CROCKETT v. STATE (2026)

ORDER

Considering the urgent need to provide a definitive resolution to prevent further confusion, and pursuant to this court's plenary supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts under La. Const. Art. V, § 5(A),

IT IS ORDERED that this Court immediately assumes jurisdiction over the proceedings in the above captioned cases. The district courts are ordered to immediately transfer the records of these cases to this Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall brief the following questions of law: “Does Act 15 of the 2026 Regular Session (“Act 15”), insofar as it abolishes the office of clerk of court for the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans, violate any provisions of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Louisiana?” and “Does the enactment of Act 15 create a vacancy in any office requiring the May 11, 2026 actions by the City of New Orleans?”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the brief of the State of Louisiana, as applicant, Chelsey Napoleon, and any party in support of Act 15 or against the City's actions of May 11, 2026, shall be due on May 18, 2026. The brief of Gary Crockett, as respondent, Calvin Johnson, the City of New Orleans defendants, and any other party opposing Act 15 or in favor of the City's actions shall be due on May 22, 2026.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the trial court in Docket C-778244 shall maintain the currently scheduled hearing for Monday May 18, 2026, which shall not be continued, and immediately thereafter, without ruling, transfer the record of that proceeding to this Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that except as expressly provided under this Order any and all litigation in any state court in Louisiana related to the application, interpretation, or constitutionality of Act 15 is hereby stayed pending the final disposition of this matter by this Court.

Based on the presumption of constitutionality afforded to all legislative acts, Act 15 should be applied unless and until this Court determines that it is unconstitutional, therefore, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Temporary Restraining Order is hereby issued preventing Calvin Johnson from executing any duties pursuant to his appointment by the New Orleans City Council. Furthermore, no official shall interfere with the legal authority of plaintiff, Chelsey Napoleon, to act pursuant to Act 15 pending the final disposition of this matter by this Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will consider any motions for intervention pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1091 if filed at least 48 hours prior to the deadline for the filing of briefs for the side that the movant seeks to support.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this _ day of May 2026.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ _

CHIEF JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

I additionally concur in the order.

I have always been reluctant to exercise the plenary authority of the Supreme Court, as evidenced in decisions I have written, decisions I have joined, and decisions from which I dissented.¹

This court must resolve complex issues to provide a final resolution for the parties involved. Occasionally, this court must do so promptly. Because of respect for the dedicated judges of the lower courts, and the established judicial process, plenary authority should be exercised on a cautionary and an extremely limited basis.

This matter now calls for such action. There are suits in separate judicial districts and jurisdictions, an election on the horizon, and no less than three individuals claiming the same office ² –an office that must process critically important documents impacting both civil and criminal issues and perform a host of other tasks, such as conducting an election.

A final decision is required that cannot be delayed regarding who will be in charge of operating this local office, which impacts many matters critical to a properly functioning civil and criminal justice system, as well as the electoral process. As such, the responsibility of this court is to resolve the legal issues presented expeditiously and effectively.

The decision to resolve this matter now should not be perceived as favoring one side or another; rather, this action has become necessary to promptly perform the tasks the court is constitutionally assigned–not to determine “winners or losers,” but to resolve matters impartially by deciding issues based on the law and the facts before the court without regard to politics, partisanship, or personalities. Ultimately, this court's role is to provide finality and closure to the disputes that come before it. There is no question this matter will eventually come before this court. The time to act is now.

I concur in this Court's order exercising its plenary supervisory jurisdiction. This is an important question that must ultimately be answered by this Court with all due expediency.

Notwithstanding that a member of my family is employed by the Orleans Parish Clerk's Office, I have reviewed the laws relevant to disclosure and recusal and determined that neither is mandated. See La. C.C.P. arts. 151 and 152. However, in the spirit of full disclosure, I hereby provide my notice of non-recusal in these matters.

