BRINE v. CAMPBELL (2019)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

This is a title dispute regarding the ownership interest of the defendant, Allan Bruce Campbell, in real property on Martha's Vineyard (the property). The dispute centers on the applicability of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 190, § 1,⁴ which set forth a statutory preference available to the spouse of a Massachusetts resident who died intestate and without issue and whose entire estate was valued at less than $ 5,000. The parties do not dispute that the plaintiffs, the trustees of the Mabel Johnson Family Trust own, at least, a ninety-nine percent interest in the property. In a thorough and well-reasoned decision, the Land Court judge determined that that the defendant owned a 0.415 percent interest in the property. We affirm.

Background.⁵ In 1927, following the death of his mother, John E. Johnson, Jr. (Johnson Jr.) inherited a one-half interest in the property,⁶ which consists of a vacant parcel in West Tisbury. In 1938, Johnson Jr. died intestate in Rhode Island. He was survived by his wife, Mabel Johnson, and his sister, Sarah Burt; he did not have any children. Johnson Jr.'s personal property was inventoried and valued at $ 2,670.65, and the estate was probated in Rhode Island.⁷ The remainder of Johnson Jr.'s estate -- his one-half interest in the property located in Massachusetts -- was probated in Dukes County and valued at $ 1,000.⁸ Thus, Johnson Jr.'s entire estate was valued at less than $ 5,000.

In 1970, Mabel Johnson died testate. In her will, she left one-half of her interest in the property to the children of Augusta Macy or their heirs and one-half of her interest to the children of Gladys Almond or their heirs. Campbell is an heir of Almond.

Discussion. The question on appeal centers on how much of Johnson Jr.'s one-half interest in the property passed to his wife, Mabel Johnson. The trustees maintain that Mabel Johnson's interest is determined under Rhode Island law, pursuant to which she received only a life estate in Johnson Jr.'s one-half interest in the property, which (upon her death) passed back to Sarah Burt. Campbell contends that Mabel Johnson inherited Johnson Jr.'s entire interest in the property because his entire estate was valued at less than $ 5,000, and thus Mabel Johnson was entitled to the statutory preference as discussed below. The Land Court judge concluded that Mabel Johnson inherited one-half of Johnson Jr.'s interest in the property.

To resolve this question, we look to statutory law applicable to the distribution of real property in Massachusetts left by a nonresident decedent at the time of Johnson Jr.'s death. Specifically, G. L. c. 199, § 1, provides:

“If administration is taken in this commonwealth on the estate of a person who was an inhabitant of any other state or country, his estate found here shall, after payment of his debts, be disposed of according to his last will, if any; otherwise his real property shall descend according to the laws of this commonwealth, and his personal property shall be distributed and disposed of according to the laws of the state or country of which he was an inhabitant.”

Pursuant to this statute, because Johnson Jr. died intestate, Massachusetts law governs the descent of his interest in the property. Thus, the trustees' argument that Rhode Island law governs the disposition of Johnson Jr.'s real property is contrary to the clear statutory mandate.⁹

We turn then to G. L. c. 190, § 1, the Massachusetts law applicable at the time of Johnson Jr.'s death, which set forth a statutory preference for surviving spouses of resident decedents who died intestate and without issue. Under the statutory preference, such spouse was entitled to the whole estate if the estate was valued at less than $ 5,000. Specifically, G. L. c. 190, § 1, provided in relevant part:

“If the deceased leaves kindred and no issue, and it appears on determination by the probate court, as hereinafter provided, that the whole estate does not exceed five thousand dollars in value, the surviving husband or wife shall take the whole thereof; otherwise such survivor shall take five thousand dollars and one half of the remaining personal and one half of the remaining real property. If the personal property is insufficient to pay said five thousand dollars, the deficiency shall, upon the petition of any party in interest, be paid from the sale or mortgage ․ of any interest of the deceased in real property which he could have conveyed at the time of his death ․”

Thus, if Johnson Jr. had been a Massachusetts resident, Mabel Johnson, as his surviving spouse, would have been entitled to his entire estate, including his one-half interest in the property, because Johnson Jr.'s estate did not exceed $ 5,000 in value.

But Johnson Jr. was not a resident. Campbell urges that because Johnson Jr.'s estate was valued at less than $ 5,000, G. L. c. 190, § 1, should be applied to Mabel Johnson, the spouse of the nonresident decedent, in the same manner as it would apply to a resident decedent. In applying the statute to a nonresident decedent, we do not write on a blank slate.

