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Rachel J. MCMAHON v. CHIEF OF POLICE OF SANDWICH & another.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Rachel J. McMahon, submitted an application for a license to carry firearms to Peter Wack, the chief of police (Chief) of the town of Sandwich. He denied the application based on his determination that McMahon was “unsuitable to be issued or to continue to hold a license to carry.” G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d). The reasons the Chief gave for the denial were set forth in a letter addressed to McMahon dated August 20, 2017. The letter stated:
“This action [the denial] is being taken for the following reasons:
• A criminal records check revealed that in May of 2007 you were charged with Assault and Battery. Your juvenile record also indicates you were charged with Assault and Battery on four separate occasions.
• On March 21, 2015 it was reported to the Sandwich Police Department that you had been making suicidal threats. Upon investigation, it was determined you had made an attempted [sic]. You were transported to Cape Cod Hospital by the Sandwich Fire Department for a psychological evaluation.”
The report of suicide threats to which the letter refers was made by McMahon's boyfriend at the time, David Thornton.
McMahon appealed the Chief's decision, see G. L. c. 140, § 131 (f). Following a hearing, at which both McMahon and Thornton testified, a judge of the District Court upheld the denial of McMahon's application. The judge found that, despite McMahon's and Thornton's testimony to the effect that McMahon did not make threats to kill herself on March 21, 2015, the report made by Thornton to the police was “reliable and credible.” In fact, the judge did not credit McMahon's or Thornton's testimony. The judge noted that when the police responded to McMahon's home and were told that McMahon had made a noose to kill herself, they searched the house and found a noose made of rope in the basement. The police then transported McMahon to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. The evaluation was performed and McMahon was released from the hospital. Despite McMahon's immediate release, the judge determined that the Chief had acted reasonably in denying McMahon's application because the incident demonstrated that McMahon “may present a risk to public safety.” Accordingly, the judge determined that the Chief had not abused his discretion or acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner and, as noted, she affirmed the denial of McMahon's application to carry firearms.
McMahon then filed a complaint for certiorari in the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4. After a hearing, a judgment entered dismissing the complaint and this appeal ensued. We affirm.
“The standard of review in an action in the nature of certiorari is ‘to correct substantial errors of law apparent on the record adversely affecting material rights.’ ” MacHenry v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 634 (1996), quoting Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Court of Boston, 369 Mass. 84, 90 (1975). In a certiorari case, the court is not authorized to weigh evidence, find facts, exercise discretion, or substitute its judgment for that of the decision-making body, but is limited to determining whether the decision is legally erroneous. See Police Comm'r of Boston v. Robinson, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 767, 770 (1999).
The “suitable person” standard vests in the Chief broad discretion or “considerable latitude.” Ruggiero v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 256, 259 (1984). In order to direct that a license to carry firearms be issued (or reinstated) over the Chief's denial, a judge must “find[ ] that there was no reasonable ground for denying, suspending, revoking or restricting the license.” G. L. c. 140, § 131 (f). See Godfrey v. Chief of Police of Wellesley, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 46 (1993). To warrant such a finding, “it must be shown that the refusal [to grant the license] was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” Chief of Police of Shelburne v. Moyer, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 543, 546 (1983). The burden of making the showing is on the applicant. Id.
McMahon has not met her burden here. There is a report of McMahon's fairly recent suicidal ideation, which the judge found credible, and which was supported by physical evidence found by the police. Given that report, coupled with McMahon's history of arrests for assault and battery, we cannot conclude that the Chief's decision to deny McMahon's application to carry firearms was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. We therefore conclude that the District Court judge did not err in affirming the Chief's decision, and the Superior Court judge did not err in dismissing the complaint for certiorari.
Judgment affirmed.
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Docket No: 19-P-757
Decided: March 26, 2020
Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts.
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FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
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