The most egregious and outrageous aspect of the majority's order is not simply it taking the unique, rare, premature and extraordinarily overreaching step on its own motion in assuming jurisdiction of this matter, but it is the appearance of prejudging the matter by ordering a temporary injunction in the same order. The majority relies on the presumption of constitutionality to issue the injunction but fails to allow the parties an opportunity to make a record in the trial court in order that we can determine whether the presumption has been rebutted. By issuing the injunction before the hearing in the trial court, we put the cart before the horse and call into question whether a majority of this court has made up its mind before we have even seen the evidence. We should never judge a thing before its time. We should be judicious in our exercise of authority. Before this court issues an injunction, a hearing should be held in the trial court to allow the parties in our adversarial system to do their job—to make a record in support of or in opposition to the issuance of such an order. A trial judge and an intermediate appellate court should be allowed to make a decision that is then reviewed by this court before we issue an injunction. Instead, the majority acts in the same order in which it grabs jurisdiction, before any party has even sought to invoke our jurisdiction in this particular case, and before we have reviewed a record, read a brief, or held oral argument.

The majority simply acts because it feels it can. However, just because you think you have the unfettered power to do something, does not mean you should. Might does not equal right. I find this to be an audacious and ill-advised activist move that undermines the rule of law. We are supposed to be neutral arbiters akin to an umpire calling balls and strikes, yet before the first pitch has been made, the majority embarks on a jurisdictional power grab and thereby walks one player all the way to home plate. Our state's highest court calls three strikes on the other player by granting injunctive relief against him. Let the players have their time at bat and let us simply call the game. We should not get caught up in the moment and lose our moral authority under the guise of exercising our plenary authority. Unlike the political branches of our government, we do not wield the sword, but we provide the shield to protect the rights of our citizenry. Our only currency is that the citizens maintain confidence in the judicial process and those of us who put on the black robe.

When courts deviate from their normal procedures, particularly in highly politicized cases, it undermines public confidence in the judiciary.¹ Ends can be tainted by the means employed to reach them—process matters. The citizens of New Orleans went through the electoral process to elect the candidate of their choice to be the criminal district court clerk and the legislative and executive branches went through their process to enact the statute in question. We are now called upon to resolve the resulting dispute. To ensure that all sides can have confidence in the results we reach and in our judicial system, we must follow our normal process for exercising our jurisdiction by allowing for full briefing and oral arguments before we reach any conclusions. Further, if this matter is as important as the majority says it is, then we should not rush to judgment. We ought to ensure transparency by allowing oral argument, which is inexplicably not provided for in the current order.

This is the people's courthouse. It should always be open for them to have their matters handled—not in our conference room that is closed to the public, but in an open courtroom that is accessible and provides a forum for public scrutiny of what we do. Justice has to be even handed, transparent, predictable, and accessible to all. Anything less undermines the integrity and independence of the judiciary. For these reasons I cannot remain silent, nor will I be complicit and therefore, I dissent from the order issued today by the majority.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “The supervisory authority of this court is plenary, unfettered by jurisdictional requirements, and exercisable at the complete discretion of the court.” Marionneaux v. Hines, 05-1191, p. 4 (La. 5/12/05), 902 So.2d 373, 376. “This court can intervene under its own plenary supervisory powers, whether or not lower courts have acted on the matter.” Id. The court has long recognized that the exercise of this authority is warranted only when “the issues presented were of an extraordinary nature, time-sensitive, and of such significant public interest that the court's plenary, supervisory jurisdiction should be exercised.” State v. All Prop. & Cas. Ins. Carriers Authorized & Licensed To Do Bus. In State, 2006-2030 (La. 8/25/06), 937 So. 2d 313, 318. See also Clark v. State, 2020-00914 (La. 7/21/20), 347 So. 3d 640, and Cantrell v. State, 2020-00915 (La. 7/21/20), 347 So. 3d 644. This case clearly meets that standard.

2.   A Louisiana version of the ancient proverb is “too many cooks spoil the roux,” as opposed to the broth.

1.   See Calhoun v. Landry, 25-00316 (La. 3/18/25), 403 So.3d 521 (Guidry, J., dissenting); Scott v. Louisiana State Police, 24-01591 (La. 1/9/25), 398 So.3d 634 (Weimer, C.J., dissenting); Crockett v. State of Louisiana, 26-0594 (La. May 10, 2026) (order granting stay) (Weimer, C.J., dissenting) (Guidry, J., dissenting).

Weimer, C.J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. Griffin, J., concurs and assigns reasons. Guidry, J., dissents and assigns reasons.