In particular, we are constrained by the Supreme Judicial Court's holding in Hite v. Hite, 301 Mass. 294, 302 (1938), that “[t]he statutory preference, in the form of either $ 5,000 or all the property if the estate is less than this amount, is not available to the surviving spouse of a nonresident decedent.”¹⁰ The provision of G. L. c. 190, § 1, permitting the whole estate to pass to the surviving spouse where the estate was less than $ 5,000, the court held, “exists only when the primary and complete administration of his estate is within the exclusive jurisdiction of our courts and where ‘the whole estate does not exceed five thousand dollars in value’ ” (citation omitted). Id. at 299. The court determined that the surviving spouse of a nonresident decedent, who had taken personal property under the laws of the domiciliary State, was not within the class of persons the Legislature intended to benefit from G. L. c. 190, § 1's, statutory preference. Id. Instead, the court held that G. L. c. 199, § 1, providing that real property descend according to Massachusetts law, is limited by “the only applicable provision of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 190, § 1, which defines her inheritable estate as one half of the realty.” Id. at 301. Accordingly, under G. L. c. 190, § 1, as construed in Hite, Mabel Johnson inherited one-half of Johnson Jr.'s one-half interest in the property. That one-quarter interest then passed according to her will. Thus, per the parties' stipulation, Campbell has a 0.415% interest in the property.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

4.   The statute was repealed in 2008. See St. 2008, c. 521, § 7. All references herein to G. L. c. 190, § 1, are to the Tercentenary Edition.

5.   The parties stipulated to the material facts set forth in this section.

6.   The property was conveyed by a 1864 deed to John E. Johnson, Sr. (Johnson Sr.). Johnson Sr. died in 1911, leaving the property to his widow, Susan M. Johnson. In 1927, Susan M. Johnson died intestate, leaving one-half of the property to her son, Johnson Jr., and one-half to her daughter, Sarah Burt.

7.   Sarah Burt died intestate in 1946. Her interest in the property passed to her sole heir, Nathaniel Burt.

8.   There are no other facts in the stipulated record regarding those probate proceedings, including whether any determination was made as to Mabel Johnson's interest at that time, and the parties do not contend that those proceedings are relevant to the resolution of the issue presented in this appeal.

9.   Cheney v. Cheney, 214 Mass. 580 (1913), is not to the contrary. There, the surviving wife of a nonresident decedent brought an action to force the sale of real estate located within Massachusetts so as to benefit from the $ 5,000 statutory preference. Id. The court dismissed the action, reasoning that the $ 5,000 minimal personal property inheritance provision under G. L. c. 190, § 1 (and its accompanying charge upon real property if the personal estate is insufficient), was available only to a resident surviving spouse. Id. at 581. For spouses of nonresident decedents, however, the descent of personal property was governed by the laws of the decedent's domicile under G. L. c. 199, § 1. Id. at 581. Thus, Cheney concerned personal property, which (for a nonresident decedent) was governed by the domiciliary State. Id. It did not hold, as the trustees suggest, that real property in Massachusetts is governed by the law of the domiciliary State -- a proposition which is contrary to the clear mandate of G. L. c. 199, § 1.

10.   The court determined that this result was mandated in view of the tension between G. L. c. 199, § 1, on the one hand, and G. L. c. 190, § 1, on the other. Specifically, while G. L. c. 199, § 1, is limited to the disposition of Massachusetts-based property, G. L. c. 190, § 1, extended to the disposition of the entire estate. Moreover, G. L. c. 199, § 1, requires deference to the laws of the decedent's domiciliary State to determine disposition of personal property in Massachusetts, while under G. L. c. 190, § 1, the administration of the entire estate was governed by Massachusetts law alone. Further, G. L. c. 190, § 1, created a statutory preference up to $ 5,000 for the spouse, whereas G. L. c. 199, § 1, creates no such preference. Finally, while G. L. c. 199, § 1, treats separately the disposition of personal property from the disposition of real estate, G. L. c. 190, § 1, considered both in determining the spouse's share. Given the court's broad holding and its reasoning, we reject Campbell's suggestion that the holding in Hite is limited to estates valued at more than $ 5,000.