DANIEL PERISTERE v. WMS PROPERTIES LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, WMS Properties, LLC, brought a summary process action against the plaintiff, Daniel Peristere, in the Housing Court for possession of a residential property (the property). After a trial, a jury granted possession of the property to the defendant in February 2019. Although the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, which this court docketed, it was dismissed. On October 15, 2024, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking to remove the underlying Housing Court summary process matter to the Superior Court. A judge of the Superior Court dismissed that complaint on the grounds that there was no authority to remove a Housing Court summary process action to the Superior Court. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

The parties are familiar with the facts and extensive procedural history in this case. Accordingly, we do not repeat that information here.

Discussion. “[A] court's sua sponte motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is analogous to a party's motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (1) or (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).” Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 460 Mass. 762, 764 (2011). “We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, and determining whether allegations plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Lanier v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 490 Mass. 37, 43 (2022). The plaintiff argues that the case must be removed to the Superior Court as a matter of right because the Housing Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree.

The Housing Court has “jurisdiction to hear summary process complaints, in which the owner of a housing unit seeks to evict the occupant of that unit and recover possession.” Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Rego, 474 Mass. 329, 338 (2016). See G. L. c. 185C, § 3.¹ In his filings in the original summary process action, the plaintiff acknowledged that this is a summary process proceeding. Hence, the Housing Court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case. See Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, supra.

The judge dismissed the complaint because “there is no statute or rule that allows the plaintiff to unilaterally and without authorization ‘remove’ a Housing Court eviction case to the Superior Court.” We agree. “[H]earing eviction actions is an express and essential Housing Court function,” and the judge properly dismissed the complaint on these grounds. Cambridge St. Realty, LLC v. Stewart, 481 Mass. 121, 127 (2018).²

The defendant's request for fees is denied.

Judgment of dismissal affirmed.

By the Court (Desmond, Tan & Wood, JJ.3)

FOOTNOTES

1.   “[T]he Housing Court [also] has broad authority to resolve civil claims and counterclaims that relate ‘directly or indirectly’ to ‘the health, safety, or welfare, of any occupant of any place used ․ as a place of human habitation,’ as well as the authority to resolve all ‘housing problems, including all contract and tort actions which affect the health, safety and welfare of the occupants or owners’ of such housing.” Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 474 Mass. at 338, quoting G. L. c. 185C, § 3.

2.   To the extent that we do not discuss other arguments made by the defendant, they have not been overlooked. “We find nothing in them that requires discussion.” Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).