STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CHARLES RAY THOMPSON (2023)

I respectfully dissent because I find that defendant has failed to meet his burden of proving, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2, that he was prejudiced by his counsel's performance.

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United States Supreme Court provided the following standard for determining whether a conviction must be reversed because of ineffective assistance of counsel:

A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (emphasis added). This is a two-pronged showing, and to obtain relief, both deficient performance and prejudice must be established. Failure to prove either element is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Pretermitting the majority's conclusion that deficient performance on the part of counsel was demonstrated, I find that defendant failed to offer sufficient proof to establish that he suffered prejudice as a result of any alleged errors on the part of his counsel. The sentence defendant received was mandatory life without parole as a third felony offender where the third felony and the two prior felonies were violations of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b)(2014). The trial court was required to depart downward from that sentence only if defendant showed that the sentence was excessive as applied to him. State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1281 (La. 1993); State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 677. As explained in Johnson, to rebut the presumption that the mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional, the defendant was required to clearly and convincingly show that he “is exceptional, which in this context means that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case.” Johnson, 97-1906, 709 So.2d at 676 (quoting State v. Young, 94-1636, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/26/95), 663 So.2d 525, 528 (Plotkin, J., concurring)).

Here, defendant alleges that if his counsel had investigated and presented the evidence in a motion to reconsider sentence, his family members would have testified that he has had a life-long struggle with drugs. In my view, such testimony is simply not sufficient to demonstrate that defendant is the “exceptional” defendant who is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense and the circumstances of the case, especially given the specific facts of this case (and each of these cases must be evaluated under their own unique facts). Indeed the most “exceptional” fact about defendant that appears in the record is the length and breadth of his criminal record. Before committing the instant offense, defendant had been convicted of illegal discharge of a firearm (pleaded down from attempted first-degree murder) and had been arrested for aggravated battery against his girlfriend, a charge which was ultimately dismissed when his girlfriend refused to cooperate with the prosecution. Defendant has also pled guilty to the offense of simple assault and resisting an officer. He has convictions of both petty drug offenses (marijuana) and serious drug offenses (cocaine–distribution, possession). Although offered rehabilitative services, he was uncooperative and ultimately “failed out” of drug court.

While defendant's prior convictions are primarily non-violent drug offenses, it cannot be overlooked that defendant's current conviction is for distribution of cocaine and for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Apparently, his dangerousness has escalated: he is a drug dealer who had a weapon while peddling potential death and addiction. Through his conduct, defendant has demonstrated that he simply cannot follow the laws enacted to protect society from those who deal drugs. The fact of his own addiction, standing alone, does not demonstrate that defendant is the “exceptional” defendant whose life sentence was excessive under the particular facts presented and whose circumstances would have required the trial court to impose a less harsh sentence. Unless he has found and demonstrated redemption in prison, which is better evaluated in pardon or parole proceedings, a court should not act to extricate defendant from the predicament he created for himself.

Therefore, I find that defendant failed to prove prejudice as a result of counsel's alleged deficient performance and, as a result, that he failed to meet his burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.

WEIMER, C.J., dissenting.