STATE v. MOSLEY (2026)

Writ granted. Defendant was convicted of attempted second degree murder in Caddo Parish for stabbing Ashley Green while they used methamphetamines together. In his sole assignment of error on appeal, he asserted two instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. He first argued that trial counsel had failed to object to one of the jurors, Paula Richardson.¹ Second, defendant argued that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to provide notice of an intoxication defense 10 days in advance of trial, as required by La.C.Cr.P. art. 726. Consequently, the defense was unable to argue that defendant's methamphetamine intoxication prevented him from forming the requisite specific intent for an attempted second degree murder conviction. See La. R.S. 14:27, 14:30.1.

The court of appeal reversed defendant's conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded for a new trial, finding “the serious error by defense counsel affected the potential outcome by precluding consideration of the jurors of the defense of intoxication, corresponding jury instructions, and a responsive verdict option.” State v. Mosley, 56,410, p. 1 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/27/25), 418 So.3d 1163, 1165. The court underscored the potential outcomes of trial had not counsel erred:

[It] was possible for the jury to have heard all of the [ ] evidence and not found the requisite intent necessary for Mosley's conviction for attempted second degree murder. It is possible that a jury may have found Mosley guilty of one of the lesser offenses. The absence of that option for the jury ․ prejudiced Mosley such that the trial was unfair and the verdict suspect.”

Mosley, 418 So.3d at 1172. Thus, the court of appeal found this assigned error had merit as defendant established both deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Under the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel set out in Strickland, adopted by this Court in State v. Washington, 491 So.2d 1337, 1339 (La. 1986), a reviewing court must reverse a conviction if the defendant establishes (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel's inadequate performance prejudiced defendant to the extent that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect.

Assuming counsel intended to introduce an intoxication defense but failed to provide the requisite notice, counsel's performance likely fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as contemplated by the first half of the Strickland test.² However, the second half of the Strickland test provides that the “defendant must [also] show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id., 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

Here, the court of appeal found that if counsel had properly preserved and advanced a viable intoxication defense, “it was possible for the jury to have heard all of the [ ] evidence and not found the requisite intent ․ It is possible that a jury may have found Mosley guilty of one of the lesser offenses.” Mosley, 418 So.3d at 1172 (emphasis added). However, the Strickland standard requires a “substantial,” not just “conceivable,” likelihood of a different result. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). That is, to show prejudice and succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland, a defendant must show “that there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that he would have prevailed on his [intoxication] defense had he pursued it.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 127, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (emphasis added). The court of appeal's conclusion that a different outcome “was possible” but for counsel's error falls short of the “reasonable probability” of a different result required under Strickland.³

As such, we reverse the court of appeal's ruling and reinstate defendant's conviction and sentence. Defendant may urge his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in future post-conviction proceedings, subject to the applicable procedural requirements. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 924 et seq.

REVERSED; CONVICTION AND SENTENCE REINSTATED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The court of appeal succinctly found this assignment of error lacked merit.

2.   In finding counsel erred here, the court of appeal assumes that the defense's trial strategy focused on a voluntary intoxication defense to negate the specific intent element of attempted second degree murder. However, counsel never explicitly identified the intended strategy, and defendant took the stand and testified under oath that he did not stab the victim. Such sworn testimony is generally incompatible with an intoxication defense, which relies on a showing that the defendant was so intoxicated as to preclude formation of the specific intent required by the charged offense. R.S. 14:15(2); State v. Massey, 436 So.2d 522, 525 (La. 1983); State v. Burge, 362 So.2d 1371, 1376 (La. 1978).

3.   Since evaluating defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires evidence of the defense's intended trial strategy, the claim would be more properly addressed on collateral review, where an evidentiary hearing would allow defendant the opportunity to show whether persuasive evidence of his intoxication was excluded at trial by counsel's failure to preserve the defense. See, e.g., State v. Deville, 2022-0350 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/23/22), 354 So.3d 99 (relegating to post-conviction relief an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to raise an intoxication/specific intent defense, as a full evidentiary hearing was needed for counsel to testify regarding trial strategy); see generally State v. Burkhalter, 428 So.2d 449, 456 (La. 1983); State v. Seiss, 428 So.2d 444, 449 (La. 1983).

Griffin, J., dissents and would deny. Guidry, J., dissents and would deny