the plaintiffs' own error in pleading constitutes a basis for relief from the declaratory judgment they requested and received.⁸ Furthermore, it appears that the owner of unit three was affected positively by the declaratory judgment. To the extent the owner of unit three disagrees, a nonparty is not bound by a declaration. G. L. c. 231A, § 8 (“no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding”).⁹ The plaintiffs, however, raise no issue of substantial injustice as to them.

Second, the plaintiffs contend that summary judgment is inconsistent with expectations, in part because, although they did not raise it before their motion for reconsideration, they contend that they have an easement by prescription over the parking spaces. As noted above, a motion for reconsideration is not the place to raise new issues triggered by an adverse result. Moreover, the facts alleged in support of an easement by prescription are founded on assertions by a nonoccupying owner who resided in another town and made no avowals of the frequency with which he observed the use of the parking spaces over the years. The judge did not abuse her discretion in declining to reopen the case to consider a prescriptive easement claim on these alleged facts.

Finally, the facts alleged do not suggest that the defendants gained a windfall at the expense of the plaintiffs. The present owners cannot be bound by documents that were ineffective to pass their parking rights to the owners of unit one. The facts indicate that the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the terms of the master deed and recording requirements caused their deal with prior owners to be unenforceable. Contrast McLeod's Case, 389 Mass. at 434 (unjust to allow judgment to stand that deprives party of entitled statutory benefits); Fortier v. Essex, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 263, 267 (2001) (manifestly unjust to affirm judgment that includes findings by jury that town had created nuisance and had trespassed on plaintiffs' property by diversion of contaminated water, yet provides no relief in face of Massachusetts statute which expressly provides for relief in such circumstances); White, 40 Mass. App. Ct. at 143 (error of holding private session, where judge's findings on custody and visitation rights were tainted by private session, was so substantial that it warranted new trial on issues of custody and visitation).

For all of the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs raise no issue of substantial injustice and we discern no abuse of discretion in the denial of the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.

Judgment affirmed.

Order denying motion to reconsider affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

4.   The plaintiffs in fact appealed from the underlying judgment as well as from the order denying their motion for reconsideration. However, as noted infra, they do not argue any issues arising from that judgment itself.

5.   Because the judgment declared that each unit had rights to one parking space, the judgment also benefited unit three, whose owner was not a party to the lawsuit.

6.   We are satisfied that the pleadings sufficiently raised an actual controversy involving the rights in the parking area. See G. L. c. 231A, § 9 (chapter “to be liberally construed”); Massachusetts Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 373 Mass. 290, 293 (1977) (“ ‘actual controversy’ ․ should be liberally construed”).

7.   The plaintiffs suggest that the judge was limited to the declaratory relief they requested. To the contrary, “when a complaint requests declaratory relief, the judge must declare the rights of the parties, even when relief is denied, ․ and even on motions for summary judgment” (citations omitted). Molly A. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Retardation, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 267, 288-289 (2007).

8.   The plaintiffs contend that DeSimone v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 1177, 1178 (1989), supports their argument; however, in DeSimone, it was not the plaintiff who sought relief from the plaintiff's failure to join a necessary party, and the third party the plaintiff failed to join would have had to make monetary payments as a result of the declaratory judgment. Id. So far as it appears from the record, such is not the case here.

9.   We note that one of the owners of unit three was named as a defendant in his capacity as trustee of the 179 Belmont Street Condominium Trust, and do not decide whether he may, therefore, be bound by the declaration in his individual capacity as well.