LANGLINAIS v. UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA (2020)

Writ application granted. See per curiam.

In this matter, defendants seek review of a judgment of the court of appeal which reversed the judgment of the district court denying plaintiffs’ motion to recuse Judge Marilyn Castle. Pretermitting the merits of the recusal motion, we find the motion was untimely.

Timeliness of a motion to recuse is governed by La. Code Civ. P. art. 154, which provides, in pertinent part, “[t]his motion shall be filed prior to trial or hearing unless the party discovers the facts constituting the ground for recusation thereafter, in which event it shall be filed immediately after these facts are discovered, but prior to judgment.” In Radcliffe 10, LLC v. Zip Tube Sys. of Louisiana, 2006-0128 (La. 11/3/06), 942 So.2d 1071, 1074, we explained, “[t]he clear intent of the statute is to allow the motion to recuse when the party discovers facts constituting grounds for recusal.”

In the instant case, the sole basis for plaintiffs’ motion to recuse was a campaign advertisement which was published in 2016 by the Committee to Elect Judge Marilyn Castle and mentioned plaintiffs’ counsel. Plaintiffs’ counsel admit they were aware of this advertisement in April 2018, when they first filed their suit and it was randomly allotted to Judge Castle, but they did not seek her recusal at that time. Plaintiffs’ counsel further participated in a hearing on exceptions before Judge Castle in January 2019, but again did not file a motion to recuse. Plaintiffs’ motion to recuse was not filed until June 28, 2019, over a year after suit was filed, and nearly three years after the advertisement in question was published.

Under these circumstances, the district court hearing the motion to recuse properly denied the motion on timeliness grounds. The court of appeal erred in reversing this judgment.

Accordingly, the writ is granted. The judgment of the court of appeal is reversed, and the judgment of the district court denying the motion to recuse Judge Marilyn Castle is reinstated. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

I agree with the majority, for the reasons set forth in the per curiam, that the motion in this matter was untimely filed. I write separately to note that this application would have otherwise presented an appealing opportunity to explore the significant question presented as to whether the probability of a judge's actual bias is deemed too high – regardless of testimony or evidence to the contrary – merely because a judge referenced campaign contributions made by a party's attorney to the judge's opponent in a past campaign advertisement. See Glob. Mktg. Sols., L.L.C. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2019-01886 (La. 2/10/20), ––– So.3d ––––, 2020 WL 770318 (finding under similar facts that “[a] campaign mailer such as the one at issue here cannot – and should not – be the basis of recusal. ․ The majority's decision to grant recusation under these circumstances, notwithstanding [the subject judge's] sworn statement, is misguided, if not patently wrong, as neither federal case law or state law requires it.”) (Crichton, J., dissenting).

Weimer, J., would grant docket. Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. Crain, J., additionally concurs for the reasons assigned by Justice Crichton. Genovese, J., recused.