DUCOTE v. MAGETTE (2022)

Writ application not considered. Not timely filed. See per curiam.

Pretermitting the merits, we find this application is untimely. The court of appeal denied the plaintiff's writ on February 3, 2022 and mailed notice of judgment to all parties on the same day. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(a),¹ any application to this court was due on or before Monday, March 7, 2022. This application was e-filed with this court on Thursday, June 23, 2022, over three months after the delay expired.

Accordingly, we decline to consider the application.²

Attorneys, who are educated in the law and are called upon to interpret the laws on a client's behalf, are uniquely postured to serve as legislators. As members of the legislature, attorneys can play an important role in drafting legislation and have an overall understanding of how the body of law is impacted by changes in one area of the law. The role that an attorney-legislator plays in the lawmaking process has been historically significant.

In the role of a legislator, an attorney is called upon to zealously represent their constituents, while at the same time representing clients. The simultaneous representation of constituents and clients during a legislative session presents many challenges for an attorney-legislator.

Simultaneously, judges are responsible for controlling their dockets and for case management. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1631(A) provides:

The court has the power to require that the proceedings shall be conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner, and to control the proceedings at the trial, so that justice is done.

Judges also have inherent power to take reasonable actions to control their dockets. See Galloway v. Ioppolo, 464 So.2d 386, 389 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1985). A trial judge has broad discretion in regulating pre-trial discovery, which discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. Bell v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., 06-1538, pp. 3-4 (La. 2/22/07), 950 So.2d 654, 656.

The importance of striking a balance in this regard is challenging, but necessary. Towards that end, the legislature enacted La. R.S. 13:4163, which sets forth the procedural requirements for invoking a peremptory legislative continuance or extension of various proceedings, including civil cases. City of Baton Rouge v. R.G. Claitor's Realty, 17-0827, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/29/17), 241 So.3d 351, 353. Subsection A of Section 4163 provides that the legislative continuance or extension “shall be sought by written motion specifically alleging” the grounds for the continuance. Id., 17-0827 at p. 8, 241 So.3d at 356. Furthermore, Subsection E of Section 4163 sets forth time limitations for the filing of the motion for a legislative continuance or extension. As indicated in the per curiam, “there is no indication counsel has [sought to invoke, by written motion,] these provisions in connection with his filing in this court.” Ducote v. Magette, op. 22-00996, p. –––– n.2 (La. 6/29/22), ––– So.3d at –––– n.2.

Louisiana R.S. 13:4163 “provides a peremptory ground for a continuance if a party or his attorney is a member of the legislature and the presence, participation, or involvement of the legislator is required in any capacity” during a legislative session. City of Baton Rouge, 17-0827 at p. 8, 241 So.3d at 356; La. R.S. 13:4163(C)(1). However, nothing in the statute provides for the automatic suspension of the tolling of the period for applying for supervisory review by this court under La. C.C.P. art. 2166 and Louisiana Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(a). See id. (which involved the tolling of the period of abandonment under La. R.S. 48:452.1). Judges, who are all attorneys, must appreciate the hardship placed on an attorney-legislator in maintaining a law practice during a legislative session. Louisiana R.S. 13:4163 requires that certain procedures be followed in asserting the peremptory legislative continuance and/or extension. See id. In the absence of a timely written motion, this court is not free to disregard the deadline imposed by the law and a court rule for applying for supervisory review by this court, assuming that La. R.S. 13:4163 even applies to issues related to the finality of judgments. See La. C.C.P. art. 2166(C); La. Sup. Ct. R. X, § 5(a); City of Baton Rouge, 17-0827 at p. 8 n.4, 241 So.3d at 356 n.4. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the refusal to consider this writ application as it was not timely filed.

The concept of comity counsels that the members of the judicial branch and the legislative branch respect the role each has in our system of democracy and work together, whenever possible, without yielding judicial or legislative independence, to serve the public.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(a) provides in pertinent part:An application seeking to review a judgment of the court of appeal either after an appeal to that court, or after that court has granted relief on an application for supervisory writs (but not when the court has merely granted an application for purposes of further consideration), or after a denial of an application, shall be made within thirty days of the mailing of the notice of the original judgment of the court of appeal; however, if a timely application for rehearing has been filed in the court of appeal in those instances where a rehearing is allowed, the application shall be made within thirty days of the mailing of the notice of denial of rehearing or the judgment on rehearing. No extension of time therefor will be granted.

2.   We are cognizant that plaintiff's counsel serves in the Louisiana Legislature and the subject matter of the writ application involves an interpretation of the legislative continuance provisions set forth in La. R.S. 13:4163. However, there is no indication counsel has invoked these provisions in connection with his filing in this court, nor did he seek any extension within the original thirty-day deadline for applying for supervisory review under La. Code Civ. P. art. 2166 and Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(a). Moreover, we note La. R.S. 13:4163(F) provides the legislative continuance provisions “shall not apply to cases in the Supreme Court of Louisiana․”

Weimer, C.J., concurs and assigns reasons.