SIMON v. FARM BUREAU INSURANCE CO (2020)

Writ application denied.

In this case, the plaintiff was rear-ended by a vehicle owned and operated by Jeffrey Doughty, whom the defendants stipulated was at fault for the accident. I find that the court of appeal erred in granting plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that Doughty was not working as an independent contractor on the date of the accident and that Beta Land Services, Inc. (“Beta”), was vicariously liable for Doughty's actions as his employer. In my view, genuine issues of material fact remain which preclude summary judgment in favor of either party on this issue.

Whether Beta is vicariously liable for Doughty's actions turns on whether Doughty was acting as an independent contractor or as an employee of Beta at the time of the accident. Hickman v. Southern Pacific Transport Co., 262 La. 102, 262 So.2d 385 (La. 1972). It is undisputed that Doughty had gone to a Beta location just prior to the accident to clean out an office there and that he was bringing items from that office to Beta's main location at the time the collision occurred. The evidence also reflects that Doughty was working as a landman for Beta pursuant to a contract entitled “Independent Landman Consulting Agreement.” However, the court of appeal correctly noted that the mere designation of Doughty as an “independent contractor” in that contract is not determinative of the relationship between Doughty and Beta for purposes of liability to third parties. As this Court stated in Hickman, whether the relationship between Doughty and Beta was, in substance, that of an independent contractor to his principal or of a “mere servant” to his employer must “be determined from the contract between them and from their intentions in establishing and carrying out that relationship as manifested in its performance and the surrounding circumstances.” Id. at 390.

In its writ application, Beta vigorously disputes the court of appeal's interpretation of the scope of Doughty's contract, as well as his deposition testimony regarding the degree of control that Beta had over the means by which Doughty accomplished his work. In short, determining whether an independent contractor/principal relationship between Doughty and Beta existed will require the trier of fact to interpret and weigh the relevant evidence and make a judgment call regarding the totality of the circumstances. Thus, material issues of genuine fact remain, and this issue is clearly inappropriate for summary judgment. La.C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeal's grant of the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and remand this case for further proceedings.

Crichton, J., would grant. Genovese, J., would grant and assigns reasons. Crain, J., would grant.