JAMES MIDDLETON HUGER v. STEPHANIE GOLIWAS HUGER (2023)

Writ application denied.

I would grant and docket this matter to study the factual and legal questions before the Court. Most notably, this matter involves the proper interpretation of La. C.C. art. 113(A), where the former wife of the community alleges that amounts advanced were interim spousal support, not an advance of community property. This Court is called upon to address multiple fact-intensive issues in this matter, including whether the extension of the period set forth in La. C.C. art. 113(A) is for good cause and the proper classifications of the amounts advanced. In such context deference to the district court, which reviewed the analysis and report of a Special Master appointed to this case, is appropriate. See Ross v. Ross, 02-2984, p. 18 (La. 10/21/03), 857 So.2d 384, 395. Accordingly, I would grant and docket to provide an opportunity for thorough review of the record as well as additional time and study of the legal issues before the Court.

James Huger and Stephanie Huger deferred the classification of certain disputed payments made to Stephanie as either interim support or an advance on community property until after such time the payments were made. A special master determined that these payments were interim support. The trial court agreed and the court of appeal affirmed. I would grant this writ to consider: (1) whether law of the case doctrine applies as to the payments issue in this case and; (2) whether a spouse's subsequent financial success can effectively serve as a basis to increase and extend interim support over what is required to maintain a supported spouse's standard of living.¹

Specifically, as to the second point, the Civil Code provides that a “court may award a party interim spousal support based on the needs of that party, the ability of the other party to pay, any interim or final child support obligation, and the standard of living of the parties during the marriage.” La. C.C. art. 113. The purpose of interim support is to maintain the status quo enjoyed during the marriage while the divorce is pending. Hight v. Hight, 17-0566, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/13/17), 234 So.3d 1143, 1147. “[T]he needs of the claimant spouse have been defined as the total amount sufficient to maintain that spouse in a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed prior to the separation, limited only by the other spouse's ability to pay.” Lambert v. Lambert, 06-2399, p. 11 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/23/07), 960 So. 2d 921, 929. Under the result reached by the lower courts, a spouse will ostensibly be responsible for increasing financial obligations to his or her former spouse the more successful the payor spouse becomes regardless of whether this far exceeds the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Such a windfall is inconsistent with both the plain language of the Civil Code and jurisprudence.

FOOTNOTES

1.   I also express concern over whether a spouse can file for an “extension” of support if they were not at that time receiving interim support.

Crichton, J., would grant and docket and assigns reasons. Genovese, J., would grant for reasons assigned by Justice Griffin. Griffin, J., would grant and assigns reasons.