STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CAROL NOLAND SALTZMAN AND ROBYN LITTLE DAVIS (2023)

Writ application granted. See per curiam.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 22-KP-1329

STATE OF LOUISIANA

v.

CAROL NOLAND SALTZMAN, ET AL

ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF CALCASIEU

PER CURIAM:

Writ granted. Defendants have adequately demonstrated that their applications for post-conviction relief, arguing several alleged violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), overcome the procedural bar of La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A) by proving application of the exception found in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A)(1)—”the facts upon which the claim is predicated were not known to the petitioner[s] or [their] prior attorneys” and they “exercised diligence in attempting to discover any post conviction claims that may exist.” The matter is remanded to the district court for further consideration of the merits of their claims.

On remand, if the district court determines that the factual and legal issues can be resolved upon the application and answer, and supporting documents submitted by either party or available to the court, it may grant or deny relief without further proceedings. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 929(A). Otherwise, the court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 930(A).

I concur in the majority's ruling that defendants have demonstrated that their applications for post-conviction relief overcome the procedural bar of La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A) based on “newly discovered evidence.” I dissent, however, to the degree the opinion permits the district court to determine that the case may be resolved upon the pleadings. In my view, a case of this importance requires an evidentiary hearing pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 930, to examine the merits of defendants’ claims that the State violated its obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

I also write separately to address the district court's dismissal of defendants’ post-conviction applications, in part, on the ground that defense counsel failed to diligently seek out items of evidence the defendants now rely upon to support their Brady claims. In this case, the state employed an ostensible open file discovery procedure. The district court found that defense counsel had an affirmative duty to file motions to obtain or otherwise request items of evidence that they knew existed. This ruling, however, does not take into account two significant facts. First, although the assistant district attorney testified that he instructed his investigators to provide the defense with full access to the state's files, the authorization he signed for that access explicitly excluded access to offense reports and witness statements.¹ Second, the district court's suggestion that defense counsel should have filed motions to access the witness statements overlooks the fact that the trial occurred before the 2013 overhaul of the criminal discovery rules. In 2013, the legislature passed Acts 2013, No. 250, which provided for La.C.Cr.P. art. 716(D)² to allow defendants to motion for access to witness statements within the control of the state. This rule did not exist at the time of defendants’ trial in 2012.

Furthermore, it is well-settled that prosecutors have a duty to learn of any exculpatory evidence known to the state and disclose this information to the defense. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1567–68, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). I am troubled by what appears to be a delegation of this solemn duty to employees of the sheriff's office. That said, I acknowledge that the record, at this stage, is not entirely clear as to the mechanics of the discovery procedures employed in this case. Accordingly, I believe this case requires a full evidentiary hearing to address the merits of defendants’ post-conviction claims for relief.

Finally, following the evidentiary hearing, I would order the district court to provide written reasons for its judgment consistent with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.1.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The final paragraph of the authorization provides,THE ABOVE AUTHORIZATION DOES NOT AUTHORIZE YOU TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT, THROUGH HIS (sic) ATTORNEY, TO VIEW, COPY, INSPECT OR REVIEW THE OFFENSE REPORTS OR STATEMENTS, EXCEPT STATEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT, ROBYN B. LITTLE DAVIS AS WELL AS STATEMENTS OF CO-ACTORS CAROL N. SALTZMAN, PREPARED IN CONNECTION WITH THIS CASE BY YOUR OFFICE CONCERNING ABOVE DEFENDANT.(all capitals in original).

2.   See Acts 2013, No. 250, effective to cases billed or indicted on or after January 1, 2014. La.C.Cr.P. art. 716(D) provides,D. Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall order the district attorney to disclose to the defendant, and to permit or authorize the defendant to inspect and copy any written or recorded statements of any witness the state intends to call in its case in chief at the trial. ․ The state need not provide the defendant any written or recorded statement of its witnesses until immediately prior to the opening statement at trial.

Crichton, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons. Griffin, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for reasons assigned by Justice Crichton.