SUCCESSION OF MECHE v. << (2022)

Writ application denied.

The lower courts' decisions focused on the merits of this case; namely, whether Ms. Cochran, as the beneficiary of the account and life insurance policies at issue, was legally entitled to their proceeds. However, the issue before the courts was whether Ms. Straube had a right of action as the succession representative to file the Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Damages. A peremptory exception of no right of action determines whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the suit. Miller v. Thibeaux, 2014-1107, pp. 5 -6 (La. 1/28/15), 159 So. 3d 426, 430. For purposes of the exception, all well-pleaded facts in the petition must be taken as true. Id.

Here, a review of the Petition reflects the allegations that Ms. Cochran waived her right to the proceeds of the account and policies, that Ms. Cochran “wrongfully obtained [the] proceeds,” and that the succession is entitled to the return of the proceeds. Although the Petition suggests that Ms. Cochran remained the beneficiary of the account and policies,¹ there is no specific allegation of this fact. Nor does it appear that evidence was introduced at the hearing demonstrating that Ms. Cochran remained the named beneficiary of the policies or account.²

A succession representative is the proper party to exercise rights of ownership in the assets of a deceased and to sue to enforce a right of the deceased. Samson Contour Energy E & P, L.L.C. v. Smith, 49,494 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/29/14), 175 So. 3d 967, 975; Horrell v. Horrell, 1999-1093 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/6/00), 808 So. 2d 363, 370. This includes the right to seek the return of property improperly taken from the estate. See, e.g., In re Succession of Hunt, 47,372 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/20/12), 135 So. 3d 654, 659. Here, the petition seeks the return of estate assets it alleges were improperly taken. Assuming the allegations of the Petition to be true, as we must, Ms. Straube would have a right of action to pursue the return of estate assets allegedly wrongfully taken. In my view, although the lower courts' findings that Ms. Cochran is entitled to the various proceeds appear legally sound, the courts erred in addressing the merits of this case by considering evidence not before them (the beneficiary designations).

Although I find error in the lower courts' reasoning, I believe the writ application likely reaches the correct result and lacks Rule X considerations. Accordingly, and for the further reason of promoting judicial economy, I concur in the majority's decision to deny the writ application.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Petition alleged that Ms. Straube, as the succession representative, is “entitled [in the alternative] to judgment declaring any designation of [Ms. Cochran] as beneficiary” to the policies and account “to be invalid.”

2.   “If the pleadings state a right of action in the plaintiff, the exceptor may introduce evidence to controvert the pleadings on the trial of the exception, and the plaintiff may introduce evidence to controvert any objections.” Howard v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 2007-2224, pp. 16-17 (La. 7/1/08), 986 So. 2d 47, 59.

McCallum, J., concurs and assigns reasons.