JOHN NEWMAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS (2025)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Alleging he was injured by officers of the Middlesex House of Correction (MHOC) in June or July 2015, the plaintiff, John Newman, filed a complaint in June 2018 against the MHOC and unnamed “John Doe” officers, claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, assault and battery, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.² A Superior Court judge allowed the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in April 2024, and the plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. We affirm.

Discussion. “The standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law” (citation omitted). Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miville, 491 Mass. 489, 492 (2023). Our review is de novo. See Gotay v. Creen, 495 Mass. 537, 544 (2025).

1. John Doe defendants. The judge granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims against the John Doe defendants individually because the plaintiff failed to identify or serve the complaint on the specific officers involved in the incident. Without a single citation to legal authority or to the record, the plaintiff argues that this was error because the defendants impeded the discovery of information that would have allowed him to identify the officers and because the defendants relied entirely on Federal and other State court decisions. “Briefs that limit themselves to ‘bald assertions of error’ that ‘lack[ ] legal argument ․ ‘[do not] rise[ ] to the level of appellate argument’ required by rule 16.” Kellogg v. Board of Registration in Med., 461 Mass. 1001, 1003 (2011), quoting Zora v. State Ethics Comm'n, 415 Mass. 640, 642 n.3 (1993). See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019) (argument section must contain “the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies. The appellate court need not pass upon questions or issues not argued in the brief”). To the extent we are able to consider the plaintiff's arguments, we discern no merit.

In the context of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “only those individuals who participated in the conduct that deprived the plaintiff of his rights can be held liable.” Cepero-Rivera v. Fagundo, 414 F.3d 124, 129 (1st Cir. 2005). “It is axiomatic that the liability of persons sued in their individual capacities under section 1983 must be gauged in terms of their own actions.” Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999). Here, as in Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 82-83 (1st Cir. 1998), the plaintiff's failure to name or identify any individual officer involved in the incident is fatal to his claims based on their conduct.³

To the extent the plaintiff asserts he was “stymied by defense tactics,” and that he should be permitted to conduct discovery by calling witnesses at trial, the judge carefully considered and reasonably rejected these arguments. The underlying incidents occurred in 2015, the complaint was filed in 2018, and the discovery deadline was extended multiple times into 2023. The plaintiff did not file a motion to compel, nor did he seek to utilize the remedy available to him under Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (f), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). “In general, discovery matters are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Buster v. George W. Moore, Inc., 438 Mass. 635, 653 (2003). “We will uphold discovery rulings unless the appellant can demonstrate an abuse of discretion that resulted in prejudicial error.” Id. We discern no abuse of discretion here. A judge “otherwise prepared to act on dispositive motions is not obligated to ‘wait indefinitely for [the plaintiff] to take steps to identify and serve ․ unknown defendants.” Figueroa, 147 F.3d at 83, quoting Glaros v. Perse, 628 F.2d 679, 685 (1st Cir. 1980).⁴

2. Negligence claims. The plaintiff asserts that even if he cannot proceed against the John Doe defendants individually, his negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against the Commonwealth should survive because he “is entitled to plead in the alternative.” While it is true that public employers are liable under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (act) for the negligent conduct of public employees acting withing the scope of their duties, see Parker v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 174, 178 (2006); G. L. c. 258, § 2, summary judgment was properly granted on the plaintiff's negligence claims for two reasons.

First, as the motion judge concluded, the plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of proving his negligence claims at trial, see Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991), because he was unable to identify the public employees who injured him. “Identification of the party responsible for causing injury to another is a longstanding prerequisite to a successful negligence action.” Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 571 (1982). See note 4, supra.

Second, because the act is the exclusive State law remedy for plaintiffs injured by the negligent actions of public employees, but does not apply to claims based on public employees’ intentional acts, see G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c), in determining whether the act applies “we must look not to the theory upon which the plaintiff elects to proceed, but rather to the substance of the claim which he asserts.” Schenker v. Binns, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 404, 406-407 (1984). See Parker, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 181. As the plaintiff argued in the section of his brief addressing qualified immunity, his § 1983 claims were based on the unnamed officers’ “intentional misconduct/battery.” And as he argued in the section of his brief addressing his negligence claims, the officers’ conduct “was an assault and battery.” Claims of “assault” and “battery” are among the claims “arising out of an intentional tort” that are specifically excluded from the purview of the act. See G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c). Because the plaintiff, in substance, alleges intentional wrongful conduct, he cannot proceed against the Commonwealth under the act.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The plaintiff later amended the complaint to include the Commonwealth as a defendant.

3.   “Although we are not bound by decisions of Federal courts (other than the United States Supreme Court) on matters of Federal law, we give respectful consideration to such lower Federal court decisions as seem persuasive” (quotations and citations omitted). ACE Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 437 Mass. 241, 248 n.8 (2002).

4.   The plaintiff further argues that the John Doe officers, acting in their individual capacities when they assaulted him, are not entitled to qualified immunity for their intentional misconduct. Because summary judgment was properly entered against the John Doe defendants based on the plaintiff's failure to identify them, we need not address whether summary judgment was also appropriate under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Moreover, even if it was reasonably foreseeable that the John Doe defendants’ actions would have caused the plaintiff emotional distress, see Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 557 (1982), it is still the case that “[i]dentification of the party responsible for causing injury to another is a longstanding prerequisite to a successful negligence action,” id. at 571.